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A PHILOSOPHIC thinker of the first rank is always
known by the amount of literature which his
writings call forth. Descartes, Locke, Spinoza,
Hume, Kant, Hegel these in their respective
spheres were epoch-makers. From the philosophic
germs which they scattered have sprung whole
libraries of controversial literature. In like manner
Mr. Herbert Spencer has paid the penalty of his
great philosophic fame. As an epoch-maker, he,
too, has had to pass through the fire of hostile
criticism. For a great number of years his philo
sophy has been the battle-ground of controversialists
who, differing in many ways among themselves,
have united in their attempts to discredit a system
of thought which threatened to destroy long-
cherished opinions and stereotyped beliefs. One
result of this has been that to the general public
the Synthetic Philosophy, embedded as it has been
in the works of critics, has necessarily appeared inVI
a fragmentary form. My object in writing this
book has been to present to the general reader
Spencerism in lucid, coherent shape. Nothing can
take the place of Mr. Spencer s own writings, but
mastery of these demands an amount of leisure
and philosophic enthusiasm which are by no means
widespread.
Until after the first negotiations had been entered
upon for the publication of this work Mr. Spencer
was unaware that it was in contemplation, but since
he has been informed of my design I have had his
approval. I must add that Mr. Spencer has not seen
a sentence of this work before publication, either
in manuscript or in proof. He has been anxious
that I should not be influenced by any criticisms he
might pass. He has taken a kindly interest in the
undertaking, and responded to my request for certain
materials. The book is by no means a slavish re
production of Mr. Spencer s writings. Taking my
stand upon the fundamental ideas of the Synthetic
Philosophy, I have used them in my own way to
interpret and illustrate the great evolutionary
process. While, therefore, Mr. Spencer has been
in full sympathy with the aim of the book, he does
not stand committed to the detailed treatment of
the subject. The work has indeed been a labourPREFACE vii
of love. Should it induce the reader to study
Spencerism as expounded by the master himself,
my reward will be ample.
I should be lacking in gratitude did I not
express my obligations to the elaborate work of
Mr. John Fiske, entitled Outlines of Cosmic
Philosophy. No student of Spencer can afford to
neglect Mr. Fiske s book, which it would be difficult
to rival in point of lucidity and intellectual ability.
I am also indebted to Professor Hudson of California
for his admirable book, Introduction to the Philo
sophy of Herbert Spencer. In the philosophic and
economic parts of the book, I have drawn upon a
few paragraphs in my Thomas Carlyle and Adam
Smith. Knowledge of a philosopher s system of
thought is greatly helped by knowledge of the
philosopher himself, and in this respect I have
been exceedingly fortunate. The recollection of
my personal relations with Mr. Spencer will ever
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EARLY LIFE
CARLYLE has remarked that the history of the world
is in the main the history of its great men. There
is profound truth in the saying, though in his anti
pathy to a purely scientific treatment of civilisation
Carlyle used his great man theory in fantastic and
misleading fashion. The intellectual contribution
which each century makes to the progress of the
world takes its hue from the dominating influence
of its leading thinkers. True greatness is epoch-
making. If we wish to discover the place of a
thinker in the great evolutionary chain, we must
apply
th&quot;* epoch-making test. The mind of the
great mail is like an overflowing reservoir which
makes for itself new channels and fertilises hitherto
unknown tracts of thought. Or to use a biological
simile, the sociological effects produced by the great
man resemble the changes caused in the fauna and
flora of a country by the introduction of a new
species. Think of the impoverishment which history
would sustain by the obliteration of the names, say,
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of Paul, Augustine, Calvin. Those thinkers not only
unlocked new forces in their day and generation,
but even yet from their tombs they hold sway over
the minds of countless thousands. Their specula
tions formed the creeds of centuries, and their
passionate and yearning musings upon human life
and destiny find echo in the souls of some of the
noblest of earth s sons. When the long night of
authority and credulity was drawing to a close,
when the sun of inquiry was dawning above the
horizon, great thinkers arose who, from the moun
tain-tops of science, foresaw the meridian glory
of the Age of Reason.
After the splendid work of Mr. John Morley, it
is superfluous to dwell upon the achievements in
the cause of enlightenment of the intellectual heroes
of the Revolution epoch. The great constructive
systems of the past had not only fallen before the
assault of Reason, but had become cumberers of
the ground. The decaying creeds of the past not
only impeded the progress of thought, but were a
barrier to social amelioration. Paths had to be
cut through the jungle, and, in the name of
humanity, abuses hoary with the sanctity of re
ligion had to be attacked. For the pioneering work
accomplished, humanity is everlastingly debtor to
the bold thinkers of the Revolution epoch. Not
content with the work of destruction, they set
themselves to the task of construction. HumanityEARLY LIFE 3
cannot live on negation. Through the writings of
Voltaire, Diderot, and the Encyclopaedists may be
detected attempts to formulate a conception of
man and his destiny which would take the place
of the theologic conception which in pre-scientiflc
times had done duty for ages as man s attempt to
solve the problem of Existence ; indeed the idea
of the Encyclopaedia rose out of the feeling that
destruction needed to be supplanted by painstaking
attempts to attain to a comprehensive, coherent
theory of life, in which humanity would find at
once intellectual satisfaction and emotional har
mony. Out of dissatisfaction with mere negation
grew not only the Encyclopaedia, but the imposing
systems of Holbach and Helvetius. The time was
not ripe for imposing philosophic systems, for the
simple reason that knowledge of the universe and
man had not gone far enough to be organised on
a scientific basis. No system can endure which
rests on premature generalisations and unverified
speculations; unconsciously the Rationalists of the
Revolution imported into their creed-making the
unreliable methods of the Theologians. Still their
failure on the constructive side should not lessen
our admiration for the splendid work they did as
liberators of humanity. They loosened the hold of
decaying creeds; they cleared the dense forest of
thought ; they pointed the way to the promised
land of mental freedom and social progress.4 HERBERT SPENCER
After the French Revolution had spent its force,
progressive thinkers became alive to the purely
destructive nature of that movement on the in
tellectual side. Among them was Comte a thinker
whose great merits have not had adequate re
cognition. Comte had the true sign of greatness
intellectual vision. He was not content, like
Hume and analytic thinkers generally, to resign
himself to the gloom of the forest, or to smother the
ever-recurring thoughts of man and his destiny in
the petty butterfly attractions of an Epicurean
philosophy. His great ambition was to provide a
path and an ideal by which humanity would march
boldly on to the expansive uplands and heights of
truth. Comte s methods were distasteful to his
English readers. His colossal egoism, his prefer
ence for mediseval modes of thought, and his
disparagement of individual liberty and reason, set
on edge the critical teeth of many who sympathised
with his high-souled endeavours. Destructive critics
like Huxley used Comte in order to make sport for
the Philistines. The fatal blow to Comte s influence
came from the new idea of Evolution, which wrecked
his p ilosophic system as it did the systems of Buckle
and Mill. All three thinkers found themselves
stranded because of their inability to incorporate
the n w views which were to revolutionise philoso
phical as well as scientific thought. Still, in spite
of the ridicule of Huxley and the contemptuousI
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treatment accorded to him in Prance and England,
Comte deserves to be held in remembrance as a
thinker of fine calibre, prophetic vision, fertile
thought, and massiveness of mind.
The dominating idea of the last half of the nine
teenth century is Evolution an idea so far-reaching
in its influence, so mesmeric in its power, that at
its touch all other ideas crystallise round it and, as
if by magic, yield to its potent sway. The thinker
with whom history will imperishably associate the
idea of Evolution is Herbert Spencer. Perhaps in
no sphere has the influence of the Evolution theory
been more indirectly potent than in biography. So
long as man was treated as an extra-mundane
creation there was a natural tendency to concen
trate attention upon the dramatic and incalculable
side of his nature. Emphasis was laid upon the
inner psychical factors to the exclusion of those
physical conditions which play such a prominent
part in human development. Great men, in the
language of Carlyle, were messengers of the Eternal
messengers who so dominated their environment
as to baffle all attempts at explanation and classi
fication. Ignorance of the law of evolution natur
ally led to an unintelligent hero-worship which
blinded the intellect to the subtle relations existing
between man and his surroundings. Herbert Spencer
changed all that. His Principles of Bioloyy fore
shadowed a conception of biography in which the6 HERBERT SPENCER
great man would no longer be viewed as an incom
prehensible incarnation of supernatural energy, but
as the product of certain interpretable forces.
Between the average man and the great man the
difference is mainly this the one remains passive,
while the other, as has been already said, reacts
upon his environment, thereby unlocking new forces
and giving a fresh impetus to progress. In coming
to the study of Herbert Spencer, we cannot do
better than use for purposes of biographic inter
pretation his own far-reaching principles. Before
seeking to understand Spencer the philosopher, it is
necessary to understand Spencer the man. A critical
estimate can only lay claim to completeness when
a picture is given of the philosopher as influenced
by his age as well as dominating his age. If the
title of great is due to those rare souls who have
scaled the heights of human thought, and from the
Pisgah summit have pointed the way to intellectual
horizons undiscoverable by ordinary mortals, upon
the brow of Herbert Spencer must be placed the
never-fading wreath of immortality.
Herbert Spencer was born at Derby on 27th April
1820. Spencer, like Mill, owed much to his father,
but the educational methods pursued were very
different indeed. James Mill had an almost
fanatical belief in education. One of the tenets of
the eighteenth-century philosophy was the modifia-
bility of human nature, and the value of systematicEARLY LIFE 7
training. James Mill put his son into training
at the earliest possible moment ; and for years
subjected him to a severe course of mental discip
line. The elder Spencer, in his own way as intel
lectually independent as James Mill, took a more
rational view of education. He did not deem it
the highest wisdom to force children into an
artificial groove; he preferred to trust to the
spontaneity of nature. In his view cramming of
the memory with bits of detached knowledge was
of little value compared with thorough mental
individuality. Being a teacher by profession, the
elder Spencer was in a position to give full sway
to his ideas. To this, and not, as has been supposed,
to delicate health, was it that young Spencer was
somewhat backward in his early education. He was
seven years of age before he could read. In due
course the boy was sent to a training day-school,
but his progress was not particularly satisfactory.
He did not take kindly to the routine of school life.
He is described as having been restless, inattentive,
and by no means pliable. In all lessons in which
success depended upon mechanical methods, such
as learning by rote, young Spencer did not show to
advantage. Knowledge of the fragmentary kind he
did not readily assimilate ; it was only when his ob
serving and reasoning faculties were called into play
that intellectual progress was discernible. Nature
appealed to him more forcibly than books. Science8 HERBERT SPENCER
in his youthful days exercised over him a special
charm. One of his favourite occupations is said to
have been the catching and preserving of insects
and the rearing of moths and butterflies from egg
through larva and chrysalis to their most developed
forms.
To his domestic surroundings, more than to his
formal school training, the boy was indebted for
his mental development. His father and uncles
were men of pronounced individualities, bold
thinkers on religion, politics, and social questions
generally. In the family circle young Spencer
heard all the topics of the day discussed with free
dom and boldness. Such an atmosphere was fatal
to that hereditary reliance upon authority character
istic of average middle-class homes. Moreover, the
boy was early taught to think for himself in matters
religious by the example of dissent which he
witnessed weekly in his own home. His parents
were originally Methodists, but his father had a
preference for the Quakers, while his mother re
mained true to the Wesleyan persuasion. On Sun
day mornings young Spencer attended the Quakers
meeting with his father, and in the evening he
accompanied his mother to the Methodist chapel.
Thus early the future philosopher had to reckon
with the personal equation, the domestic bias in
matters theological. There is nothing in Mr.
Spencer s writings to show that religion had everI
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taken vital hold of him, as it did some of his noted
contemporaries. Mill has left on record how he
grew up outside of religious influences. His father
deliberately kept him from contact with religion on
its emotional and ceremonial side. In that case
Mill s detachment of mind on religious questions
was intelligible ; but, in regard to Spencer, the
curious thing was that, while moving in the midst
of religious influences, he seems to have remained
totally unaffected by them. One would have ex
pected to find him, like George Eliot, under the
sway of those spiritual ideals and impulses which
were inseparably associated with middle-class
Evangelicalism in the first half of the century.
In conversation I once asked Mr. Spencer if, like
George Eliot, he had first accepted the orthodox
creed, then doubted, and finally rejected it. His
reply was that to him it never appealed. It was
not a case of acceptance and rejection: his mind
lay outside of it from the first.
In many ways both Mill and Spencer would have
found their philosophic influence broadened and
deepened had they, in their early days, shared in
the spiritual experiences of their contemporaries.
Those thinkers who, under the domination of youth
ful enthusiasm, have endeavoured to realise super
natural ideals and, under emotional fervour, to strike
the note of ascetic sanctity, receive an almost
intuitive insight into the deeper religious problems10 HERBERT SPENCER
of the age an insight denied those who come to
the study of religious psychology with the footrule
of the logician and the weighing-scales of the
statistician. Many students who have long since
broken away from the bonds of orthodoxy, and
whose minds now soar into the ampler air of
speculative freedom, will be ready to admit that in
dealing with religion the minds of both Mill and
Spencer work under serious limitations, due to their
lack of spiritual receptivity in early days. To this
lack of receptivity must be traced the error into
which Mr. Spencer fell in his First Principles in
supposing that science and religion would find a
basis of agreement in recognition of the Unknowable.
The terms proposed by science resemble those of the
husband who suggested to the wife, as a basis of
future harmony, that he should take the inside of
the house and she the outside.
When young Spencer reached his thirteenth year,
the question of his future came up for serious con
sideration. It was deemed wise to trust him to the
educational care of his uncle, the Rev. Thomas
Spencer, perpetual curate at Hinton, near Bath.
The Rev. Mr. Spencer was a Radical in politics, a
temperance advocate, an anti-corn law agitator,
and an enthusiastic advocate of all measures relating
to the welfare of the people a man, in brief, whose
life was shortened by unsparing devotion to ideals
which are now recognised as realisable, but whichEARLY LIFE 11
then were treated as the products of a Quixotic
mind. The reverend gentleman, himself a dis
tinguished graduate of Cambridge, naturally set
himself to qualify his nephew for a university
career. His nephew s mind, however, was not cast
in the university mould. In his interesting
biographic sketch of Herbert Spencer, Professor
Hudson sums up very concisely the progress made
during this period :
* The course of study now
pursued was somewhat more regular and definite
than had been the case at home ; and the dis
cipline was of a more rigorous character. But
save for this the uncle s method and system did not
materially differ from those to which young Spencer
had been accustomed while under his father s roof.
Once again his successes and his failures in the
various studies which he now took up were alike
significant. In the classic languages to which a
portion of his time was daily given very little
progress was made. The boy showed neither taste
nor aptitude in this direction ; rules and vocabularies
proved perpetual stumbling-blocks to him ; and what
little was with difficulty committed to memory was
almost as soon forgotten. But while for studies
of this class there was shown an inaptitude
almost astounding, a counterbalancing aptitude was
exhibited for studies demanding a different kind of
ability constructive and co-ordinating power rather
than a memory for unconnected details. In mathe-12 HERBERT SPENCER
matics and mechanics such rapid advancement was
made that he soon placed himself in these depart
ments abreast of fellow-students much older than
himself. What was noticeable, too, was his early
habit of laying hold of essential principles, and his
ever-growing tendency towards independent analysis
and exploration.
Close study of his nephew s mind led the Rev. Mr.
Spencer to abandon the idea of a university career.
It has been represented that his uncle was emphatic
upon the necessity of a university training, and only
reluctantly gave up the idea in consequence of the
nephew s obstinacy ; but I have it on Mr. Spencer s
authority that this was not the case. In his own
words : There was no dispute. My uncle gave up
the idea when he saw that I was unfit. That is to
say, it became clear to the Rev. Mr. Spencer that
the mind of his nephew was of a type which could
not be fitted into the university mould. He saw
that it would follow a bent of its own, and would
not be forced into conventional channels. Much has
been said of the loss which Spencer has sustained
through exclusion from the atmosphere and training
of university life. In dealing with exceptional minds,
whose evolution is pre-determined along original
lines by innate capacity and genius, no good purpose
is served by appealing to general rules, which from
the nature of the case can deal only with the
expected and the calculable, not with those out-EARLY LIFE 13
standing individualities which defy the ordinary
laws of averages and probabilities. One drawback
certainly was attached to Spencer s exclusion from
university life. He was compelled to face not only
a hostile public, but the insidious opposition of
university cliques, who could not bear to see a new
thinker of commanding power step forward into the
intellectual arena without the hall-mark of uni
versity culture. Had Spencer been the centre of an
admiring group of university disciples, his system
would have come into vogue much earlier ; it would,
in other words, have become fashionable. As it
was, after the gradual decay of home-made philoso
phies, Hegel became the idol of university circles,
and Spencer was left, a voice crying in the wilder
ness. Notwithstanding all this, Spencer gained more
than he lost by missing the conventional university
training. However reluctant the Rev. Mr. Spencer
was to abandon his deeply-cherished design, he
admitted in after-years that in following the prompt
ings of nature his nephew had acted wisely. He
doubtless saw that the very qualities which unfitted
his nephew for the routine of a classical curriculum
were precisely the qualities which gave him his
great superiority in science and philosophy. A
grinding in dead languages and a saturation in old-
world methods and ideas might have seriously
checked the faculties for observation and massive
generalisation which, when left to develop naturally,14 HERBERT SPENCER
have made their possessor an unrivalled king in
quite a new intellectual sphere, in which stand in
unique conjunction the widest speculative thought
and unparalleled analytic power.
The abandonment of the university design led
to a period of uncertainty as to young Spencer s
future. He returned home. The practical outlook
seemed vague and uncertain. In the absence of
any well-defined plan, his father secured him an
assistantship in a school. The teaching profession
was one in which Spencer might well have shone
provided the curriculum were framed on a rational
and scientific basis. As a teacher he would have
found himself out of sympathy with modern systems,
and sooner or later his career would have been
cut short. One quality invaluable in a teacher he
possessed in a pre-eminent degree that of luminous
exposition. Those who have had the privilege of
conversing with Mr. Spencer have been at once
struck with the marvellous lucidity of his handling
of the most abstruse topics. Into ordinary con
versation he carries the habits of thought and
exposition which other men usually leave behind in
the study. There is no pedantry, no formalism :
sweep of thought, clearness in statement, fertility
of illustration, and lucidity of exposition, are wedded
to conversational charm. This expository power
struck John Stuart Mill forcibly in his first inter
view with Spencer. A friend of Mill once told meI
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of Mill s admiration for Spencer s power of present
ing a full-orbed view of his subject in language
at once precise and luminous. It is plain that
Spencer would have made an ideal teacher. How
ever, circumstances rather than design cut short
his pedagogic career. In the autumn of 1837 young
Spencer, whose early bent was towards science,
especially on the mathematical and mechanical
sides, received and accepted an offer from the
resident engineer of the London division of the
London and Birmingham railway, then in process
of construction. For a year and a half he worked
in London as a civil engineer, and subsequently,
for two and a half years, on the Birmingham and
Gloucester railway. During this time he showed
his interest in the intellectual side of his profes
sion by contributing several papers to the Civil
Engineer Journal, and his inventive faculties
found scope in the invention of a little instru
ment called the velocimeter, for calculating the
speed of locomotive engines. Again his life-
plan was destined to be changed. After eight
years at civil engineering, young Spencer was
brought face to face with a crisis by the disasters
which followed upon the great railway mania. In
the reaction which followed, Spencer, with other
young men similarly situated, suffered. The demand
for new railways fell off, and consequently the de
mand for civil engineers. At the age of twenty-six16 HERBERT SPENCER
Spencer had to begin the world afresh. He re
turned to his home in Derby. Meanwhile Spencer s
mind had been branching out in other quarters
besides civil engineering. He was musing upon
political philosophy and science. In 1842 he con
tributed to a paper called The Nonconformist
a series of articles on The Proper Sphere of
Government. These, after due season, appeared
later in pamphlet form. In his home retreat
at Derby his mind was still further matured
by reading and thinking. Man, however, does not
live by thought alone, so it behoved Spencer to turn
his attention to the bread-and-butter side of life.
He cast his eyes toward journalism, and after a
miscellaneous period he was, in 1848, in his own
words, invited to take the position of sub-editor
of the Economist newspaper. This post he held
till 1853. In London he got his feet on the first
rung of the ladder of fame. The history of his
long, toilsome, and heroic ascent is mainly the
record of the various stages of his mind in the
conception and elaboration of that vast system
of thought with which his name is imperishably
associated.CHAPTER II
INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT
WHILE engaged in the work of a civil engineer, and
before he settled in London, Spencer was quietly
pondering over the great intellectual problems of
the time. Naturally he was led by his fondness for
science to study the highest authorities in the vari
ous departments. At the age of twenty he began
to study Lyell s Principles of Geology. Without
demur he accepted the development as opposed
to the special creation theory of the earth and man,
though like the rest of his contemporaries he could
not trace the process in its detail, nor understand
its nature. In order to follow the evolution of
young Spencer s mind it will be necessary to describe
the intellectual environment in which it moved in
those early days.
The early years of the century were years of
great fermentation, theological, philosophic, political,
and social. The practical energies of the nation,
freed from the great strain of the continental wars,
found new outlet in the spheres of commerce and
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industry. Scientific study of nature, no longer
tabooed by theology, demonstrated its utility by an
imposing record of inventions and discoveries, whose
influence on the national prosperity was at once
dramatic and all-embracing. Such a transformation
of the industrial and social order could not take
place without exerting a potent influence upon the
higher thought of the time. Science, which in the
practical sphere had achieved colossal triumphs, and
given man power over nature, could not but be
greatly influenced by the new forces which it had
called into existence. Science, as the worker of
miracles, became the idol of the hour : at its shrine
the popular as well as the cultured intelligence of
the day worshipped fervently. The printing-press
teemed with books for the diffusion of useful
knowledge, while to the more highly cultured the
British Association, established in the first half of
the century, proved itself a veritable Mecca. The
union between science and industry had one effect
discoveries, inventions, and theories came pell-mell,
to the utter confusion of the methodical thinker,
with his desire to reduce his intellectual knowledge
to something like order. In the whirl of practical
details, thought in the wide and comprehensive
sense was paralysed ; the wood could not be seen
for the trees. In the midst of the jubilation over
the advance of discovery, in the midst of the
eulogiums over the material victories which ScienceINTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 19
had brought in its train, there were those who
remembered that man does not live by facts alone,
those who are ever ready to string facts on the
thread of philosophic or scientific generalisations.
Since the days of Bacon and his Novum Oryanum,
thinkers have cherished the ambition to discover
knowledge by the slow but sure methods of science,
and to weave that knowledge into one comprehensive
whole.
It soon became evident that a new theory of man
and his relation to the Universe was following in the
wake of science and its discoveries. In Scotland,
the theological spirit, much as it wished, could
not prevent the reading public from being influenced
by such books as Combe s Constitution of Man, and
the famous Vestiges of Creation. On the Continent
the same spirit of scientific inquiry and theorising
was abroad. This desire of science not to remain
content with looking upon nature as a huge museum
in which the highest aim was duly to ticket and
label phenomena, found expression in Humboldt s
Cosmos, which appeared in 1845. About the same
time appeared Whewell s History and Philosophy
of the Inductive Sciences, which was intended to
be the continuation of the work of Bacon renovated
according to our advanced intellectual position and
office. A thinker of the type of Whewell labours
under one distinct disadvantage while he is
engaged upon ultimate generalisations, discoveries20 HERBERT SPENCER
are being made which may knock away the founda
tion of his entire cosmical structure. This was
precisely the fate of Whewell. As Merz says in his
valuable work on European Thouylit : In the year
1857, the date of the publication of the latest
editions of Whewell s works, nothing was popularly
known of energy, its conservation and dissipation,
nothing of the variation of species and the evolution
of organic forms, nothing of the mechanical theory
of heat or that of gases, of absolute measurements
and absolute temperature ; even the cellular theory
seems to have been popular only in Germany. And
yet all the problems denoted by these now popular
terms were then occupying, or had for many years
occupied, the attention of the leading thinkers of
that period. But we find no mention of them in
Whewell s Works. Still, Whewell did great service
to the cause of scientific thought. His was a bold
attempt to reduce to something like coherence the
confused mass of scientific knowledge. Underlying
the book was the idea of the organic unity of the
sciences; and if he failed to realise his ideal, the
reason lay not in his lack of insight, but in the fact
that scientists had not then discovered by observa
tion and experiment the marvellous unity of nature.
The next great impetus to scientific thought
came from Oomte. In the history of scientific
thought the name of Auguste Comte will always
occupy an honoured place. It is customary toINTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 21
belittle Comte on account of his vagaries in
connection with the Religion of Humanity, but
we must not allow his fa!
1
ings to blind us to
the great work he did in the sphere of scientific
thought. Science, as has been pointed out, had
a bewildering effect upon the average mind. Along
with the material blessings which came in its
train, Science had incidentally come forward as a
rival to Theology, as an interpreter of Man and the
Universe. In the minds of many people, even
thinkers of the calibre of Faraday, the theological
and scientific conceptions lived comfortably side by
side. But studious readers of the signs of the times
had come to the conclusion that Theology and
Science were deadly rivals, yet perplexity existed
as to how they were related in the history of
thought and speculation. It was the merit of
Comte to attempt to show the position which
Theology, Metaphysics, and Science hold in the
progress of humanity. Whether or not we agree
with his famous law of the three stages, this, at
least, must be conceded Comte by his law has
rendered luminous a large tract of history which,
in the hands of the average historian, had been a
perfect maze. In a rough sort of way we do get
a fruitful view of human progress when we say with
Comte that Theology failed in its interpretation
of the Universe, because it busied itself with
personal causes, while Metaphysics also went wide22 HERBERT SPENCER
of the mark because it dealt in entities, whereas
Science has been fruitful in so far as it has confined
itself to the study of phenomena on the lines of
observation and experiment. In the purely scientific
sphere, Comte did great service in his efforts to
show that progress does not take place at haphazard,
as a superficial student of the history of discoveries
and inventions is apt to think, but that through
the seemingly aimless growth of science there is
traceable a definite law. Before Comte the various
sciences were treated as so many distinct branches
of man s knowledge of nature. Any classification
which existed was of an artificial kind. For this
Comte substituted a classification which had the
note of organic unity. The sciences, according to
him, are six in number: Mathematics, Astronomy,
Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Sociology. The
merit claimed for this arrangement by Comte is that
the order of their classification is the order in which
the sciences have been evolved the order in which
they have passed from the theological or meta
physical into the scientific stage. If we wish to
learn how far scientific conceptions are gaining
ground, we have a fairly reliable method if we
apply the Comtean classification. In Mathematics,
Astronomy, and Physics, the scientific method pure
and simple has long held sway. It is not, however,
long since Chemistry and Biology were at the
metaphysical stage, with its
*
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such like entities, while in the region of Sociology
prayers for success of war, for industrial prosperity,
etc., show unmistakable signs of the theological
stage.
Valuable as was the work of Comte, it was
vitiated by one great defect. In his antipathy to
the study of causes, he was led to confuse two
things which are quite distinct final or theological,
and efficient or mechanical cause. The result of
this was that he refused to trace his six sciences to
a common root. All attempts to get behind pheno
mena, even to the subtle laws and forces which
seemed to be the key to phenomena, were ruthlessly
opposed by Comte. As Lester F. Ward, an Ameri
can writer, puts it: Among the most lamented of
Oomte s vagaries is his uncompromising hostility to
all the modern hypotheses respecting the nature of
light, heat, electricity, etc. He classed all these
along with gravitation, and declared that all the
efforts expended in the vain search after origin,
nature, or cause were simply squandered. These
agencies, according to him, were merely phenomena,
and were to be studied only as such. The imaginary
interstellar ether was an ontological conception or
a metaphysical entity to be classed along with
phlogiston and all the spirits of the laboratory and
the imaginary occupants of the bodies of men,
animals, and inanimate objects. The undulatory
theory of light was no better than the emission24 HERBERT SPENCER
theory, and both equally vain attempts to know
what from the nature of things can not be known.
In fact, the domain of the unknowable in Oomte s
philosophy was enormous in its extent, and when
we contemplate the little that was left for man
to do we almost wonder how he should have re
garded it worth the labour of writing so large a
work. The amount of mischief which this one
glaring fallacy accomplished for Comte s system of
Positivism, insinuating itself into every chapter,
and more or less vitiating the real truths contained
in the work, was so great as to give considerable
colour to the claim that pure Comtism, if it could
be made to prevail and exert its legitimate influence
upon human inquiry in the future, would so far
cripple every department of science as to throw it
back into mediaeval stagnation. For it would strike
a fatal blow at all true progress in human know
ledge by crushing out the very spirit of inquiry,
and would quench all interest in phenomena them
selves by prohibiting the search after the springs
and sources the causes of the phenomena which
furnish the true life and soul of scientific research.
Comte failed to realise his ideal, for a reason
which explains the slow progress that has hitherto
been made in the great task of formulating a
scientific philosophy of the Universe. For this two
things are needed vast accumulation of facts and
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but a passion for facts is simply an intellectual
hodman, whose relation to the philosophical scientist
is that of a bricklayer s labourer to the architect.
On the other hand, great speculative power work
ing upon imperfect knowledge leads often to sheer
absurdity. Witness Germany with its natural philo
sophy. The ideal condition is one in which fact
and theory go hand-in-hand. Comte came as near
as was possible in his day to providing a scientific
key to Nature. All that was needed was for Comte
to discover and formulate the law of unity, which,
like a golden thread, runs through his six sciences.
For logical purposes, it is necessary to treat the
various sciences as if they stood for separate in
dependent classes of facts in Nature, but the dis
coveries which were taking place just at the close
of Comte s career substituted the dynamic for the
statical conception of Nature. Herbert Spencer
profited by the new conception of Nature of which
Comte was unable to take advantage. From the
point of view of the scientific thinker, the dominat
ing fact of the century may be defined as a new
conception of Nature. Until Spencer began to write,
the conception of Nature was that of a colossal
machine, the various parts of which were specially
manufactured to fit into their respective places.
Unity, of course, there was, but the unity was in
the mind of the Supernatural Mechanic, not in the
material of which the machine was constructed.26 HERBERT SPENCER
Alike in the works of scientists and theologians of
the early century, we find a total absence of the
thought of organic unity as applied to the Cosmos.
Not only did the thinkers of the time fail to hit
upon the great fact of the unity of the Cosmos,
but they had resigned themselves to the view that
it was impossible to make such a discovery. Caught
in the meshes of a false philosophic method, the
philosophers of the Rational school placed an arbi
trary limit to speculation. Mill s Logic was the
text-book of the school. Mill s admiration of Comte
finds explanation in the fact that the great French
man had carried the method of induction in inter
pretation of the Universe to what seemed to be its
utmost limit. According to Mill, knowledge resolves
itself into a recognition of particulars. What we
call a law is simply a recorded observation that
phenomena follow each other in a regular order.
There is no inherent necessity that phenomena
should be inter-related. Comte s law of the sciences
determined nothing as to the necessary relations
between the six sciences which he named : all that
could be said was that the human mind in the course
of its progress came to a knowledge of the sciences
in the way indicated by Comte. Mill, like Comte,
considered that scientific men were going beyond
the inductions of experience when they endeavoured
to attribute to Nature any kind of inherent regularity
and necessity. Hence his remark that in some afterINTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 27
planet the axiom that two and two make four might
not hold. With Mill a scientific philosophy had done
its work when it revealed the existence of a number
of apparently permanent laws whose inter-relations
were undiscoverable, and upon which the regularity
of the Cosmos depended. Mill s conception of the
world was that of a collection of facts grasped by
the mind by virtue of the law of association facts
existing by no inherent necessity, but resting in the
last analysis on the arbitrary and the accidental.
In our Cosmos these facts exist in one way : else
where the connection might be totally different.
Thus, as Taine puts it, the Experiential philosophy,
the philosophy which plumed itself upon refusing
to go a step beyond Induction, ends in an abyss
of chance, an abyss of ignorance.
Here we have the explanation of Mill s curious
attitude to religion, as revealed in his posthumous
essays. At bottom Mill s conception was that of
Theology, with its postulation of an unknown cause
which at any time may reveal itself in an arbitrary
manner. Mill was bound to admit that things need
not necessarily exist in the connection in which
we now find them. At any moment the connection
might be severed; consequently he was driven to
admit that the question of miracles really turned on
the question of evidence. We find the same
curious sympathy with theological conceptions in
Huxley, who was constantly throwing a sop to the28 HERBERT SPENCER
theologians, in the admission that he was quite
ready to believe the most profound mysteries in
religion, if the evidence were forthcoming, on the
ground that Science contains as many mysteries as
anything to be found in Theology. In other words,
Huxley, like Mill, contended that it was not pos
sible to detect in Nature any facts held together
by necessity. Oomte, Mill, and Huxley never got
beyond the interpretative standpoint of Hume, whose
Agnosticism, it should be remembered, extended to
science as well as to theology. We shall see later
that Spencer s contribution to a scientific conception
of the Universe consisted in going beyond Hume,
Comte, and Mill, in the direction of including all
generalisations under one generalisation, and in
supplementing the inductive method by the deduc
tive, thereby demonstrating the necessary and
organic unity of the Cosmos. So much for the
scientific conceptions of the Universe which were
prevalent among advanced thinkers when Spencer
began to study science in a broad and comprehensive
manner. Along with the scientific was the philo
sophic conception, which also formed one of the
factors in his intellectual environment.
The French Revolution will always remain a land
mark in modern history. If the student of history
desires to understand the lines of modern thought
and life, he must go back to that great political and
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Revolution exhausted its influence mainly in the
sphere of public activity. In all departments its
reactionary effect was felt, and in none more so than
in Philosophy. What do we mean by Philosophy?
The answer to that will be easier when we consider
what is meant by Science. Science has been defined
as the systematisation of our knowledge of phe
nomena. In a word, Science deals with the modes
of existence ; Philosophy with the nature of exist
ence. It is clear that the conceptions which
Philosophy forms of the nature of existence will
react powerfully on the conception which Science
will form of the modes of existence. Assume that
Matter is the ultimate fact, and you are logically
committed to a materialistic conception of Mind and
of Society a conception which must have far-
reaching influence upon individual and social evolu
tion. If we wish, then, to find the key to the
development of the nineteenth century, we must go
back and try to discover the philosophical concep
tions which dominated the previous era. The
apostles of the Age of Reason adopted Materialism
as their philosophic creed. Voltaire and Rousseau
were Deists, but the influential party in revolutionary
circles were undoubtedly Materialists. The creed
of Diderot and his apostles was summed up in
Holbach s famous System of Nature, in which every
thing, from the movements of the solar masses to
the movements of the soul, was interpreted in30
terms of matter. Even before the Revolution the
dreariness of the French philosophy struck the
highest minds of the time with a kind of despair.
Thus Goethe says : The materialistic theory which
reduces all things to matter and motion appeared
to me so grey, so Cimmerian, and so dead, that we
shuddered at it as at a ghost.
Its downfall was inevitable when the Age of
Reason ended in a carnival of diabolism. As George
Henry Lewes puts it: The reaction against the
philosophy of the eighteenth century was less a
reaction against a doctrine proved to be incompetent
than against a doctrine believed to be the source of
frightful immorality. The reaction was vigorous,
because it was animated by the horror which agi
tated Europe at the excesses of the French Revolu
tion. Associated in men s minds with the saturnalia
of the Terror, the philosophic opinions of Condillac,
Diderot, and Cabanis were held responsible for the
crimes of the Convention ; and what might be true
in those opinions was flung aside with what was
false, without discrimination, without analysis, in
fierce, impetuous disgust. Every opinion which had
what was called a taint of Materialism, or seemed
to point in that direction, was denounced as an
opinion unnecessary, leading to the destruction of
all religion, morality, and government. In the
reaction which followed the French Revolution, we
have a vivid illustration of the close connection31
which exists between philosophy and everyday life.
The sudden contempt into which Materialism fell
may be taken as an instinctive, though irrational,
testimony to the intimate relation which exists
between abstract thought and concrete life. It may
be taken for granted that the conceptions which
people form of the Universe and of their relation to
it will largely influence the nature of the social bond.
Morality and human ideals generally cannot remain
unaffected by theories which make Matter or Spirit
the root-principle of the great cosmical scheme.
In Holbach s System of Nature we have the
materialistic theory worked out logically into a com
prehensive ethical and sociological creed. In the
famous French Encyclopaedia of Sciences Materialism
had formal embodiment as a system of philosophy.
Nature was viewed simply as a piece of mechanism,
man as the product of a complex molecular arrange
ment, mind the development of animal sensations,
morality as a phase of self-interest, religion as a
product of emotional hallucination, and government
as an ingenious arrangement between despotic
kings and designing priests to keep the people
in slavery. When the crash came it was natural
that the whole scheme of Materialistic Philosophy
should totter to the ground. What was to take
its place ?
Naturally thinkers looked around for a set of first
principles which would give repose to their minds32 HERBERT SPENOER
as well as stability to the social system. The
Catholic section, headed by de Maistre; the Royalists,
inspired by Chateaubriand ; and the Metaphysicians,
stimulated by the Eclectic School of Cousin, united
their forces against Materialism. For a time
Eclecticism held the field, but the work of construc
tion both in Prance and Britain needed a new set
of first principles which neither nation could supply.
The constructive principles were imported from
Germany. The Germans Kant, Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel attacked the problem of Existence from
the spiritual instead of from the material side. To
the Materialists, French and English, of the Revolu
tion school, the Germans said that the great mystery
of Being was insoluble by mechanical methods.
Reduce Matter, they said, to its constituent
atoms and you fail to seize the principle of life ; it
evades you like a spirit. With the Germans
especially Hegel Cosmology and Psychology grew
naturally out of Ontology : Nature and Man were
incarnations of the Absolute. Coleridge and Car-
lyle, in their own peculiar ways, vigorously com
bated the Materialistic Philosophy with its denial
of necessary truth, its repudiation of religion, and
its substitution of Utilitarianism for a moral sense.
What Carlyle and Coleridge did for the cultured
class generally Sir William Hamilton did for the
purely philosophic section. Though one part of his
philosophy the doctrine of the Relativity of Know-I
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ledge lias been used in the interests of Agnosticism,
the general drift of his influence was anti-material
istic. How formidable a foe he was may be judged
by the elaborate attempt of Mill to discredit
Hamilton as an authority. The contrast between
the two philosophies is well put by Mill in his essay
on Coleridge. Mill says : The German-Coleridgian
doctrine expresses the revolt of the human mind
against the philosophy of the eighteenth century.
It is ontological, because that was experimental;
conservative, because that was innovative ; religious,
because that was abstract and metaphysical ; poeti
cal, because that was matter-of-fact and prosaic.
Political circumstances were soon to lead to a re
vival of the Experiential as opposed to the Intui
tive school, the school of Hume, Diderot, and Mill,
as opposed to Kant and his British interpreters.
With the peace of 1815 the old despotism, under the
name of the Holy Alliance, began to press heavily
upon Europe. People forgot the evils of Anarchy
under pressure of present despotism. Institutions
which were looked upon as refuges from the Revolu
tionary storm were now used as prison-houses for
the free spirit of man. A philosophy which tended
to prop up existing institutions, to justify existing
beliefs, and, when questioned, to fall back upon
innate ideas, intuitions of the mind such a philo
sophy became the natural target of thinkers of
reforming proclivities. It was not without reason
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that the political Radicals of the early years of
the century were bitter opponents of the Intuitive
school. Mill senior, and Bentham, did much to pave
the way for the revival of Empiricism, but the philo
sopher of the sect was John Stuart Mill.
In Mill s hands Empiricism lost its old fanaticism.
So long as a thinker of materialistic tendencies
never gets beyond the popular ideas of Matter he
will have no difficulty in finding in experience a
steadfast ground of certainty. But Mill was too
well versed in psychology, was too acute a thinker,
to find repose in the materialism of the old school.
By sheer stress of logic, Mill was driven close to
Hume s position by his definition of Matter as a
permanent possibility of sensation, and Mind as a
permanent possibility of feeling. With such a hesi
tating and uncertain cosmological and psychological
creed, it is easy to understand Mill s contention
that in science there is no such thing as necessary
truth ; in ethics no such thing as moral intuition ;
and in politics no such thing as authoritative belief:
over every department hangs a cloud of uncertainty.
In his remarkably suggestive book on British philo
sophy, Professor Masson puts this characteristic of
Mill s whole philosophy very well when he says
:
Mr. Mill s logic corresponds with what the science
of logic could alone be consistently with his funda
mental psychological principle. It could not be like
the old logic and Hamilton s logic, a science of theINTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 35
necessary laws of thought, but only a science of
the method of quest after experimental truth or
probability. So in his fine essay on liberty the
radical idea is that one can never be surer of any
thing, be it even the forty-seventh proposition of
the first book of Euclid, than in proportion as the
chances of contradiction are exhausted ; and the
high value set thus upon human freedom, and even
upon eccentricity of thought and action, seems to
be grounded on the conviction that the human race
can never know what it may attain to in the shape
either of knowledge or of power, until it has sent
out a rush of the largest number of individual
energies simultaneously, and with the least restraint
from law or custom, in all directions. As for the
essay on Utilitarianism, it is expressly a restatement
of Paley s and Bentham s theory of expediency as
the sole possible foundation of morals, but with a
suggestion of this higher and more exquisite defini
tion of expediency characteristic of Mr. Mill, that
it means the largest possible amount of pleasure,
and the least possible amount of pain, not to
you or me or this age or all mankind only, but to
the sum-total of sentient existence. In short, if I
am not mistaken, Mr. Mill s writings prove that
if he thinks of any one particular mode of thought
among his contemporaries as being more than any
other chargeable with the total mass of obstruction,
fallacy, and misery that yet rolls in the heart of36 HERBERT SPENCER
society, as being more than any other the False God
or Baal or Moloch of the human mind it is the
theory of necessary beliefs.
In all this Mill was thoroughly consistent. Having
failed to discover any inherent necessity in the
Cosmos, he was unable to find any such necessity
in the mind of man. Effective enough in its polemic
against the reigning Intuitionalism as represented
by Hamilton, Empiricism, even in the hands of an
acute thinker like Mill, was incapable of returning
satisfactory answers to the fundamental problems
of Psychology. In regard to the root-question,
that relating to the constitution and function of the
mind, Mill remained virtually at the position of
Locke. With Mill, as with Locke, the mind was a
blank sheet of paper, upon which, by means of the
law of association, experience was duly registered
and transformed into coherent knowledge. In such
a system there was no room for a priori ideas ; all
was traceable to experience. So far good, but
experience showed that in the mind certain beliefs
impressed themselves with an intuitive force and
an absoluteness which found no explanation in
the experience of the individual. The axioms of
geometry and of causality were not reached by the
individual through a purely inductive process. How
were these to be explained? Before Empiricism
could give a rational answer to this question it had
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evolutionary idea. In Psychology as in Cosmology
Spencer s contribution was so original as to trans
form the old Experiential system of Mill, and bring
to an end the long-standing feud between the
Intuitionalists and the Experientialists. That will
be explained in all detail later. Meanwhile, it was
necessary, in order to understand the revolution
worked by Spencer in philosophy, to have a clear
conception of the problems which came before him
for solution.CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF THE EVOLUTION THEORY
IT is a mistake to suppose that when he began
his studies Spencer set himself consciously and
deliberately to discover the unifying root of Nature s
multiform manifestations. At first his mind was
mainly directed to questions of a politico-social
nature. In the early years of the century, political
thinkers were greatly exercised about Government,
its nature and limits. Brought up in a democratic
circle, inheriting the traditions of Liberalism on the
side of religious dissent and political Radicalism, it
was natural that Spencer s early thoughts should
run in a sociological direction. Ever in search of
first principles, it was also natural that he should
endeavour to seek the scientific basis of Govern
ment. As the earliest products of his thinking, his
letters on The Proper Sphere of Government, pub
lished in the Nonconformist newspaper in 1842, and
republished in pamphlet form in 1843, demand
attention. In these letters we find emphatic
insistence on the view that social phenomena con-I
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form to invariable laws : the ethical progress of
man as due to social discipline, the spontaneous
nature of society, with a consequent discourage
ment of State interference and control. Not satis
fied with his treatment of the subject, Mr. Spencer
resolved to deal with it on a more comprehensive
scale. In 1850 appeared Social Statics, the object
of which was to base his practical views of the
nature and scope of Government on a coherent set
of first principles. At a later stage of the present
work, when dealing with Sociology, an attempt will
be made to show the nature of Spencer s con
tributions to political science as compared with the
speculations of previous thinkers from Locke to
Mill. Meanwhile, in tracing the evolution of Mr.
Spencer s mind, it is necessary to point out that
in Social Statics are to be found the germs of those
pregnant speculations which were to lead to the
far-reaching cosmical generalisation which, like a
magnet, gathers to itself the scattered detached
fragments of scientific thought.
In Social Statics we find Mr. Spencer giving
expression to his dissatisfaction with the prevailing
school of political thought, with which he was, on
the practical side, in close sympathy namely, the
Utilitarian school. He felt that on the philosophic
side Utilitarianism, as defined by Bentham and his
followers, lacked theoretic stability. Spencer set
himself to ask and answer the questions What is40 HERBERT SPENCER
society? and What are the relations between man
the unit and society the mass? In harmony with
their fundamental principle, the Utilitarians founded
their conception of society on Induction. Men,
they recognised, all made happiness the goal of
their endeavour. Society is composed of numbers
of men in search of happiness ; consequently the
highest type of society would be one in which the
greatest number of its members enjoyed the greatest
amount of happiness.
Here, as in science and philosophy, the school of
Bentham and Mill displayed the arbitrary nature
of their fundamental principle. No attempt was
made to demonstrate the necessary connection
between individual and social happiness and the
general laws of life. Man was viewed from the
statical standpoint. Human nature was treated
after the style of the eighteenth century philo
sophers as a stable product. Human nature is
everywhere the same, summed up the eighteenth
century point of view. The evils of society were
held to be due to bad governments. Let legisla
tion aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, and all will go well. Now such a mode
of reasoning did not commend itself to Spencer.
He argued that before an all-embracing social law
can be legislatively formulated, we must first dis
cover what society is, and how man the unit stands
related to society. We must not rest content withEVOLUTION OP EVOLUTION THEORY 41
induction : we must discover the necessary bond
between the unit and the mass. And when that is
accomplished, we may be in a position to deduce
the necessary laws of that relationship. Manifestly
at the outset an answer had to be given to this
question Is society a natural or an artificial pro
duct ? The rationalist thinkers of the eighteenth
century favoured the view that society was an
artificial product.
Rousseau, with his famous theory of a state of
nature, simply gave expression in exaggerated form
to the idea generally entertained that society was
largely the result of manufacture, of deliberate
design, too often the outcome of base motives.
Governments held an exaggerated importance in
the minds, not only of the eighteenth century
thinkers, but also of the school of Philosophic
Radicals the Mills and the Benthams. Even John
Stuart Mill, in his book on Representative Govern
ment, shows traces of this view by his constant
anxiety lest, in the absence of political checks and
counterchecks, society should proceed along wrong
lines. Society, until Spencer wrote his Social
Statics, was viewed almost exclusively from the
political side. Spencer changed the point of view
from the political to the biological. It is a common
objection to the Spencerian system of thought that
it is simply a revival in modern times of the
a priori methods of the Schoolmen a kind of42 HERBERT SPENCER
materialistic Hegelism in which facts are made to
flt a preconceived theoretic framework. Nothing
could be further from the truth. I confess myself
to have held some such view. With many others
I supposed that Spencer had started consciously
with a vast cosinical theory, and had then explored
the realm of science for illustrations and verifica
tions. In conversation Mr. Spencer assured me
that such was not the case. He began with fact ;
he stuck by the inductive process ; and it was only
at a certain stage of his scientific exploration that
the thought flashed across his mind that the law of
biological and social evolution is a universal process,
traceable in the cosmical changes and in the latest
results of civilisation. But we do not need to rely
upon conversation on this point. In one of his
essays, Reasons for Dissenting from M. Comte, there
is an interesting autobiographic statement. In
reply to those who classed him erroneously as a
follower of Comte, Spencer says : And now let me
point out that which really has exercised a profound
influence over my course of thought. The truth
which Harvey s embryological inquiries first dimly
indicated, which was afterwards more clearly per
ceived by Wolff, and which was put into a definite
shape by Von Baer the truth that all organic
development is a change from a state of homo
geneity to a state of heterogeneity this it is from
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hold have indirectly resulted. In Social Statics
there is everywhere manifested a dominant belief
in the evolution of man and of society. There is
also manifested the belief that this evolution is in
both cases determined by the incidence of conditions
the actions of circumstances. And there is further,
in the sections already referred to, a recognition of
the fact that organic and social evolution conform
to the same law. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions
of various orders, everywhere determined by natural
causes (beliefs again displayed in the Theory of
Population and in the Principles of Psychology),
the formula of Von Baer set up a process of organi
sation. The extension of it to other kinds of
phenomena than those of individual and social
bodies is traceable through successive stages. It
may be seen in the last paragraph of an essay on
The Philosophy of Style, published in October 1852 ;
again in an essay on Manners and Fashion, pub
lished in April 1854; and then in a comparatively
advanced form in an essay on Progress : Its Law
and Cause, published in April 1857. Afterwards
there came the recognition of the need for modifying
Von Baer s formula by including the trait of in
creasing deflniteness ; next, the inquiry into those
general laws of force from which this universal
transformation necessarily results ; next, the de
duction of these from the ultimate law of the
persistence of force ; next, the perception that there44
is everywhere a process of Dissolution complementary
to that of Evolution ; and finally, the determination
of the conditions under which Evolution and Dis
solution occur. The filiation of these results is,
I think, tolerably manifest. The process has been
one of continuous development set up by the
addition of Von Baer s law to a number of others
that were in harmony with it.
In Appleton
1
8 Popular Science Monthly for Feb
ruary 1897, there appeared an article on Mr. Spencer,
by Professor Hudson of California, in which the
evolution of Mr. Spencer s mind is minutely traced,
by the aid of an important letter on the subject
from Mr. Spencer himself. Professor Hudson says:
*I am fortunate in having before me as I write a
letter in which he was kind enough to outline for
me the important stages in his progress toward the
great doctrines of the synthetic philosophy. If, in
following his account and in occasionally reproducing,
as I shall venture to do, his own words, I am forced
to touch again upon points already brought out,
this will scarcely be deemed ground for regret,
since the slight repetition involved will serve per
haps to throw the whole subject into clearer relief.
The simple nucleus of his philosophic system first
made its appearance in Social Statics, where, in the
chapter entitled
&quot; General Considerations,&quot; mention
is made of the biological truth that low types of
animals are composed of many like parts not mutu-I
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ally dependent, while higher animals are ccmposed
of parts that are unlike and are mutually dependent.
This, he writes,
&quot; was an induction which I had
reached in the course of biological studies mainly,
I fancy, while attending Professor Owen s lectures
on the Vertebrate Skeleton.&quot; With this was joined
the statement that the same is true of societies,
&quot; which begin with many like parts not mutually
dependent, and end with many like parts that are
mutually dependent.&quot; This also was an induction.
&quot; And then in the joining of these came the induction
that the individual organism and the social organism
followed this law.&quot; Thus the radical conception of
the entire system took shape before Mr. Spencer
had become acquainted with Von Baer s law, which,
as we have seen, did not occur till two years later.
This law, though applying to the unfolding of the
individual only, had none the less its use. In fur
nishing the expression
&quot; from homogeneity to hetero
geneity,&quot; it presented a more convenient intellectual
implement.
&quot; By its brevity and its applicability to
all orders of phenomena, it served for thinking much
better than the preceding generalisation, which
contained the same essential thought.&quot; The essays
which followed Social Statics were marked by the
establishment of various separate inductions in
which other groups of phenomena were brought
under this large principle, while in the first edition
of the Psychology, not only was the same principle46 HERBERT SPENCER
shown to comprehend mental phenomena, but there
was also recognised the primary law of evolution-
integration and increase of deflniteness. What
followed may best be given in Mr. Spencer s own
words :
&quot; Then it was that there suddenly arose in
me the conception that the law which I had
separately recognised in various groups of phenomena
was a universal law applying to the whole Cosmos :
the many small inductions were merged in the large
inductions. And only after this largest induction
had been formed did there arise the question Why?
Only then did I see that the universal cause for
the universal transformations was the multiplication
of effects, and that they might be deduced from the
law of the multiplication of effects. The same thing
happened at later stages. The generalisation which
immediately preceded the publication of the essay
on Progress : Its Laiv and Cause the instability of
the homogeneous was also an induction. So was
the direction of motion and the rhythm of motion.
Then having arrived at these derivative causes of
the universal transformation, it presently dawned
upon me (in consequence of the recent promulgation
of the doctrine of the conservation of force) that all
these derivative causes were sequences from that
universal cause. The question had, I believe, arisen,
Why these several derivative laws ? and that came
as the answer. Only then did there arise the idea
of developing the whole of the universal transforma-I
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tion from the persistence of force. So you see the
process began by being inductive and ended by
being deductive ; and this is the peculiarity of the
method followed. On the one hand, I was never
content with any truth remaining in the inductive
form. On the other hand, I was never content with
allowing a deductive interpretation to go unverified
by reference to the facts.&quot; The cautious method of
induction employed is evident from this extract,
and is a sufficient answer to those who twit Mr.
Spencer with dealing purely in hypotheses. Mr.
Spencer s great originality will be found to consist
in the unique manner in which he has combined
the two processes, inductive and deductive. He has
taken away the reproach of empiricism from scien
tific thought, and the reproach of vague theorising
from philosophic thought. Thus slowly and uncon
sciously was Mr. Spencer drawn on to the path of
his great discovery. His studies in biological and
social science, as has been shown, led him to formu
late a law of change and progress, which he suddenly
discovered to be the law of all change and progress.
Notwithstanding Mr. Spencer s protests against
being classed as a Comtist, the impression still
largely prevails that in aim and method Spencerism
and Positivism are fundamentally alike. That they
are fundamentally different will be evident from
comparison of the two systems. With Spencer the
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root of the Cosmos. The task of the scientist is to
discover the widest generalisations in particular
divisions of the Cosmos. He formulates the laws
of mechanics, of chemistry, of biology, psychology,
and sociology. Is it possible to go beyond these
generalisations? Is it possible still further to
combine the generalisations of science under one
supreme generalisation, without abandoning the
methods of induction and deduction ? Are the great
divisions of phenomena arbitrary divisions, the
result of the principle of the division of labour?
Or is it possible to proceed still further, and show
that the various sciences represent separate yet
closely related stages in the development of the
Cosmos stages which are not arbitrary departments
devised by man for intellectual convenience, but
parts of one all-embracing process? In other
words, is the Cosmos from star to soul pervaded by
one law, or must we be content with the view that
a rigorous analysis brings us down to a number of
Permanent Causes or Laws which cannot be re
duced to an ultimate unity ? Comte held distinctly
by the view that all attempts to reduce phenomena
to a single law were chimerical. Such attempts he
declared to be as futile as the old theological
theorisiiigs about a First Cause. Man s business,
according to Comte, is to analyse accurately the
circumstances of phenomena, and to connect them
by the natural relations of succession and resem-I
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blance. Failing to distinguish between final and
efficient Causes, Comte unwittingly put an arbitrary
limit to human inquiry. Content with noting the
order of phenomena, he denied with scorn the right
of the intellect to seek for the cosmical causes of
phenomena. In harmony with his view Comte
treated with contempt the cell doctrine, which,
even while he was writing, was revolutionising
physiological science ; he tabooed all inquiries into
the origin of the human race, he was hostile to all
hypothesis about the nature of heat, light, electri
city. Because Theology in its search for origins had
taken the wrong road, he would prohibit the search
altogether, forgetful of the fact that knowledge
which limits itself to the mere noting of co
existences and resemblances among phenomena
remains at the empirical stage. On the other hand,
the Spencerian philosophy rests upon the possibility
of framing, in relation to the Cosmos as a whole,
a generalisation which shall be verifiable in detail.
According to Spencer, the duty of Philosophy is,
taking its stand upon the widest truths formulated
by Science, to form a generalisation which shall
link all phenomena into one organic whole. Comte
denied the possibility of any such universal Syn
thesis. He included in one sweeping condemnation
philosophies of the Cosmos as well as theologies of
the Cosmos. Manifestly Spcncerism and Comtism
cannot be in fundamental agreement when Comte
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passionately denounces precisely the speculative
methods and results which have constituted the
life-work of Mr. Spencer. Mr. Spencer was not
indebted for his fundamental ideas to Comte, for
the simple reason that not only had Comte no
fundamental ideas about the Cosmos, but he de
nounced as metaphysicians or theologians in disguise
all who ventured to formulate such ideas. In short,
Spencer could not be indebted to Comte for his
philosophy of the Cosmos, because Comte had no
philosophy of the Cosmos : he put it forward as his
chief title to fame that he had none.
But, it will be said, Comte claimed to be the
author of the Positivist Philosophy. It will not do,
in order to establish the originality of Mr. Spencer,
to assert that Comte was no philosopher, in face of
the fact that it is as a philosopher that he is known
to history. Within certain definitely prescribed
limits Comte was a philosopher, and deserves
credit for producing new and fruitful conceptions
of great value ; but their value is historical and
sociological, not cosmical. Banishing the idea of
efficient cause, Comte quite logically was brought
to a full stop at his six sciences. Beyond these
he could not- go. Here induction had completed
its work, and all that an empirical philosophy
could do was to show the historic relation between
the sciences, and organise them in a social direction.
This constituted Comte s originality. Having dis-I
EVOLUTION OF EVOLUTION THEORY 51
missed as futile all inquiries into causes which
lay beyond the methods of the museum and the
laboratory, having relegated ultimate laws to the
region of the Unknown, Comte was compelled to
organise his philosophy round Humanity instead
of the Cosmos. All speculations which had no
direct relation to human well-being were placed
by him in the same category as theology. Such
a contracted view of man s intellectual capabilities
gradually transformed his philosophy into a religion
in which intelligence was discouraged and authority
elevated to the front rank as a factor in human
progress. Conclusive evidence has been adduced
to show that Mr. Spencer s conception of philo
sophy is fundamentally different from that of
Comte. Spencer s view of causation, with his
insistence upon the necessary co-relations of pheno
mena as distinguished from customary association,
marks off his system completely from the Em
piricism of Hume, Mill, and Comte, while his
sociological like his cosmical conceptions have
nothing in common with the Positivist system;
in fact, the two systems agree only in their
acceptance of those ideas which are held by all
scientific thinkers, as opposed to theological con
ceptions of Man and the Universe. Meanwhile,
before proceeding to study Mr. Spencer the
philosopher, a few pages may fitly be devoted
to Mr. Spencer the man.CHAPTER IV
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
THE ten years from 1850, when he published his first
book, Social Statics, till 1860, when he issued
the prospectus of his Synthetic Philosophy, were
fruitful to Mr. Spencer both socially and intellectu
ally. Although his writings were not popular, they
brought him into notice in circles where high think
ing was sure to be appreciated. The intervals of
leisure enjoyed while on the staff of the Economist
Mr. Spencer utilised in contributing to the leading
reviews, notably the Westminster, which at that
time had as sub-editor Mary Ann Evans, destined
later to take the world by storm as George Eliot.
In the Life of George Eliot are to be found a
number of interesting references to the rising
philosopher. In a letter to Mr. Bray about the end
of September 1851, George Eliot writes :
* On Friday
we had Foxton, Wilson, and some other nice people,
among others a Mr. Herbert Spencer, who has just
brought out a large work on Social Statics, which
Lewes pronounces the best book he has seen on the
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subject. In another letter to the Brays a year
after she says : I went to the opera on Saturday,
at Covent Garden, with my
&quot; excellent friend
Herbert Spencer,&quot; as Lewes calls him. We have
agreed that there is no reason why we should
not have as much of each other s society as we
like. He is a good, delightful creature, and I always
feel better for being with him. Writing to Miss
Sara Hennell, she expresses herself thus: My
brightest spot, next to my love of old friends, is
the deliciously calm new friendship that Herbert
Spencer gives me. We see each other every day,
and have a delightful camaraderie in everything.
But for him my life would be desolate enough.
Again
: Herbert Spencer dined with us to-day
looks well, and is brimful of clever talk as usual.
His volume of Essays is to come out soon. He is
just now on a crusade against the notion of Species.
But perhaps the most interesting reference is to be
found in the extract from the diary of George Henry
Lewes, under date January 28, 1859 : Walked along
the Thames towards Kew to meet Herbert Spencer,
who was to spend the day with us, and we chatted
with him on matters personal and philosophical. I
owe him a debt of gratitude. My acquaintance with
him was the brightest ray in a very dreary, wasted
period of my life. I had given up all ambition
whatever, lived from hand to mouth, and thought
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his intellect, especially during our long walks,
roused my energy once more, and revived my dormant
love of science. His intense theorising tendency
was contagious, and it was only the stimulus of a
theory which could then have induced me to work.
I owe Spencer another and deeper debt. It was
through him that I learned to know Marian to know
her was to love her and since then my life has been
a new birth. To her I owe all my prosperity and
all my happiness. God bless her. In regard to the
concluding remarks, rumour has it that Lewes
supplanted Spencer in the affections of George
Eliot. This is not the case. Mr. Spencer s relations
with George Eliot from first to last rested on the
basis of friendship pure and simple.
The reference by Lewes to Mr. Spencer s theoris
ing tendency needs to be supplemented by reference
to his passion for facts. He is equally removed
from the hodmen of science who are content to
throw down before their readers a confused mass of
facts, and the fantastic theorists who weave cosmic
speculations out of their inner consciousness. It is
said of Ouvier that from the examination of a bone
he could in his mind construct the entire animal.
To Spencer a fact is valuable in so far as it enables
him to place it in organic relation with other facts
in an interpretative scheme of thought. He possesses
an instinctive insight into the value of facts. The
combination in his mind of philosophic and scientificqualities, strange as it may seem, has somewhat
retarded his fame. The philosopher who soars into
cloudland blames Mr. Spencer for his utilitarian
habits of thought, his constant reference to reality,
and his resolute refusal to take imaginative flights.
The men of science, on the other hand, are quite
willing to admit his philosophic powers, but they are
jealous of a thinker who has assimilated the results
of science without having gone through the usual
apprenticeship in the museum and the laboratory.
Rather than frankly admit that in Mr. Spencer s
mind the philosophical and scientific tendencies are
uniquely blended, his opponents pursue a policy of
detraction, with the hope of discrediting his influ
ence as a speculative thinker and as a master of
scientific method.
Reference has already been made to Mr. Spencer s
great expository power. In regard to this Dr.
Hooker once remarked, He talks like a book. It
is not to be supposed, however, that there is any
thing like pedantry in his conversation. He is as far
as possible removed from the conventional conception
of a philosopher, who is supposed to be so wedded
to abstract meditation as to be in social life the
embodiment of dreary dulness. There is nothing of
the dry-as-dust about Mr. Spencer. I remember how
agreeably surprised I was with my first meeting with
the great man. I had expected to meet a grave and
somewhat awe-inspiring philosopher, whose mind56
was so absorbed in study of the Cosmos as to make
him impatient of the trivialities of ordinary mortals.
Instead, I found myself in presence of a bright,
vivacious personality, a man of generous impulses,
very much at home among the actualities of life,
and withal brimful of humour. There is no assump
tion of superiority in Mr. Spencer s conversation.
It is racy, pointed, vigorous. His criticisms of
contemporary writers are calm, suggestive, and
penetrative; and, great as is his fame, he never
poses as an oracle, or, in Carlylean style, assumes
pontifical airs. How far he is removed from every
thing like this is well illustrated by an incident
which occurred at a London dinner-party. The
hostess had invited a friend specially to meet Mr.
Spencer. The guest found himself seated beside an
elderly gentleman, to whom he addressed the usual
commonplaces. During the evening he was aston
ished to hear the elderly gentleman addressed across
the table as Mr. Spencer. In surprise he turned to
him and exclaimed,
* Are you really Mr. Herbert
Spencer? Mr. Spencer, smiling blandly, and no
doubt with a merry twinkle in his eye, quietly
replied that he was. Until considerations of health
forbade him, Mr. Spencer delighted in the social side
of life. Daily he used to visit the Athenaeum Club,
not to study, but to enjoy a game of billiards, of
which he was passionately fond. There he would be
found with his coat off, as intent upon scoring aI
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victory against his opponent as he is in wrestling
with a controversialist in the philosophic arena.
But after all, the interest in Mr. Spencer s life is
of an intellectual kind. As Emerson says
:
* Great
geniuses have the shortest biographies. They live
in their writings. Specially does this hold of Mr.
Spencer, whose seclusion, apart from indifferent
health, was necessitated by the formidable philo
sophic scheme which he had mapped out for him
self. In 1860, when forty years of age, he published
the prospectus of a colossal scheme, namely, a
new theory of the Cosmos, from its earliest
nebular manifestations to its highest development
in man and civilisation a scheme bold in theoretic
conception, and, considering Mr. Spencer s state
of health, seemingly Quixotic in practical design.
Prom this time onward the history of his life
is mainly the history of a series of heroic en
deavours, culminating in heroic achievement. How
heroic were these endeavours will be made clear
when the whole circumstances are fully considered.
In addition to indifferent health the result of
a nervous breakdown consequent on over-work
Mr. Spencer had to face the fact that he had
dedicated his life to an ideal in the realisation of
which both adequate remuneration and fame must
at best have been remote results. In an age when
the main springs of human activity are largely con
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of immediate tangible reward, Mr. Spencer set the
bright example of a career wholly devoted to
universal ends, unblemished by that infirmity of
noble minds thirst for popular applause. With a
determination positively heroic, an energy positively
superhuman, the quiet, self-centred thinker set
himself to wrestle with the great mysteries of
Existence, undeterred by the chilly dreariness of the
study, and untempted by the glittering allurements
of the market-place. In his evidence given before
the Copyright Commission, Mr. Spencer affords the
reader a glimpse of the hard, stiff, lonely battle that
had to be fought, uncheered by sympathy, and un
relieved by public approval. The autobiographic
portion of his evidence runs as follows :
*
I published
my first work, Social Statics, at the end of 1850.
Being a philosophical work, it was not possible
to obtain a publisher who would undertake any
responsibility, and I published it at my own cost.
The edition consisted of 750 copies, and took
fourteen years to sell. In 1855 I published the
Principles of Psychology. There were 750 copies.
I gave away a considerable number of copies, and
the remainder I suppose about 650 sold in twelve
and a half years. I afterwards, in 1857, published a
series of Essays, and, warned by previous results,
1 printed only 500 copies. That took ten and a
half years to sell. Towards 1860 I began to publish
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issuing to subscribers in quarterly parts, and to the
public in volumes when completed. Before the
initial volume, First Principles, was published, I
found myself still losing. During the issue of the
second volume, Principles of Biology, I was still
losing. In the middle of the third volume I was
still losing so much that I found I was frittering
away all that I possessed. I found that in the
course of fifteen years I had lost nearly 1200
adding interest, more than 1200, and as I was
evidently going on ruining myself, I issued to the
subscribers a notice of cessation. . . . After the issue
of the notice, property came to me in time to
prevent the cessation. My losses did not continue
very long after that. The tide turned, and my
books began to pay. They were repaid in 1874
that is to say, in twenty-four years after I began
I retrieved my position. In addition he spent
nearly 3000 in Sociological Tables.
That is to say, in the cause of truth Mr. Spencer
for twenty
- four years worked without fee or
reward. His solitary intellectual labours were
utterly ignored by the public, and in spite of that
he laboriously and heroically toiled up the steep
ascent of philosophy. In all this there is a grandeur
quite Miltonic. In the midst of the general neglect
Mr. Spencer had the sympathy of a number of
philosophic thinkers, who knew his real worth. A
number of American admirers, hearing of his deter-60 HERBERT SPENCER
mination to stop the series, forwarded to Mr.
Spencer through Mr. Youmans, his devoted adherent
and friend, a purse of money and a gold watch.
The money, with characteristic high-mindedness, he
accepted as a public trust for public ends. John
Stuart Mill, I am informed, also stepped into the
breach. He recognised in Mr. Spencer a new
thinker of unique calibre, and with magnanimity
far removed from personal rivalry, he offered Mr.
Spencer a large sum to enable him to carry out
his great undertaking. Mr. Spencer declined the
offer, while fully appreciating the spirit in which it
was made.
The financial difficulty solved, Mr. Spencer had
another difficulty to face, which proved to be a life
long one namely, chronic ill-health. In spite of
all obstacles he has the satisfaction of knowing that
the work mapped out forty years ago has been
accomplished. In dignified strain he thus records
his impressions in the concluding volume of his
great undertaking
: On looking back on the six-
and- thirty years which have passed since the
Synthetic Philosophy was commenced, I am sur
prised at my audacity in undertaking it, and still
more surprised at its completion. In 1860 my
small resources had been nearly all frittered away
in writing and publishing books which did not repay
their expenses ; and I was suffering under a chronic
disorder, caused by over-tax of the brain, which,I
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 61
wholly disabling me for eighteen months, thereafter
limited my work to three hours a day, and usually
to less. How insane my project must have seemed
to onlookers may be judged from the fact that
before the first chapter of the first volume was
finished, one of my nervous breakdowns obliged me
to desist. But imprudent courses do not always
fail. Sometimes a forlorn hope is justified by the
event. Though, along with other deterrents, many
relapses, now lasting for weeks, now for months,
and once for years, often made me despair of
reaching the end, yet at length the end is reached.
Doubtless in earlier days some exultation would
have resulted, but as age creeps on feelings weaken,
and now my chief pleasure is my emancipation.
Still there is satisfaction in the consciousness that
losses, discouragements, and shattered health have
not prevented me from fulfilling the purpose of my
life.
Though Mr. Spencer had finished his life-task,
though in the process age had crept upon him and
his physical energies had become weaker, yet were
his philosophic powers unimpaired, his mental vision
undimmed, and his intellectual strength unabated.
Finding London life distracting, he retired to
Brighton, where, in comparative solitude, he was
enabled, as far as considerations of health would
admit, to round off his great work by bringing it
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containing the groundwork of the system, needed
little or no attention ; but in Biology great strides
had been made since his Principles were published,
and Mr. Spencer set himself to publish a new and
revised edition. The Principles of Psychology, too,
stood in need of revision. The book had borne the
brunt of recent attacks from the new Hegelian
school which had sprung up in Oxford and Glasgow.
These attacks had to be met, and in this and
kindred tasks Mr. Spencer found his leisure at
Brighton amply occupied. Along with the feeling
of satisfaction at the completion of his task was
the feeling of gratification at the steady advance of
his fame and influence. In America, where Mr.
Spencer first received recognition, his influence has
been deep and far-reaching. Even to a greater
extent than in England his works have moulded
the religious and philosophic thought of the New
World. On the Continent his books have been
translated by enthusiastic disciples, and among
Oriental thinkers, in India and Japan, the bold and
massive generalisations of the Spencerian philosophy
have found a congenial home. Following in the
footsteps of philosophic fame have come offers of
worldly honour, which Mr. Spencer has steadily
refused. To a thinker whose triumphs have been
won, not in the stifling atmosphere of personal
ambitions, but in the ample region of pure intel
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world seem pale and shadowy. So far as con
ventional distinctions are concerned, Mr. Spencer
prefers to end life as he began a devoted, austere
worshipper of truth, removed alike from the distrac
tions of the market-place and the allurements of
social distinction.CHAPTER V
THE COSMOS UNVEILED
A COMMON charge against Mr. Spencer is that he is
a Materialist. Again and again he has repudiated
the term, but explanation and denial do little to
stem the current of misrepresentation. The root
error made by those who accuse the Spencerian
philosophy of being materialistic is due to failure
to distinguish between a comprehensive generalisa
tion of the Universe resting upon the data of
science, and a philosophic interpretation of that
generalisation. Now, there are two ways in which
the Universe may be viewed, as natural and super
natural, mechanical, or rather dynamical, and
spiritual. The supernatural or spiritual view has
been condemned by history as sterile in the region
of fact, and fantastic, not to say superstitious, in
the region of interpretation. Progress in the ac
quiring of exact knowledge dates from the time
when the mechanical view of the world was substi
tuted for the spiritual. When Newton substituted
his conception of gravitation for the angelic theory
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of planetary movements, he introduced into the
study of the world a mechanical element verifiable
in terms of force. Did this constitute Newton a
Materialist? When Darwin substituted for the
spiritual theory of special creations the dynamical
conception of a struggle between organisms for a
definite amount of life-sustaining forces, was he
necessarily a Materialist ? Now, what Spencer has
done is simply to fuse the separate generalisations of
science into one all-embracing generalisation. His
life-work has been to trace the evolutionary process
from star to soul, always, observe, scientifically in-
terpretable in terms of force. Every man of science
must be a Materialist when dealing with tangible
modes of existence and their verifiable laws. The
charge of Materialism would be valid if Mr. Spencer
contended that for the ultimate explanation of the
Universe all that was needed was the mechanical
forces with which men of science deal. Now,
Mr. Spencer repudiates as earnestly as his de
tractors the view that force which on the
mechanical side is the final word of the scientific
conception of the world is the final word of the
philosophic conception. To the philosophical scien
tist force is but a symbol : in his view atoms and
energies have only a relative value. Indeed, so
impressed is Mr. Spencer with the inadequacy of
the Materialist theory that in his First Principles
and his Psychology, he says that it is more rational
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to conceive the ultimate principle of Existence in
terms of Mind than Matter. But what the actual
nature of the one reality is Mr. Spencer does not
undertake to say. Once for all let it be understood
that Spencerism stands on its own merits as the
philosophy of the Knowable, and as the only organ
ised body of thought which has its roots in ex
perience and is a guide to the understanding of life,
both theoretically and practically. Those who
choose to identify Spencerism with Materialism are
simply blinding themselves with a dust-cloud of
their own raising.
It tends greatly to clear the ground for the com
prehension of the Spencerian philosophy if we re
member that it cuts itself off entirely from the
old metaphysical attempts to solve the absolute
mystery of existence. In his First Principles
Spencer adopts and improves the Hamiltonian de
monstration of the relativity of knowledge, holding
that, from the constitution of the human mind,
knowledge of noumena is impossible. From this it
follows that Spencer restricts philosophy to the
unification of Knowledge, the reduction of pheno
mena to one ultimate law. If the Universe is not
a chaos the laws which underlie phenomena must
be related, and when traced back must merge into
one another as the branches of a tree merge in the
trunk and the trunk in the root. Mr. Spencer s
task was to find the root-principle of phenomenal1
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existence. Some one has said that to a thinker
capable of comprehending it from a single point
of view, the Universe would present but a single
fact, but one all-comprehensive truth. Everything
depends upon the point of view. From the point
of view of the supernaturalist the Universe need
not necessarily seem a single fact, one all-com
prehensive truth. The unifying principle may well
be not in the Universe, but in the mind of the
Creator. So far indeed from the Universe testifying
to its own unity, or being the manifestation of
one all-comprehensive truth, supernaturalists have
always postulated the necessity of a revelation as
interpreter of the Universe. Then again, if we
take a mechanical view of the Universe, we do
not readily arrive at the idea of unity. Between
the various parts of a machine there may be no
necessary, inevitable connection. For unity we
must go to the mind of the constructor of the
machine. So long as the purely mechanical con
ception of the Universe obtained sway over the
minds of philosophers there was no getting beyond
Positivism, with its theory that nothing can be
known beyond co-existences and sequences. Mill s
intellectual helplessness before the problem, his
belief that there was no inherent necessity at the
heart of things instance his declaration that in
other worlds two and two might make five, had
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mechanical conception of the Universe had upon
his mind.
The demonstration of the essential and necessary
unity of the Cosmos was only made possible when
the dynamical was substituted for the mechanical
point of view. The dynamical point of view in
volved the idea of growth, as against manufacture.
When the Universe began to be viewed as a dynamic
process rather than as a manufactured product, the
way was opened for treating phenomena as some
thing more than co-existences and sequences as
necessary links in a great cosmical chain. Mani
festly we must get a clear grasp of the dynamic
conception of the Universe before we can under
stand the law of its evolution. Meanwhile from
a purely scientific standpoint all that is necessary
is recognition of the fact that the two great
generalisations known as the Nebular theory
and the Conservation of Force have made the
dynamic theory of Matter the necessary basis of a
study of the Cosmos. The scientific philosopher
who deals with phenomena with a view to their
unification must necessarily start with Existence
when it comes before him in concrete, material
fashion. Now, in tracing the Universe, science can
get no further back than the nebula, or world-stuff.
According to the nebular theory the matter which
composes the solar system once existed in a diffused
state. The problem is to discover the laws byI
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which, from a diffused nebulous state, Matter has
increased in concentration and complexity so as to
result in the world we now see. Along with the
Nebular theory goes the doctrine of the Conserva
tion of Force, which, interpreted, means that the
Matter of the Universe is a fixed quantity, and is
capable of endless transformations. Viewed thus,
the Universe is one fact, the result of one great
cosmic process namely, the Redistribution of
Matter and Motion. When Spencer came upon the
scene, he found the path of discovery cleared by the
three great generalisations the universal law of
Gravitation, the Nebular theory, and the doctrine of
the Conservation or Persistence of Force. These
three isolated generalisations Spencer fused into one
by his theory of Evolution. Newton formulated the
law of Gravitation, Kant and Laplace used it to
explain the origin of stellar and planetary systems,
and Spencer, combining this with the doctrine of
the Persistence of Force, was led to discover the
law of the entire cosmical process from star to
soul. As has been well said, the idea embraced
in the word Evolution as employed by Spencer is
by far the nearest approach ever yet made to the
conception of an absolutely universal and cosmical
law.
The problem before Mr. Spencer was this :
Given a Universe composed of a fixed quantity of
Matter and Motion, conceived in harmony with the70 HERBERT SPENOER
Newtonian law of Gravitation as manifesting co
existent forces of attraction and repulsion, to trace
the process by which the Cosmos evolved from its
nebulous to its present state. Spencer s starting-
point is the Persistence of Force, on the ground
that, reduced to its ultimate analysis, our concep
tion of Matter rests upon forces standing in certain
correlations. When we say that Force is per
sistent, we are simply declaring that the Force
in the Universe is constant is never increased
or diminished. This belief rests upon something
deeper than a scientific induction : it is a psycho
logical necessity. If Force came into existence
and went out of existence, the Universe would
be, not a Cosmos, but a Chaos. If Force was liable
to sudden creation and annihilation, reasoning would
be impossible, because reasoning is simply the classi
fication of the relations among Forces. Scientific
induction as well as abstract reasoning could not
exist unless the forces of Nature persisted that is,
continued to exist. The great universal fact of the
Redistribution of Matter and Motion is no arbitrary
fact, but follows naturally from the Persistence of
Force. It needs little reflection to see that, if
Force is persistent, the relations among forces must
also persist : the one is a corollary of the other. In
the one as in the other, scientific induction and
psychological necessity are in entire harmony.
When we say that the relations among forces per-THE COSMOS UNVEILED 7i
sist, we are simply postulating the law of Nature s
uniformity, which is the essential basis of all
scientific procedure. As Mill puts it, the uniformity
of the laws of Nature is the major premise of all
inductions. This belief has a deeper root than is
indicated in the old Experiential and Positive philo
sophies. Hume, Mill, and Comte traced our con
ception of Nature s uniformity to Experience. Hume
got no further than custom, and Mill never could
reach anything better in the way of certainty.
Comte s whole philosophy, resting as it does on
the idea of recording co-existences and sequences,
entirely ignored the element of necessity in our
conception of Nature s uniformity. According to
Spencer, the belief in the uniformity of Nature is
something more than the outcome of experience:
it is a necessity of thought, which unconsciously we
bring with us to the interpreting of experience, and
without which experience itself could not be under
stood so as to be made the foundation of scientific
certainty. Moreover, the Spencerian conception of
Force and its relations throws a flood of light upon
the idea of Cause and its teleological implication.
Reduced to its ultimate analysis, our belief in the
necessity and universality of causation is the belief
that every manifestation of force must be preceded
and succeeded by some equivalent manifestation.
That is to say, between cause and effect a natural
and necessary relation exists. How far-reaching is72 HERBERT SPENCER
the law of the persistence of relations among forces
may be gathered from a remark made by Stallo in
his suggestive book, Concepts of Modern Physics,
where, without reference to Mr. Spencer at all, he
says : The real existence of things is co-extensive
with their qualitative and quantitative determina
tions. And both are in their nature relations, quality
resulting from mutual action, and quantity being
simply a ratio between terms neither of which is
absolute. ... It may be observed in this connec
tion that not only the law of causality, the conserva
tion of energy, and the indestructibility of matter
so called, have their root in the relativity of all
objective reality being indeed simply different
aspects of this relativity, but that Newton s first
and third laws of motion, as well as all laws of
least action in mechanics (including Gauss s laws
of movement under least constraint), are but corol
laries from the same principle. And the fact
that everything is, in its manifest existence, but
a group of relations and reactions, at once ac
counts for Nature s inherent teleology. Prom this
point of view, the laws of Nature are not exter
nally imposed upon Matter, but are necessarily
evolved along with the evolution of phenomena
are, in fact, from the scientific standpoint,
generalised descriptions of Nature s actions and
reactions.
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of Force is the transformation and equivalence of
forces. If the force in the Universe is a definite
fixed quantity, it is evident that forces do not cease
to exist when they elude the senses. Changed in
form, force must reappear. This corollary from the
Persistence of Force has had abundant illustration
by science. Thanks to the labours of Meyer, Joule,
Grove, and Helmholtz, science is now able to
formulate, as a fundamental law of Nature, the
transformation and equivalence of forces. Helm
holtz has described the process with such lucidity




quantity of mechanical work is lost, there is
obtained, as experiments made with the object of
determining the point show, an equivalent quantity
of heat, or instead of this, of chemical force ; and
conversely, when heat is lost, we gain an equivalent
quantity of chemical or mechanical force ; and
again, when chemical force disappears, an equivalent
of heat or work
; so that in all these interchanges
between various inorganic natural forces, working
force may indeed disappear in one form, but then it
reappears in exactly equivalent quantity in some
other form : it is thus neither increased nor
diminished, but remains in exactly the same
quantity. The attempt to extend the law of the
transformation and equivalence of forces to organic
processes met with stubborn resistance. It was
feared that the reduction of the organic processes,74 HERBERT SPENCER
with the mysteries of life and growth, to the play
of mechanical forces would lead straight to
Materialism ; consequently for a time an entity
called vital force was invoked in order to combat
the coming danger. In his First Principles,
Spencer in his usual lucid and convincing manner
shows that through all Nature s processes, organic
and super-organic as well as inorganic, the law of
the transformation and equivalence of forces holds
good.
Two other corollaries from the Persistence of
Force refer to the direction of Motion and the
rhythm of Motion. Motion, as Spencer shows by
numerous and striking illustrations drawn from all
parts of Nature, always follows the line of least
resistance. Whether he is dealing with the move
ments of the planets, the forces which go to explain
the condensation and evaporation of clouds, the
nutritive and mechanical processes of organic
nature, or the economic forces of society, Spencer
is able to verify the great all-comprehensive truth
that Motion follows the line of least resistance. It
is the same with the truth that Motion is rhythmi
cal. Mr. Spencer s treatment of this section is
specially profound. It is difficult to know which to
admire most the clearness of his analysis of the
complex phenomena with which he deals, or the
brilliancy of his power of generalisation. So
impressed have some of his contemporaries beenI
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with the marvellous power exhibited in this section
that one of them, a writer of great repute, has
declared that Mr. Spencer s treatment of the
rhythm of Motion offers one of the most brilliant
examples of strict philosophic thinking which the
world has yet produced. Like the other corollaries,
direction of Motion and the rhythm of Motion are
shown to be necessary deductions from the Per
sistence of Force. In regard to the former Mr.
Spencer says :
* When we seek a warrant for the
assumption that of two conflicting forces that is the
greater which produces motion in its own direction,
we find no other than the consciousness that such
part of the greater force as is unneutralised by the
lesser must produce its effect the consciousness
that the residuary force cannot disappear, but must
manifest itself in some equivalent change the con
sciousness that force is persistent. In regard to
rhythm Mr. Spencer also shows that the inductive
truth that all motion is rhythmical rests on the
deductive fact that all motion must necessarily be
rhythmical : The force embodied as a momentum
in a given direction cannot be destroyed ; and if it
eventually disappears, it reappears in the reaction
of the retarding body, which begins afresh to draw
the now arrested mass back from its aphelion.
. . .
Thus, then, rhythm is a necessary characteristic of
all motion. Given the co-existence everywhere of
antagonistic forces a postulate which, as we have76 HERBERT SPENOER
seen, is necessitated by the form of our experience
and rhythm is an inevitable corollary from the
persistence of force. Obviously, we have only got
part of the way to the construction of a philosophy
in showing that all phenomena rest upon one law
the Persistence of Force and its corollaries. This is
only to show the unity of phenomena, but how are
we to explain the difference? It is essential to
trace the One in the Many ; it is equally essential
to trace the rise and progress of the Many. Mr.
Spencer had now to show how the Universe as a
cosmical product resulted from these laws in other
words, he had to formulate the process by which
phenomena assume their varied forms in obedience
to the law of the Persistence of Force. What was
wanted was a formula which would cover the pro
cess manifested by phenomena in all their mutual
actions and inter-actions, from the earliest nebulous
existence to the highest products of civilisation.
The law of that process discovered by Mr. Spencer
he calls the law of Evolution. At the end of a
long inquiry, worked out brilliantly by means of the
inductive method, Mr. Spencer reaches the law of
the great cosmic process. The redistribution of
Matter and Motion which results in the formation
of an aggregate, Mr. Spencer calls by the name of
Evolution
; the redistribution which results in the
decay and dissipation of an aggregate he terms
Dissolution. Evolution is defined as an integrationI
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of Matter and concomitant dissipation of Motion,
during which the Matter passes from an indefinite
incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent
heterogeneity, and during which the retained
Motion goes through a parallel transformation.
This law holds true of all existences whatsoever.
For convenience we divide phenomena into sections
astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, socio-
logic; but the process of Evolution is one and its
law is one. Evolution of the parts goes on along
with evolution of the whole. Not only is Evolution
one in principle, but one in fact.
We are still, however, in the region of induction.
John Stuart Mill would remind us that no number of
inductions can establish a necessary law. For any
thing induction can tell us, there may not be any
necessary connection between facts. They may be
found within our experience existing in a regular
order, but as to the necessity of that order induc
tion is silent. Unless, therefore, Mr. Spencer s
attempt at a great cosmic philosophy was to prove
abortive, it was essential that he should not only
show how the cosmic process takes place, but also
why it takes place in one form and could not possibly
take place in another. In other words, he had to
deduce the great world-transformations from the
Persistence of Force. Induction and Deduction had,
so to speak, to join hands before Knowledge was
unified and Philosophy had reached its goal. Taking78 HERBERT SPENCER
his stand upon the great cosmical fact of which all
other facts are merely phases namely, the redistri
bution of Matter and Motion, as shown to follow
necessarily from the transformation and equivalence
of force, along the line of least resistance, and in
rhythmical direction Spencer had to show that the
process which results in the formation of aggregates
necessarily means a process of evolution from a
state of indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a state
of definite coherent heterogeneity. It is now a
fact generally accepted by men of science that the
planetary system at its origin was an immense
nebulous mass at the stage of comparative homo
geneity a stage which, however, was necessarily
being departed from by the attractive force of
Matter. Motion towards local centres of gravity
would set up heterogeneities in the masses, which,
being subject to unlike forces, would be rapidly
differentiated. In the course of the redistribution
of Matter and Motion the homogeneous nebulous
fluid, under the operation of strictly mechanical
principles, was bound to become heterogeneous.
The same process is traceable in the solar system,
in the geologic and organic history of the earth, and
in civilisation. Not only the Universe, but all things
in it, have advanced from the homogeneous to the
heterogeneous state. The instability of the homo
geneous is greatly increased by another principle,
which acts with all the force of mechanicalI
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necessity namely, the multiplication of effects:
one cause produces many effects. To this is due
the diversity which we find in Nature.
So far we have traced the passage of the homo
geneous to the heterogeneous, from the simple to the
complex, as being the result of sheer mechanical neces
sity, but no reason has been given why the hetero
geneity should proceed in an orderly definite manner.
If there were only instability of the homogeneous and
multiplicity of effects, the Universe might well be
a chaos. To what is the orderliness of Nature due ?
Still adhering to the principle of mechanical neces
sity, Mr. Spencer shows that like forces produce
like results, unlike forces unlike results, and thus
along with the passage of aggregates from the uni
form to the multiform there also proceeds a change
from indefiniteness to definiteness of parts. As has
been well said : Segregation, or the clustering of
the like and separation of the unlike parts under the
action of forces capable of moving them, produces
the definiteness and individuality of things. Under
the influence of mechanical law the process of the
redistribution of Matter and Motion, being the result
of antagonistic forces, must reach a point where the
forces balance, producing upon us the feeling of
harmony or equilibrium in Nature. In its com
pleteness the law of Evolution is presented in
ductively and verified deductively from the law
of the Persistence of Force, which moves along the80 HERBERT SPENCER
line of least resistance in a rhythmical direction,
producing integration by loss of Motion and orderly
differentiation, owing to the instability of the homo
geneous, the multiplicity of effects, and segregation,
resulting in a balance of forces, called equilibration.
When the balance is overthrown by an increase of
Motion, then disintegration begins, followed by
incoherent indefinite heterogeneity, ending in Dis
solution.
By tracing Nature s processes to their cosmical
root Mr. Spencer has unified phenomena, and in
the act has, of course, unified Knowledge. In
his view the Universe is a complex unity which,
when reduced to its ultimate analysis, is seen to be
one fact the Redistribution of Matter and Motion,
all phenomena being complex aspects of that one
fact. The object of Mr. Spencer s numerous works
is to trace the law of evolution through the various
branches of phenomena, organic, super-organic,
psychologic, and sociologic, and by means of it to
unify and interpret phenomena. Mr. Spencer makes
no attempt to give an absolute explanation of the
Universe. His aim has been to show in what
manner the earth with all its life has been evolved,
to trace the cosmical process, to unify phenomenal
knowledge, not to dispel mystery or answer ques
tions of the Absolute and Infinite. In his First
Principles Mr. Spencer has applied his formula to
the evolution of the earth from its nebulous to itsI
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present stage ; but to bring his scheme of philosophy
within reasonable compass, he has merely outlined
the inorganic evolution, reserving his strength for
the development of life to which the Principles of
Biology are devoted.CHAPTER VI
THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE
WHATEVER be the ultimate philosophic value of
Comte s famous law of the Jiree stages, to the
student of scientific thought it is of great utility.
He learns the close connection that exists between
metaphysical conceptions and scientific discoveries.
If discovery has been slow, the reason is due perhaps
more to a wrong method of metaphysical interpreta
tion than to actual scientific exploration. Facts
have lain around the man of science in abundance,
but he has remained blind to their significance,
simply because his mind was filled with conceptions
which belong to the metaphysical stage of thought.
At the metaphysical stage, the mind in its search
for causes finds a resting-place in entities or abstrac
tions. Instead of being content with a formula
which describes all phases of phenomena a kind of
intellectual shorthand the mind personifies the
process, and converts the final result into an initial,
dominating, all-controlling agent.
In all regions of phenomena the belief in entitiesI
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has retarded the progress of knowledge. Light,
heat, electricity, magnetism each in turn has been
conceived not as the result of certain conditions,
but as a mysterious principle controlling the con
ditions. A good example of this is associated with
Stahl s doctrine of phlogiston, which he used to
explain the theory of combustion. Stahl supposed
that all combustible substances contained a common
element, which he called the Fire Principle. The
discovery of the doctrine of the Conservation and
Transformation of Forces brought to an end, in the
realm of physics and chemistry, the despotic sway
of entities, of personified abstractions. But if they
no longer govern, they reign in somewhat languid
and ornamental fashion. No man of science takes
entities into account when dealing with physical
and chemical phenomena, but in common speech
their influence may still be traced. In the popular
mind Gravitation, for instance, is thought of as the
cause of bodies tending to approach one another,
instead of being simply the name of an observed
fact. Chemical affinity, too, is thought of as the
cause of the combination of gases, whereas, like
Gravitation, it is the generalised description of a
natural process.
In one realm, that of Biology, entities not only
reign, but govern. So despotically do metaphysical
abstractions rule in Biology that they have been
tlie most formidable opponent to the application of84 HERBERT SPENCER
the Evolution theory to life and its multiform
manifestations. Just as formerly men of science
spoke of a Heat Principle and a Fire Principle, so
now they speak of a Vital Principle. It may be
surmised that as metaphysical conceptions have
been driven out of the purely mechanical and
chemical spheres, they must ultimately be banished
from the higher and more complex world of organic
life. The surmise is transformed into a confident
expectation when it is discovered that the meta
physical view of phenomena is the result of a natural
infirmity of thought, which can only be cured by a
rigorous application of scientific and philosophic
analysis. That infirmity of thought is well expressed
by James Hinton when he remarks upon the fact
that the processes of Nature are studied by us in
an inverse order: we see effects before we see
causes. He illustrates this as follows :
* Let us
conceive that, instead of having invented steam-
engines, men had met with them in nature as
objects for their investigation. What would have
been the most obvious character of these bodies?
Clearly their power of acting of moving. This




endowment of steam-engines long before the part
played by the steam had been recognised ; for that
would have required careful investigation and a
knowledge of some recondite laws, mechanical,
chemical, pneumatic. Might it not then haveI
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happened that motion might have been taken as a
peculiar characteristic belonging to the nature of
the engine ? and when after a long time the expan
sion of the steam coincident with this motion was
detected, might it not have been at first regarded
as consequence and not as cause ? Under these
circumstances it would seem the most natural
thing in the world to trace the complex activity
of the steam-engine to a Locomotive Principle.
How inadequate as an explanation of biological
phenomena is the principle of Vital Force is admir
ably shown by Mr. Spencer in his remarkable
chapter, The Dynamic Element in Life, in the
new edition of his Principles of Biology. Those
who write down Mr. Spencer as a Materialist
will find him in that chapter quite at one with the
Idealist in admitting the mystery of Life, and the
impossibility of conceiving it to stand in the relation
of effect to purely mechanical causes. It is a
mistake, however, to suppose that there is some
thing specially inscrutable about life. The inscruta
bility is the same in kind as that which belongs to
Existence as a whole. The fall of a stone is quite
as inexplicable as the activity of an organism. It
is just as impossible to conceive how a stone falls as
how an organism moves. As Mr. Spencer observes,
neither Newton nor any one else has been able to
conceive how the molecules of matter in the stone
are affected not only by the molecules of matter in86 HERBERT SPENCER
the adjacent part of the Earth, but by those forming
parts of its mass eight thousand miles off, which
severally exercise their influence without impedi
ment from intervening molecules ; and still less can
we conceive how every molecule of matter in the
sun ninety-two millions of miles off has a share in
controlling the movements of the Earth. Still less
can we conceive the physical process by which
electric impulses are transmitted from one place to
another. The ultimate reason of any phenomenon
is unknown ; the fact we know, and the law of the
fact we can discover. For the evolutionist the one
practical question in biology is not, Can the mystery
of life be explained ? but, Can the processes of life
be traced, and the complex phenomena reduced to
something like unity? In other words, Will the
Spencerian formula of Evolution, as a movement
from the simplex to the complex through successive
integrations and differentiations, cover not only the
purely mechanical side of Nature, but also those
processes known as living ?
Anti-evolutionists deny the application of Mr.
Spencer s formula to biology on the ground that
between non-living and living matter there is a
great gulf, which cannot be bridged by a theory
that postulates the unity and continuity of all
Nature s processes. In their view living matter is
so unique that by no conceivable process could it be
evolved from non-living matter : a special creativeTHE EVOLUTION OP LIFE 87
act is necessary, which at once invalidates the
methods and results of the evolutionist. The
assumption here is that there are two kinds of
matter, living and dead. This assumption takes its
rise in the old conception of matter as something
dead, inert, which can only be energised in two
ways, either by a specific creative fiat, or by the
infusion of a mysterious vital principle. This crude
idea of matter no longer holds sway over the minds
of modern philosophers and scientific students.
Science and philosophy, long divided by such watch
words as Materialism and Idealism, are now begin
ning to unite in recognition of the fact that Matter
is not dead, inert, but alive and everywhere palpi
tating with energies, and that organic life is no
special creation, but simply a highly specialised and
complex form of the universal life of Nature. So
far from Mr. Spencer being a Materialist, he might
more correctly be described as an Idealist. So far
from thinking that life is a product of Matter, he
has clearly indicated that in his view Matter itself
is a form of life. In his own words :
* Under one
of its aspects, scientific progress is a gradual trans
figuration of Nature. Where ordinary perception
saw perfect simplicity it reveals great complexity ;
where there seems absolute inertness it discloses
intense activity ; and in what appears mere vacancy
it finds a marvellous play of forces. Each genera
tion of physicists discovers in so-called
&quot; brute-88 HERBERT SPENCER
matter
&quot;
powers which but a few years before the
most instructed physicists would have thought in
credible. When the explorer of nature sees that,
quiescent as they appear, surrounding solid bodies
are thus sensitive to forces which are infinitesimal
in their amounts when the spectroscope proves to
him that molecules on the earth pulsate in harmony
with molecules in the stars when there is forced
on him the inference that every point in space
thrills with an infinity of vibrations passing through
it in all directions; the conception to which he
tends is much less that of a universe of dead matter
than that of a universe everywhere alive ; alive, if
not in the restricted sense, still in the general
sense. At the end of all scientific and philosophic
inquiries we come, according to Mr. Spencer, to an
infinite and omnipresent Energy from which all
things proceed. Manifestly this new conception
of Life renders unreal the old dispute about non
living and living matter. Living matter we no
longer think of as something entirely different in
kind from non-living matter. We now think of the
difference as one of degree. Matter is alive, not
because there has been added to it a special
property. What we call living matter only seems
to us to be specially alive because its movements
are of a highly complex nature, and because it is
organised on what seems to us to be a principle of
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between living and non-living matter be really an
artificial distinction, the result of a natural infirmity
of thought, clearly the philosopher who would trace
the process of life must begin his work with the
earliest manifestations of living matter.
Naturally Mr. Spencer begins his Principles of
Biology by a consideration of the constitution of
organic matter. It is no part of the biologist s
duty to discuss the speculative question of the
origin of life. The mathematician does not con
cern himself with what Quantity, Space, and
Time are ; nor the physicist with what Force is.
In like manner the biologist has to deal with the
manifestations of life, not with origins. As a
philosophic biologist, Mr. Spencer has accomplished
his task when he shows that the phenomena of
life conform to the process of evolution which he
has traced in the inorganic sphere. At the outset
an apparently formidable obstacle meets us in the
attempt to interpret organic evolution by means
of the Spencerian formula. In its simplest form
evolution may be described as an integration of
matter and concomitant dissipation of motion. But
when we come to study organic matter, we dis
cover the two processes no longer working in
antagonism, but in unison. Unless motion can be
conserved instead of being entirely dissipated,
there cannot be secured those secondary phases
of evolution known as functional activities. The90 HERBERT SPENCER
problem is to secure at one and the same time
structural fixity with functional mobility. How
is motion to be retained in an organism without
producing the natural consequence of disintegra
tion? In the case of organic bodies these ap
parently contradictory conditions are reconciled.
In organic bodies matter is combined in a form
which embodies an enormous amount of motion
along with a great degree of concentration. Both
in his First Principles and Principles of Biology
Mr. Spencer subjects matter in its earliest or
protoplasmic state to a rigorous analysis, the
result of which is to show that the essential
characteristic of living matter is the union of
great molecular activity along with a degree of
cohesion that permits of temporary fixity of arrange
ment. The phenomena of life, so far as the man
of science is concerned, are inseparably associated,
not with unique properties, but with modes of
motion. Science has amply justified Mr. Spencer s
reasonings. Thus we find Sir Michael Foster from
the practical point of view unconsciously endorsing
the Spencerian line of thought, as follows :
* The
more these molecular problems of physiology are
studied, the stronger becomes the conviction that
the consideration of what we call structure and
composition must, in harmony with the modern
teachings of physics, be approached under the
dominant conception of modes of motion. TheTHE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 91
physicists have been led to consider the qualities
of things as expressions of internal movements;
even more imperative does it seem to us that the
biologist should regard the qualities of protoplasm
(including structure and composition) as in like
manner the expressions of internal movements.
He may speak of protoplasm as a complex sub
stance, but he must strive to realise that what he
means by that is a complex whirl, an intricate
dance, of which what he calls chemical composi
tion, histological structure, and gross configuration
are, so to speak, the figures ; to him the renewal
of protoplasm is but the continuance of the dance,
its functions and actions the transference of the
figures. . . It seems to us necessary, for a satis
factory study of the problems, to keep clearly
before the mind the conception that the phenomena
in question are the result, not of properties of
kinds of matter, but of kinds of motion. Organic
evolution begins with homogeneous living matter
with protoplasm in its most elementary form.
Owing to its molecular instability matter changes
in the direction of the heterogeneous, becomes
differentiated. In other words, there results multi
plication of organs, with their respective functions.
From the amoeba, whose entire body may be
said to consist of a single organ, its stomach,
to the human being, the differentia is immense.
Yet the process is not abrupt, but transitional :92 HERBERT SPENCER
each stage is a link in the great evolutionary
chain. Hand in hand go integration, differentiation,
and segregation. Different parts of an organism
become co-ordinated, the result being a moving
equilibrated system, a coherent individuality. Mani
festly if life is conceived as a mode of motion,
as the resultant of complex molecular activities,
it cannot be understood except in relation to
its environment, the medium of these activities.
So long as a Vital Principle was postulated, the
inner activities of an organism received an undue
importance, almost to the exclusion of the environ
ing agencies. Mr. Spencer showed that life was no
entity, but a relation. Vital phenomena are the
product, not of an inherent principle of life, but of
the organism and its medium, the inner forces in
vital correlation with the outer forces. According
to his celebrated definition, Life is the continuous
adjustment of internal to external relations. In
his First Principles and Principles of Biology
Mr. Spencer has shown that the evolution of organic
life, from the humblest protoplasmic forms in which
it is found to the highest types with all their
structural and functional complexities, is from
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, by means of
successive integrations and differentiations.
It should not be forgotten that the evolution
of organic life is simply a specialised form of
cosmical evolution, consequently a close corre-THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 93
spondence exists between organisms and their
environment. Given an environment gradually
increasing in heterogeneity, and it follows that
in order to survive and propagate themselves
organisms must, in adapting themselves, also
increase in heterogeneity. Parts of the organ
isms restrict themselves to certain processes, and
thus by specialisation a sort of division of labour
takes place, the result of which is to create struc
tural and functional complexities. This process,
called direct equilibration, would be powerless with
out indirect equilibration, better known as Darwin s
law of Natural Selection a law which should not
be confounded with the law of Evolution, it being
at most a brilliant confirmation of Mr. Spencer s
cosmical generalisation. By means of the struggle
for existence everywhere going on among organisms,
there is secured the killing-out of the unfit, and
the survival and perpetuation of those organisms
characterised by successful variations, which by the
law of heredity become structural and functional.
Palaeontology confirms this by showing that each
geological epoch had its own class of organisms in
correspondence with the environment, thus proving
that organic has gone hand in hand with inorganic
evolution. Embryology adds further confirmation,
by showing that the human organism in its evolu
tion from the germ cell summarises the ancestral
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incoherent protoplasmic homogeneity to the definite
coherent heterogeneity of the fully developed body
through successive integrations and differentiations
all of which, as Mr. Spencer indicates, are necessi
tated by the law of the Persistence of Force, and
its corollaries.
Without transgressing at undue length upon the
work of specialists, and making this summary of Mr.
Spencer s views severely technical, it would be im
possible to do justice to the elaborate and painstaking
manner in which the theory of Evolution is applied
to the construction of what has been aptly called a
working thought-model of organisms and species, in
their development, racial history, and everyday
activities. Mr. Spencer has done more than recon
struct Biology on new lines
; he lias linked the
science to human affairs by his bold and luminous
generalisation on the multiplication of the human
race a generalisation which, on account of its
bearing on the famous theory of Malthus, is of
perhaps greater interest to the sociologist than to
the biologist. Those who are acquainted with the
social aspirations of the French Revolution thinkers
do not need to be told of the enthusiastic hopes which
were entertained of the human race from the Age
of Reason, which it was believed had dawned upon
humanity. According to the Encyclopaedists, with
the destruction of the great enemies of progress,
Priestcraft and Kingcraft, the reign of equality andTHE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 95
brotherhood would be inaugurated. The specula
tions of Condorcet summed up the creed and the
hopes of the eighteenth century reformers. Like
the spectre at the banquet, Malthus appeared with
his gloomy prophecies of the future. By his theory
of population Malthus seemed to prove that human
ills were untouched by political and social revolu
tion were inherent in the nature of things. With
great parade of statistics and imposing display of
logic, the English parson contended that he had dis
covered a law against which the philosophic opti
mists would battle in vain, the law that human
population increases at a quicker rate than human
subsistence. Poverty and misery as a consequence
inevitably followed at the heels of civilisation.
According to Malthus there was no cover set for
the poor man at Nature s table. Godwin and his
fellow-optimists strove hard to weaken the force of
this pessimistic theory ; but coinciding as they did
with the misery of the Revolution wars, the specu
lations of Malthus appeared to have an immovable
root in actual experience.
To Mr. Spencer was reserved the honour of
formulating a biological theory which, while doing
justice to the elements of truth in Malthusianism,
pointed the way to a solution which removed the
dark shadow of pessimism from civilisation. As
the result of profound study of the phenomena of
multiplication, Mr. Spencer discovered that Indi-96 HERBERT SPENCER
viduation and Genesis are in necessary antagonism :
advance of the one necessitates decrease of the
other. The error of Malthus lay in the assumption
that Genesis was an absolute instead of a relative
factor of organic life. According to Mr. Spencer,
Genesis varies with Individuation. The higher and
more complex the organism, the lower the rate of
increase. In an advancing state of civilisation
where nerve and brain development are the domin
ating factors, the rate of population necessarily
declines. Mr. Spencer presents his theory in con
densed form as follows : The necessary antagonism
of Individuation and Genesis, not only fulfils the
a priori law of maintenance of race, from the
monad up to Man, but ensures final attainment of
the highest form of this maintenance a form in
which the amount of life shall be the greatest
possible and the births and deaths the fewest
possible. From the beginning pressure of popula
tion has been the proximate cause of progress. It
produced the original diffusion of the race. It com
pelled men to abandon predatory habits and take to
agriculture. It led to the clearing of the earth s
surface. It forced men into the social state ; made
social organisation inevitable ; and has developed
the social sentiments. It has stimulated to pro
gressive improvements in production, and to in
creased skill and intelligence. It is daily thrusting
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relationships. And after having caused, as it
ultimately must, the due peopling of the globe,
and the raising of its habitable parts into the
highest state of culture after having perfected all
processes for the satisfaction of human wants after
having, at the same time, developed the intellect into
competence for its work, and the feelings into fitness
for social life after having done all this, the pres
sure of population must gradually approach to an
end. And thus we find Mr. Spencer in Sociology
acting the part of reconciler between the Optimists
and the Pessimists, just as in Psychology he put an
end to the feud between the Intuitionalists and the
Experientialists.
The Principles of Biology created a new era in
the study of Nature. When it appeared, master
minds were under the spell of metaphysical concep
tions of life, and the real facts of organic develop
ment were obscured, on the one hand by the
erroneous notion about the origin of life-forms, and
on the other by the forbidding nomenclature of
dry-as-dust specialists men whose vision was so
narrowed by pedantic devotion to details that they
could not see the wood for trees. By his pierc
ing vision into the heart of Nature s process, and
his marvellous co-ordinating faculty, Mr. Spencer
brought order out of confusion, and by the touch of
his philosophic magic wand revealed a new world of
surpassing interest and beauty. Biological science
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has made great strides since his work appeared, but
the strides have been mainly along the lines which
were indicated half a century ago by the unique
genius of the author of the Principles of Biology.
That the progress of biological knowledge has
been mainly on the lines laid down by Mr. Spencer
is evident from the revised edition of the Principles
of Biology published in 1898 and 1899. Since the
publication of the work in 1864 men of science
have accumulated facts in great abundance, but
these, instead of conflicting with the conceptions
of Mr. Spencer, harmonise with his philosophic
ground-plan. Since 1864 biologists have busied
themselves largely with the astonishing phenomena
of Metabolism, cell-life, and the questions of
heredity as raised by Professor Weismann. In the
new edition these problems are attacked with an
acumen and vigour which abundantly show that
at the age of fourscore Mr. Spencer s intellectual
vision has not become dim, nor his intellectual force
abated. Notwithstanding this, there is a tendency
in some quarters to question Mr. Spencer s method
of dealing with the intricate and minute facts of
organic life on philosophic principles a method apt
to be superficially confounded with the a priori
speculations of the old Nature philosophers. Dis
tinguished men of science, however, bear ungrudg
ing testimony to the great practical value of Mr.
Spencer s biological philosophy. In a letter datedTHE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 99
1898, a portion of which I should like to quote were
I permitted, an author of several biological works of
importance refers to the influence which the Prin
ciples of Biology exercised on him. In a review
of the revised edition Professor Morgan remarks:
What strikes one most forcibly on reading the
Principles of Biology in this new and enlarged
edition is the extraordinary range and grasp of its
author, the piercing keenness of his eye for essen
tials, his fertility in invention, and the bold sweep
of his logical method. In these days of increasingly
straitened specialism it is well that we should feel
the influence of a thinker whose powers of generali
sation have seldom been equalled, and perhaps never
surpassed. In the same strain men of the stamp of
Sir Joseph Hooker and Professor Ray Lankester
have borne testimony to the great and enduring
work which Mr. Spencer has done in the biological
field. On the Continent Mr. Spencer s labours have
met with hearty and generous appreciation. In the
January number of the Revtie Scientifique for 1899
appeared the following: The work of 18G4 itself
has unquestionably had a profound influence upon
these improvements [in the domain of biology since
18G4] in suggesting new inquiries and aims. Bio
logists cannot do without consulting the revised
work new on many points of the English philo
sopher; and doing so, they will find in it many
precious ideas and suggestions from which their100 HERBERT SPENCER
experimental work will benefit largely. And like
us they will be full of admiration for this work, so
all-compact and admirably arranged, so crammed
with facts and ideas, of the philosopher who has
exercised such a profound influence upon the science
of his time. Professor Yves Delage, Professor of
Zoology and Comparative Anatomy at the Sorbonne,
in the preface to his work, The Structure of the
Protoplasma and Theories on Heredity, etc., says :
What I have called positive experiment is often
as difficult to conceive as to accomplish, and if a
philosopher counsels it and a naturalist corroborates
it as well, it may so happen that the former has
not the least part in the success. The example of
H. Spencer is proof of it. With him the philosopher
is coupled with the naturalist, but, so to speak, with
a non-practising naturalist. I do not know if he
dissected animals or practised the ingenuities of
technical histology. Who would dare deny, how
ever, that he has rendered important services to
Biology? He possesses deep knowledge of bio
logical questions, and arguments drawn from
anatomy, histology, or embryogeny do not in any
way embarrass him.*
In the same connection my friend Professor
Arthur Thomson of Aberdeen, the distinguished
Scottish biologist, has favoured rne with the fol
lowing
: Mr. Spencer has a genius for seizing
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disposing facts in big groups, for disclosing what
one might call rational relationships and, in this
respect, quite apart from the Evolution theory, his
Principles of Bioloyy was an epoch-making work.
I mean that even as a balance-sheet of the facts of
life, the book is a biological classic ; consciously or
unconsciously we are all standing on his shoulders.
Indeed, many of us have had the experience of re
discovering clear ways of relating facts which we
presently find much better done in a brief paragraph
in the Principles. But then the great work was
much more than a careful balance-sheet of the facts
of life not that this was little, it was the introduc
tion of order, clearness, breadth of view, and gave
biology a new start, it also displayed the facts of
life and the inductions from these for the first time
clearly in the light of evolution. I mean that if the
evolution idea is an adequate modal formula, then we
need to think of growth, development, differentiation,
integration, reproduction, heredity, death all the big
facts in the light of this. This was not Darwin s
line ; he was a great evolutionist, but surely not
philosophic. Spencer s problems are not less real be
cause more general, though many who talk of &quot;organ
ism,&quot; &quot;growth,&quot; &quot;differentiation,&quot; etc., glibly, and
without ever feeling the problems behind every
word, would probably not admit this. I cannot say
that I have any great sympathy with those who call
Spencer an abstract biologist, a philosophical biologist,102 HERBERT SPENCER
etc., and mean thereby to suggest that he is not in
touch with, and is not treating of the real facts of
life. I should rather think that he got nearer the
realities than any one else. But I suppose the false
antithesis between philosophy and science will have
a lingering death, since even Spencer s work has not
killed it.
When regard is had to the profound influence and
epoch-making nature of the Principles of Biology,
Mr. Spencer may be allowed, with pardonable pride,
to express in the preface of his new edition a feeling
of gladness at surviving long enough to present his
work in a finished and modernised form.CHAPTER VII
THE EVOLUTION OF MIND
IN dealing with biological phenomena it was pointed
out that one great source of error was the fact that
the processes of Nature are necessarily studied in
an inverse order. We see effects before we discover
causes. Ignorant of the slow complex processes
of Nature, the mind naturally seeks for causes
sufficiently striking and dramatic to account for
imposing effects. As already remarked, had we
been ignorant of the mode of construction of a
steam-engine, we should naturally have attributed
its power of motion to a property, or in other
words to a Locomotive Principle. In the absence
of scientific knowledge man naturally falls back upon
entities as causes of phenomena. We have seen the
part which entities have played in Biology. Even
yet many scientific men, in dread of Materialism,
cling to the Vital Principle as the chief and
dominating cause of life and its multiform mani
festations. When we come to the study of mind,
we are not surprised to find that here, even more
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than in life in general, entities have played an
important part. The marvels of consciousness, the
mysteries of brain and mind, are so overpowering,
that the first impulse of the student is to look for
the cause altogether outside of ordinary cosmic
forces. Primitive man could find no cause adequate
to the effect short of supernatural power. In his
view, God formed man of the dust of the earth,
and breathed into him a living soul. As the
theological conception faded away, its place was
taken by the metaphysical conception. Instead of
a supernatural agent acting outside of the Cosmos,
the metaphysicians postulated an agent within the
organism. Just as a Vital Principle was invoked to
explain life in general, so an Intelligent Principle
was invoked to explain the conscious life of man in
particular. Philosophers pictured the mind as being
somewhat like a political State where intellect and
conscience ruled by a kind of divine right. Their
authority was liable to be overturned. Evil, in
fact, was the result of mental and moral anarchy.
The lower passions were in revolt against the
higher. Thus we have Butler plaintively remarking
that if Conscience had power as it had right, it
would rule the world. The process of thought
was personified until the intellect became, not a
generalised term, but an active agent. As Samuel
Bailey says: The faculties have been represented
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passing them on to each other mutually, and trans
acting their business among themselves. In this
kind of phraseology the mind often appears like a
sort of field in which perception, reason, memory,
imagination, will, conscience, the passions, produce
their operations like so many powers, either allied
or hostile.
Mr. Spencerrevolutionised Psychologybyabolishing
the absolute distinctions which metaphysicians had
drawn between mind and the outer world, between
subject and object. He dethroned entities and ab
stractions by the simple process of representing mind
and matter, not as two antithetical substances, but
as two phases of one cosmical process. Mr. Spencer
has made it impossible to speak of the mental life
of man as being under the control of a Principle of
Intelligence, or mysterious Entity, which creates
and directs thought. In the Spencerian philosophy
Psychology stands in close and necessary relation
to Biology. In both departments two all-mastering
conceptions hold sway the continuity of phenomena,
and the intimate relations between the organism and
its environment. If there is no absolute distinction
between non-living and living matter, it follows that
between the earliest and the latest manifestation of
psychical life there can be no absolute demarcation.
Between the humblest expressions of life in the
animal world and the highest manifestations in the
intellect of man, the difference is not one of kind106 HERBERT SPENCER
but of degree. The Spencerian Psychology is based,
not on the pre-evolution view that mind is an entity
with supernaturally endowed capacities, capable of
being studied apart from its material mechanism,
but on the idea that the mental faculties are evolved
by slow and imperceptible gradations, along with a
slowly evolving mechanism, in response to move
ments in the environment. And thus we are
brought back to Mr. Spencer s definition of life as
the continuous adjustment of internal to external
relations. The organism, however humble, can only
continue in existence by maintaining a correspond
ence with its environment. Where the environment
is simple, the organism is simple.
* A plant s vital
processes display adjustment solely to the conti
nuous co-existences of certain forces surrounding its
roots, and vary only with the variations produced
in these elements and forces by the sun. The life of
a worm is made up of actions referring to little
else than the tangible properties of adjacent things.
Progress towards higher life implies ability in
the organism to respond to more special and more
complex movements in the environment. Among
the humbler organisms the correspondences in the
environment are so few that the same structures
are capable of performing diverse functions ; but a
study of Biology shows that division of labour takes
place, so that in presence of a complex environment
organisms, in order to live, must develop complexTHE EVOLUTION OF MIND 107
structures. Biologically speaking, the degree of
life varies with the degree of correspondence.
At a certain stage in the evolution of life, the
environment becomes so complex that the corre
spondence cannot be maintained automatically by
the organism, however greatly differentiated in
structure and function. There comes a limit, for
instance, to the capacity of sight and hearing to
discriminate, as it were, automatically among the
external changes. At this limit life purely physical
shades into life psychical. In the higher animals
the ability to respond to complex external relations
is associated with a specialised form of matter
called nerve matter, which in its highest develop
ment is associated with Consciousness. The
science of Psychology, then, in the strict sense
of the term, begins with the dawning of Con
sciousness. Or, as it must be otherwise expressed,
Psychology is that department of science which
deals with the evolution of Consciousness by means
of which, and under the direction of which, the
mind maintains its correspondence with an environ
ment no longer purely material, but including history,
society, and all the influences which flow from the
atmosphere of conscious life and thought in a
word, civilisation. It is impossible in brief space to
indicate in detail the masterly manner in which Mr.
Spencer shows the close and intricate correspond
ence between life and its environment, and the108 HERBERT SPENCER
unrivalled skill with which he traces the crual
process of evolution of mind and its environment,
developing from the simple to the complex by suc
cessive integrations and differentiations.
The problem of Psychology, on the subjective side,
is to discover and determine the evolutionary pro
cess of Consciousness in other words, the law of
intelligence. If life in general is definable as
correspondence between internal and external re
lations, obviously mental life in particular, or
intelligence, must be included in the definition. It
is idle to inquire into the ultimate nature of Con
sciousness or Intelligence. We know no more about
the starting-point of Consciousness than we do
about the starting-point of Matter. In both cases
we begin with the homogeneity which we find in
Nature, and with that as the basis we try to
discover the cause of all the complex developments.
In its ultimate analysis Mr. Spencer finds Intelli
gence to rest upon the recognition of likeness and
unlikeness between primary states of feelings.
Grant to the mind the power of recognising and
distinguishing feelings, and it is plain that the
entire mental life of humanity, from that of a
savage to, say, a Newton, is the result of con
tinuous differentiation and integration of states
of consciousness. What is the law of intelli
gence? The law is no other than the association
of ideas.
* When any two psychical states occurTHE EVOLUTION OP MIND
in immediate succession, an effect is produced, such
as that if the first subsequently recurs, there is
a certain tendency for the second to follow it.
Upon this law all education is based, and upon it
rests the cogency of the sayings, Practice makes
perfect, and Habit is second nature. What, then,
are the evolutionary stages in the growth of intelli
gence? The first stage is reflex action, in which a
single impression produces a single sensation.
Reflex action scarcely comes within the domain
of Psychology, as, being automatic, it is performed
without consciousness. Its significance consists in
the fact that it is the connecting-link between
biological and psychological phenomena. Instinct
is a highly developed form of reflex action. With
instinct we have a combination of movements
following a combination of impressions, but in the
course of development the environment becomes so
complex that even highly developed instinctive
actions are not able to maintain their automatic
responses to the environment. The co-ordination
becomes irregular. So long as the actions between
the organism and the environment are automatic,
memory cannot exist. Memory emerges when the
correspondence is not complete. When the adapta
tion is re-formed, when the adaptation is again
complete, memory lapses into instinct, as may be
seen in the fact that a musician, who at first strains
his faculties to remember the notes of a new piece,110 HERBERT SPENCER
by and by plays the tune automatically, even so far
as to carry on a conversation at the same time.
That is to say, he plays instinctively, without
memory being called into exercise.
What of Reason? Is it a supernatural endow
ment, or an evolutional product ? According to
Sptencer, Reason cannot be absolutely demarcated
from Instinct. The difference between them is one
of degree, not of kind. So long as the adjustments
between internal and external relations are simple
and permanent, they are made instinctively. Instinct
may be defined as unconscious adjustments. When
the adjustments are many, complex, and temporary,
deliberation comes into play. Reason may be de
fined as conscious adjustments. The process of
evolution is thus luminously sketched by Mr.
Spencer
:
* While on the one hand instinctive actions
pass into rational actions when from increasing
complexity and infrequency they become imper
fectly automatic, on the other hand rational actions
pass by constant repetition into automatic or in
stinctive actions. Similarly we may here see that,
while on the one hand rational inferences arise
when the groups of attributes and relations cognised
become such that the impressions of them cannot
be simultaneously co-ordinated, on the other hand
rational inferences pass by constant recurrence into
automatic inferences or organic intuitions. . . .
The genesis of instinct, the development of memoryI
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and reason out of it, and the consolidation of rational
actions and inferences into instinctive ones, are
alike explicable on the single principle that the
cohesion between psychical states is proportionate
to the frequency with which the relation between
the answering external phenomena has been re
peated in experience. At this stage emerges Mr.
Spencer s great philosophical contribution, whereby
he revolutionised the science of Psychology by
bringing to an end the historic feud between the
Intuitionalists and the Experientialists.
In order to appreciate the full force of the Spen-
cerian theory of reconciliation, it is necessary to
present an historical sketch of the famous philosophic
feud, beginning with John Locke. Locke s whole
system of metaphysics rests on the idea that the
mind or soul exists as an agent independent of the
external world. The problem he set himself to
solve was the exact relation between the mind and
the world. Dissatisfied with the theory of innate
ideas, Locke took up the position that all knowledge
comes through the senses, consequently ideas are
the counterparts of sensations. The question which
immediately faced Locke was this What is that
thing called Matter which is the basis of all our
knowledge? He saw that all the properties of
Matter could not exist exactly as they seemed to
exist, because many of them were conditioned by
the mind itself. Light and heat, he saw, did not112 HERBERT SPENCER
exist as properties apart from the mind they
existed only in relation to the mind. But if matter
is clothed by the mind with secondary qualities,
what guarantee is there that the primary qualities
are not also in some ways conditioned by the
mind ? The result of Locke s inquiry was to leave
the mind just where Descartes left it in the
position of a self-acting entity. He dethroned
innate ideas, but he put nothing in their place.
With Descartes the mind was a constitutional mon
arch, conditioned in all its workings by innate ideas.
With Locke the mind was still a monarch, but one
whose system of government had fallen into anarchy.
Berkeley detected the fatal consequences of Locke s
philosophy. In order to dispel anarchy he got rid of
Locke s dilemma about the primary and secondary
qualities of matter by abolishing matter altogether.
According to Berkeley, Spirit, not Matter, was the
real substance of the Universe. At this stage
Hume appears, and in effect says to Berkeley : If
there is no evidence of the existence of matter as
a permanent substance, there is a like want of evi
dence for the existence of mind as a permanent
substance. What, says Hume, we are conscious of
is not an entity called mind, but a chain of feelings
linked together by association. In the hands of
Hume the reasonings of Locke and Berkeley ended
in scepticism. Locke s theory, like Berkeley s, was
formulated in the interests of Theology. LockeI
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hoped to find in Causation a stepping-stone to a
great First Cause; Hume, by substituting Associa
tion for Causation, knocked the props from Theology.
By resolving mind as an entity into a series of
feelings linked by association, Hume also knocked
the props from Psychology. Hume drove Theology
and Philosophy into bankruptcy that is what con
stitutes him an epoch-making force in the history of
thought.
Hume s destructive criticism roused into philo
sophic activity Immanuel Kant, whose contribution
to the problem took the shape of innate forms of
thought, instead of the innate ideas of Descartes.
Great as are the differences among the Germans,
they all, from Kant to Hegel, endeavour to break
the force of Hume s criticism by re-establishing in a
more plausible and subtler form the conception of
a self-acting Ego, a spiritual agent endowed with
potencies and capabilities, with forms of thought
apart from experience. An attempt has been made in
England to modernise Kant and Hegel, but it cannot
be said that the attempt, headed by the late Pro
fessor Green, has been a success. Nco-Kantianism,
instead of the old forms of thought, postulates a
single active self-conscious principle, a transcen
dental unifying principle, the one subject which
sustains the world and is the real knower in all finite
intelligences. Professor Seth Pringle Pattison effec
tively disposes of this latest attempt to construct an
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Idealistic theory when he says it is of a piece with
the Scholastic Realism which hypostatised humanitas
or homo as a universal substance, of which individual
men were in a manner the accidents. Similarly
here the notion in general the pure Ego which
is reached by abstraction from the individual, is
erected into a self-existent reality, an eternally
complete self-consciousness, of which the individual
is an imperfect representation or mode. Hume s
destructive theory was far-reaching. If the mind
was no entity, but a process, clearly a blow was
struck at innate ideas and intuitive forms of thought.
Naturally Hume s conception of mind commended
itself to the Experiential philosophers, like the two
Mills, in their crusade against the intuitional theory
of morals. With John Stuart Mill, mind resolves
itself, as with Hume, into a permanent possibility
of feeling. Mill s philosophy was transitional.
Effective enough in its polemic against the reigning
Intuitionalism, Empiricism, even in the hands of an
acute thinker like Mill, was incapable of returning
satisfactory answers to the fundamental problems of
Psychology. In regard to the root question, that
relating to the constitution and function of the mind,
Mill remained virtually at the position of Locke.
When the Darwinian theory of man s origin began
to gain general acceptance, it was evident that
Psychology would be profoundly influenced. If no
break was discoverable in the evolution of animalI
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forms, the difficulty was increased of making the
human mind an isolated entity with a specially
created constitution, in which were embedded a
priori forms of thought. Equally difficult was it to
conceive the mind as possessing nothing but a
susceptibility to impressions. Thinkers began to
ask whether the Darwinian theory did not involve
the view that mind also was gradually evolved from
a lower form of life. Pursuing this line of thought,
even before Darwin popularised it, Spencer reached
the far-reaching conclusion that what had hitherto
been accepted as necessary truths by the Intuitiou-
alists, and which the school of Mill never could
resolve into individual experiences, were beliefs
which, though a priori to the individual, were a
posteriori to the race.
Here, indeed, was a luminous conception a con
ception by the aid of which Empiricism was able
to make most serious inroads upon the Kantian
answer to Locke and Hume. As Mr. Fiske puts
it : Locke was wrong in calling the infant s
mind a blank sheet upon which experience is to
write knowledge. The mind of the infant cannot be
compared to a blank sheet, but rather to a sheet
already written over here and there with invisible
ink, which tends to show itself as the chemistry of
experience supplies the requisite conditions. Or,
dropping metaphor, the infant s mind is co-related
with the functions of a complex mass of nerve-tissue,116 HERBERT SPENCER
which already has certain definite nutritive ten
dencies. The school of Leibnitz and Kant was
wrong in assuming a kind of intuitional knowledge,
not ultimately due to experience. For the ideas
formerly called innate or intuitional are the results
of nutritive tendencies in the cerebral tissue, which
have been strengthened by the uniform experience
of countless generations until they have become as
resistless as the tendency of the dorsal line of the
embryo to develop into a vertebral column. The
strength of Locke s position lay in the assertion that
all knowledge is ultimately derived from experience
that is, from the intercourse between the organism
and the environment. The strength of Kant s posi
tion lay in the recognition of the fact that the brain
has definite tendencies, even at birth. The doctrine
of Evolution harmonises these two seemingly opposite
views, by showing us that in learning we are merely
acquiring latent capacities, by more or less power
ful nutritive tendencies, which are transmissible
from parent to child.
What Kant described as a priori principles Spencer
declared to be racial experiences which, by their
constancy and universality, have become organic
forms of thought operating with all the force of
intuitions. Manifestly, Spencer s matchless con
tribution to Psychology was rendered possible by
his destruction of the old conception of mind as a
self-centred entity with supernatural endowmentsTHE EVOLUTION OF MIND 117
or metaphysical properties, and the substitution of
the conception of mind as co-related with matter
mirroring its movements, and subject to the law of
reciprocity. Mind, in the Spencerian view, is no
entity, but a specialised form of a universal process,
and evolving in correspondence with its environ
ment. Up till Spencer began to write, mind had
been almost exclusively studied by the introspective
method. It was treated as an abstraction, and even
followers of Hume, like Mill, who had given up the
old idea of a separate mental substance, never
realised the importance of associating Psychology
with Biology, and studying mental processes in
their earlier pre-human manifestations.
Mr. Spencer s two volumes on Psychology are not
only an epoch-making work in the region of meta
physics, but they have also proved the forerunner
of a new method in the study of brain and nerve
dissolution as well as of evolution. So long as
the mind was treated as an entity, so long was
Psychology barren in the region of practical life.
When, however, the conception of mind as co-
related in structure and function to a material
organ and a nervous system became clear to Mr.
Spencer, it was plain that mental processes could
only be adequately studied through their physical
equivalents. If the development of intelligence
keeps pace with a developing nervous organisation
and increased complexity of brain, if the process of118 HERBERT SPENCER
evolution is not divisible into two sections, one
physical and one mental, there is no escape from
the conclusion that the lapse from intelligence, or
mental dissolution, will have its physical equivalent
in the shape of a disordered nervous organisation
and diseased brain structure. In that case Psycho
logy, as expounded by Mr. Spencer, becomes a
valuable aid to the practical physician. That it is
so, I am assured by no less an authority than Dr.
Hughlings Jackson, who in a private letter to me
states that he has
* found Mr. Spencer s Principles
of Psychology more useful than any other works
on psychology in the study of those diseases of the
nervous system which have a mental side. I
believe that Mr. Spencer s doctrines of Evolution
and Dissolution are of very great value in the
methodical analysis of cases of insanity, and further
that, on the basis these doctrines supply, relations
of different kinds of disease of the highest cerebral
centres to one another can be traced, and also re
lations of disease of these centres to diseases of
lower centres of the nervous system. Another dis
tinguished authority, Dr. Mercier, whose writings
have done much to elucidate the pathological as
pects of mental evolution, writes me as follows :
My idea of the value of Spencer s work is that he
has done for co-ordinations in Time what Newton
did for co-ordinations in Space, and by so much as
the intricacy and multiplicity of the former exceed119
those of the latter, by so much does Spencer s
achievement exceed Newton s. In my own official
work in Neurology, Psychology, and especially in
Pathology, I may almost say in the case of the
two former and quite in the case of the latter, he
has reduced chaos to order. He has at any rate
discovered the fundamental principles of these
sciences, and whatever systems are erected in
these sciences in the future must be erected on
the foundations he has laid. I am at present
engaged upon a book on Psychology in which I
am essaying to expand and apply his principles, to
supplement and fill in his outlines. This is sufficient
answer to those who contend that the Spencerian
philosophy, like the Hegelian, is a fantastic piece of
theorising, having little or no basis in reality. It
is Mr. Spencer s merit as a psychologist that to the
keenest speculative vision he unites a devotion to
fact so minute as to give his writings the stamp at
once of philosophic profundity and eminent practical
utility.
4
But, exclaims the startled reader,
*
if mental life
develops from biological life by unbroken stages,
there is no escape from Materialism. Foresee
ing this objection, Mr. Spencer has been careful
to point out that the terms Matter and Mind are
after all symbols, not absolute existences. When
the philosophical scientist endeavours to under
stand the nature of Matter and Mind he is baffled.120 HERBERT SPENCER
Though he may succeed in resolving all properties
of objects into manifestations of force, yet, says Mr.
Spencer,
* he is not thereby enabled to realise what
force is. Similarly though analysis of mental actions
may finally bring him down to sensations as the
original materials out of which all thought is
woven, he is none the forwarder ; for he cannot in
the least comprehend sensation cannot even con
ceive how sensation is possible. He sees that the
materialist and spiritualist controversy is a mere
war of words. ... In all directions his investiga
tions eventually bring him face to face with the
unknowable. He learns at once the greatness and
the littleness of human intellect, its power in
dealing with all that comes within the range of
experience ; its impotence in dealing with all that
transcends experience. He feels, with a vividness
which no others can, the utter incomprehensibleness
of the simplest fact considered in itself. He alone
sees that absolute knowledge is impossible. He
alone knows that under all things lies an impene
trable mystery. Students who have not gone to
the root of his philosophy conclude that because
Spencer, as distinct from Hegel, treats of the evolu
tion of concrete Matter instead of abstract Spirit,
therefore he is a Materialist. What Mr. Spencer
says is that thought is conditional upon brain
structure, and that increasing complexity of brain
structure is paralleled by increasing complexity ofI
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intelligence ; in both cases the law of Evolution
holds good. He is no Materialist. Like Job,
Goethe, Carlyle, and all kindred thinkers, Mr.
Spencer stands uncovered before the Power behind
phenomena that mysterious, awe-inspiring Power,
the source of all phenomena, material and mental,
the Infinite and Eternal, before which, now as of
old, the fit attitude of the human soul is one of
sacred silence and devout humility.CHAPTER VIII
THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OP SOCIETY
WHAT is called progress in the purely organic world
has been seen to consist in a series of structural and
functional changes from a relatively simple state
of organisation. Does social progress conform to the
same law ? According to Mr. Spencer, the formula
which is applicable to purely physical phenomena
embraces also social phenomena. ( Society, like an
organism, begins in a state of relative simplicity,
and by a series of structural and functional changes,
reaches a state of relative complexity./xThe task
which lies before the Sociologist is that of tracing
the evolution of society through its various stages,
from the primitive tribe to the highest form of
civilisation. Here as elsewhere he is not primarily
concerned with the question of origin. In treating
of cosmical evolution, the evolutionist commences
with the nebulae ; in dealing with organic evolution
he begins with indifferentiated protoplasm ; and in
studying the development of spciety his starting-
point is primitive man as historically discernible?^
122^V^jt-Cr o I
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY
The task of the evolutionist is clearly defined: he
has to discover the cause and law of social progress.
His first duty is to endeavour to get back to the
starting-point of human history, to the doings of
primitive man.
Whatever view is taken of man s relation to the
animal world, one thing is certain his condition
when history first catches a glimpse of him was not
far removed from animalism. Primitive man was
a creature of appetites and instincts controlled by
rigorous necessities. Led by the senses, he was
utterly devoid of morality in any real sense of the
term. Marriage was unknown; the social bond
weak and uncertain ; life resolved itself into a
bitter struggle for existence among a discordant
mass of antagonistic units. In a word, society
was in a fluid state resembling the nebulae of the
pre-planetary period. By what means was a start
made in the direction of social integration ? To the
Sociologist the answer to this question is of funda
mental importance. Once the cause of social pro
gress is discovered, we have within our grasp the
key to civilisation. The cause of social progress
must be found in the nature of primitive man. A
reference to Mr. Spencer s Principles of Psychology
shows that whether the habits of an animal shall be
solitary or gregarious depends upon the relation
between the two most general functions self-main
tenance and race - maintenance. Those animals124 HERBERT SPENCER
which can adequately provide for their own wants
lead solitary lives ; whereas those which cannot
supply their individual wants live and act in con
cert. Now of all animals man is least fitted to lead
a solitary life ; some kind of co-operation with his
fellows is an indispensable necessity. Here, then, is
the germ of sociality. The germ is increased by the
necessities of race-maintenance. It is a physio
logical fact that the higher and more complex the
physical and mental organisation the longer the
period of infancy. However crude and unsatis
factory the affection between mother and child in
primitive times, it must have been kept alive and
increased during the period of infancy. Not that
domestic relations had any coherence or stability.
There is good reason to believe that the family was
not the earliest form of social organisation. A
species of domestic communism seems to have pre
ceded family life, but under whatever form, the tie
between mother and child was enduring. Civilisation
on its highest and noblest side is rooted in mother
hood. Even in primitive society the strength of
affection fostered by the maternal relationship did
something to counteract the force of the purely
selfish feeling, and to increase the fund of sociality.
Sooner or later the family as an institution was
bound to evolve from tribal chaos ; and when it
did evolve the first step was taken in the path of
civilisation. Upon primitive man, when the stageof the family was reached, two pressing duties
devolved self maintenance and family maintenance.
In other words, the cause of social activity was
man s desire to provide for his own wants and the
wants of those dependent upon him. Comte,
followed by Mill, makes the..-. intellect the chief
cause of progress. According to them, civilisation
is prompted and controlled by ideas. Ideas play a
great and ever-increasing part in civilisation, but
they are not the prime cause. Progress has an
economic root. Injprder to live, in order to main
tain correspondence with his environment, man,
like plants and animals, must have adequate susten
ance. The first task imposed upon primitive man
by the rigours of his environment was not to get true
ideas, was not intellectual culture, but the grati
fication of his physical requirements. He had to
live, and the first necessity was to supply his
material needs. The cause of social progress lies
not in. the intellectual but in the physical side of
human nature. Society took its rise from the fact
that man by co-operating with his fellows was
abler to supply his wants than by individual effort.
Not that there was any formal contract, as Locke
and Rousseau would have us believe. Primitive
men formed themselves instinctively into tribes in
order to lessen the stern struggle for existence.
With the formation of tribes the struggle for
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times, owing to man s ignorance of natural laws
and processes, population constantly outran the
means of subsistence. Darwin has familiarised the
modern mind with the view of Nature as an arena
in which plants and animals are engaged upon a life-
and-death struggle for existence, a struggle in which
only the fittest survive. In this arena primitive
man also fought. We moderns have greatly lessened
the force of the struggle, because by science we
have learned to make the means of subsistence
outstrip the increase of population. But in early
times life was a perpetual struggle for the means of
subsistence, and naturally the struggle took the
form of wars between tribes. With an increasing
population and a stationary food-supply tribes had
either to starve or steal. A policy of annexation
was thrust upon men by sheer necessity.
It needs little reflection to see that wars must
have been an integrating factor of great force.
Militarism must greatly have increased the cohesive-
ness of the tribal bond
; in Spencerian phraseology,
it made for social integration. Under Militarism
the individual was necessarily subordinated to the
tribe or state. This subordination was intensified
by primitive religions which, by deifying the chief
or king, identified the law of the tribes or kingdom
with the will of Heaven. Thus it was that under
the military regime humanity was ruled both by the
dead ind the living ; indeed, the rule of the deadI
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was the stronger, inasmuch as the ruler was only
obeyed so long as he voiced religion and tradition.
The development of primitive humanity becomes
intelligible when we describe it as progress from
the tribal stage to a complex military stage by a
series of integrations and differentiations. But the
military regime contained one fatal defect. The
task of procuring sustenance became subordinated
to that of aggression. War, which in the earlier
stages was a means to an end, became ultimately
an end in itself. The nation was divided into
workers and warriors. Under the influence of
religion and patriotism, war was glorified as the
main function of life, and to the military ranks
gravitated the best talent of the community. In
the words of Buckle : The three most distinguished
statesmen Greece ever produced, Solon, Themistocles,
and Epaminondas were distinguished military com
manders. Socrates, supposed by some to be the
wisest of the ancients, was a soldier; and so was
Plato ; and so was Antisthenes, the celebrated
founder of the cynics. Archytus, who gave a
new direction to the Pythagorean philosophy, and
Melissus, who developed the Eleatic philosophy, were
both of them well-known generals, famous alike in
literature and in war. Among the most eminent
orators, Pericles, Alcibiades, and Demosthenes were
members of the military profession ; as also were the
two greater tragic writers, ^Eschylus and Sophocles.128 HERBERT SPENCER
The most philosophic of all the Greek historians
was certainly Thucydicles, but he, as well as Xeno-
phon and Polybius, held high military appointments,
and on more than one occasion succeeded in changing
the fortunes of war.
While war was held in the highest honour, in
dustrial labour was held in the greatest contempt.
As a consequence, slavery, as we see from the
political writings of Aristotle, was viewed as the
normal state of the lower orders. Following this,
there could be no such thing as distribution of wealth
among the people. Among ancient nations the
function of the people was to minister to the
pleasure of the rich, who held a monopoly of power
and wealth. Of all the nations of antiquity Greece
came nearest to the modern ideal, but she fell
because she endeavoured to import a democratic
constitution, suitable to the industrial regime, into
the military regime. Greece struck the note of
freedom and individuality, but she was a premature
development. Greece was born out of due season.
In a warlike epoch, a democratic community, resting
upon slavery, and devoting its resources to military
aggrandisement, could not hope permanently to
resist the encroachment of a world-wide military
power. Greece fell a prey to Rome. Rome in her
turn fell a prey to militarism with its false
economic system. Much has been said of the
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were at work religious, moral, social and
political, but underlying them all was the one
cause which was at the root of the decay of ancient
civilisation, namely, the unequal distribution of
wealth, with the resulting slavery of the popula
tions. Instead of production of wealth by means of
science and industry, there was annexation of wealth
by means of war and conquest. Instead of dis
tribution of wealth on the lines of intelligence and
industry, there was monopoly of wealth on the lines
of military force and slavery. The result of this
was the corruption of the governing classes and the
deterioration of the lower classes. So long sub
ordinated to the State, and treated as a mere chattel,
the individual was totally unfit to cope with the
fierce liberty-loving independent barbarians who
broke up the Roman Empire. Under the military
regime humanity failed to solve the first necessity
of life that of adequately providing for its own
sustenance. The great economic experiment in the
hands of Militarism had proved a colossal failure.
Rome arrested human progress, and Rome was over
thrown by the progressive instincts of humanity,
which nothing can permanently thwart.
Prom the ruins of the Roman Empire there arose,
slowly but surely, a new social order. This time,
owing to the widespread anarchy, society was
reorganised, not on the basis of the family or the
tribe, but on the Feudal system. At first it seemed
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as if one kind of despotism had simply been ex
changed for another. Feudalism was nothing if not
despotic, and it was difficult to see how society
would avoid the rock upon which it had already
split, the rock of Militarism. But in the heart of
Feudalism lay hidden the germ of progress. When
society began to assume a relatively settled form,
when all the great lords dependants were not
needed for military duty, a number were settled
around the estates as hinds and artificers. This
social differentiation had far-reaching consequences.
The moment an attempt was made to provide for
human necessities by means of labour instead of by
war, that moment a new hope dawned upon the
horizon of humanity. From the small body of arti
ficers which, slave-like, clung to the bounty of the
great feudal lords sprang Industrialism, with all its
world-transforming influences. Guizot traces the
earlier evolution of Industrialism as follows : No
sooner was society a little settled under the feudal
system than the proprietors of fiefs began to feel
new wants, and to acquire a certain degree of taste
for improvement and cultivation; this gave rise to
some little commerce and industry in the towns in
their domains; wealth and population increased
within them slowly for certain, but still they
increased. By and by the industrial serfs in the
towns of the lords domain began to feel their power.
They became what the slaves of the ancient worldI
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never became, an important factor in the social
system. To prevent the town serfs from increasing
in independence, the lords resorted to harsh and
despotic measures. Between the two a great
struggle for supremacy took place. It ended in the
triumph of the burghers, who freed the towns from
the harassing rule of the feudal law. From this
dates the emancipation of industry. Henceforth
freedom was given to a new power in the State.
The satisfaction of human wants was to be accom
plished, not by war, but by peaceful industry. The
individual man was at last permitted to secure his
own sustenance by means of labour, instead of
having the fruits of his labour taken from him by
war and slavery. When society acknowledged the
right of the individual to be what Nature intended
him to be, a being formed for self-maintenance, the
first stage was reached in the evolution of an
enduring civilisation.
The great problem of social evolution is to pre
serve the spontaneity and freedom of primitive
humanity along with the social restraints and
influences which are needful for the cohesion of
society. In Spencerian language, the difficulty is to
allow the cohesive or integrating forces in society
to have due influence without stamping out the
principle of variation or differentiation, upon which
progress depends. In the organic world Darwin lias
made us familiar with the truth that plants and132 HERBERT SPENCER
animals which do not respond to the variation in the
environment are doomed to disappear in the struggle
for existence. We have seen that ancient civilisa
tion disappeared from the same causes. Religion,
Government, economic error, all tended to produce
individual and social stagnation. The different
nations failed to adjust themselves to outer rela
tions, and Nature in her sternest mood stamped
them out of existence.
It is now to be seen how modern civilisation set
itself to solve the problem of uniting social cohesive-
ness with individual variability. Modern civilisation
in so far as it has been progressive has proceeded by
successive integrations and differentiations. We
have already seen the cause of social progress to lie
in man s efforts to satisfy his material wants. When
that cause is not allowed to operate, there results
individual and social stagnation. The operation,
when allowed to take place, must follow a definite
law. What, then, is the law of social progress?
The law is that where material prosperity, the result
of industry, is the most widely distributed, the
greater is man s progress intellectually, morally, and
socially. This has been so well stated by an
American author, Mr. Gunton, who has so admirably
applied the doctrine of Evolution to social philosophy,
that his words deserve to be reproduced: The
progress of society towards greater complexity of
organisation, in which the necessity of physicalI
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effort is diminished, intellectual power and personal
freedom increased, and moral character elevated, is
always in the ascending order from the material to
the intellectual and moral; the material being the
basis, the intellectual the means, and the moral
qualities the result. By overlooking the funda
mental importance of the economic side of society
great confusion has been imported into the study
of civilisation. One writer, De Tocqueville, mars
a series of otherwise profound generalisations by
tracing the social and political phenomena of modern
societies to the passion for equality, which in his
view is the distinctive note of democracy. To what
is the passion for equality due? Had De Tocque-
ville pursued the subject further, he would have
found that the passion for equality has its root in
the economic necessity of man to secure equal rights
as a primary condition of self-maintenance. Men
did not agitate for political freedom from an
abstract love of freedom : they sought for political
rights as a means of securing the right to labour,
and the right to the fruits of their labour. Like
De Tocqueville, Comte went astray in attri
buting civilisation to an abstract law like that of
the three stages, instead of to the economic law
that mankind seek to satisfy their material wants
along the line of least resistance.
When industry began to assert itself, two great
powers of resistance blocked the way, the134 HERBERT SPENCER
State and the Church. In the Middle Ages the
people were ground under two despotisms, the
Roman Catholic Church, and the State, as repre
sented by the feudal lords and monarchy. How
were these successfully attacked? The common
view is that the Roman Catholic Church had its
despotic power weakened by the Protestant move
ment, and that the despotism of the Crown and the
lords was weakened, in this country at least, by the
unique concessions arising from the Crown and
embodied in Magna Cliarta. That the revolt
against Roman Catholicism had a deeply religious
side no one would deny. But what made the revolt
a success ? A clue to the answer is had when it is
remembered that the Church of Rome came into
collision with the new industrial ideal. The teaching
of the Church, as Mr. Lecky well shows, was based
on monastic, ascetic, and other ideals which were
totally incompatible with the industrial and com
mercial spirit. At every turn industry and com
merce found themselves hampered by laws and
teachings which not only repressed individual effort
and initiative, which are the roots of Industrialism,
but which treated the accumulation of wealth and
devotion to money-getting as sinful. A religious
system which ran counter to the economic tendencies
of the new industrial epoch was bound to come into
collision with the growing intelligence which a life
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It was no accident that the Reformation, and for
that matter political freedom, made greatest pro
gress in those countries where the towns had gained
the greatest success in their contest with the
feudal regime. It is a significant fact that Eng
land was the only country in which the Free
Towns were not overpowered by either the Church,
the Monarchy, or the Barons : and consequently
it was the only country in which religious, social,
and political progress was not arrested. The
middle classes became a power in the State when
they wrested the control of the towns from the
barons, and the same classes, imbued with the
spirit of freedom and intelligence, the out-growth
of the industrial regime, broke the back alike of
Papal domination and aristocratic and monarchic
despotism.
One of the elements of perplexity which confront
the student of civilisation is the manner in which
phenomena, which were at first effects, ultimately
become causes. The desire for material satisfaction,
which is the primary cause of social progress, leads
naturally to increased knowledge of Nature. In
crease of intelligence, the effect, becomes itself the
cause of further increase of material prosperity, and
thus social differentiation, which began instinctively,
is followed consciously and with rational purpose.
No thinker has done more to show the close psycho
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civilisation than Mr. Spencer, and no thinker has
done more to focus the historical effects of the pro
cess than Oomte. Upon the mind of the student,
Oomte s picture of the Middle Ages, the fall of the
feudal regime, and the rise of the industrial epoch,
has all the effect of a panoramic vision. Were it for
nothing else than his magnificent historical survey,
Oomte would be entitled to everlasting remembrance
by philosophic students of intellectual, social, and
political evolution.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate in
detail the value of the various discoveries in science,
the increase of knowledge, the rapid progress of
inventions, upon the development of civilisation,
especially on the side of complexity and variability.
To these we must largely attribute the great con
trast between the fixity of ancient civilisation and
the flexibility of modern civilisation. But two
causes must be signalised as exerting a momentous
influence upon the great evolutionary course of
society, namely the substitution of Free Trade for
Protection, and the substitution of machine for hand
labour. In the past these have produced great
effects, the full force of which, however, will not be
felt till the removal of disturbing influences in the
form of certain politico-economic delusions. Even
yet the old superstition about the evil effect of
machinery is alive in the mind of working men ; and
they are not to blame when they can quote theECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 137
depreciatory words of Mill in his Political Economy.
And as regards Free Trade, the world is yet far from
admitting the truth of the great economic concep
tions of Adam Smith, who did for the industrial what
Newton did for the physical world.
What is the precise relation of Adam Smith s
economic gospel to the evolution of society ? No
greater evidence that the primary cause of social
progress is not ideas, but desires, is had than the un
reasoning way in which mankind carried into the in
dustrial era the ideas and methods which pertained
to Militarism. What a sad commentary upon human
intelligence is the fact that not till the time of
Adam Smith was the true theory of trade and
commerce formulated in scientific terms ! For cen
turies trade and commerce were conducted under
the influence of an economic theory which kept
alive the old features of antagonism that belonged to
the military period. Under the influence of Protec
tion trade and commerce, instead of uniting man
kind, kept alive feelings of disunion. War, instead
of dying away in presence of a higher type of civili
sation, was made an instrument of national aggran
disement. Nations laboured under the delusion
natural enough when wealth and conquest were
synonymous that they could only become prosperous
by beggaring their neighbours. In the words of
Adam Smith : Each nation has been made to look
with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the138 HERBERT SPENCER
nations with which it trades, and to consider their
trade as its own loss. Commerce, which ought to
be among nations, as among individuals, a bond of
union and friendship, has become the most fertile
source of discord and animosity. The intelligent
adoption of Adam Smith s doctrine as the corner
stone of foreign policy is only a matter of time ; and
when Free Trade is universal, humanity will advance
from the stage of nationalism to that of inter
nationalism. When that day arrives wars will
cease. As I have expressed it in my work on Adam
Smith : Free Trade rests, not like mercantilism, on
national independence, but on national inter
dependence. Under Free Trade the progress of one
nation makes for the progress of all. Fleets and
armies are no longer needed to secure a monopoly of
trade, to preserve the balance of power, because in
obedience to an economic law those countries which
are industrially equipped will share in the trade of
other countries, even in the teeth of protective
tariffs. Free Trade is not synonymous with a clash
of interests, but in essence means mutually advan
tageous exchange of services. Once this view is
reached, there flashes on the mind the vision of a
time when the whole world will be bound together
by the golden chain of self-interest, a self-interest
which recognises that, given the conditions of
liberty and justice, the gain of one is the gain of
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from the economic side, the application of Christian
ethics to the international sphere. Nations, instead
of being hated rivals, each armed to the teeth lying
in wait for the other, are seen to be members of a
great federation, each developing its resources to
the utmost, and exchanging its products in harmony
and with mutual profit. What a stride from the
ferocious tribal rivalries of primitive man, and the
scenes of carnage among the great military nations
of the past, to the doctrine of world-wide peace
taught by Adam Smith! Well might Richard
Cobdeu describe Free Trade as the international law
of God Almighty.
What an ennobling vision of humanity would have
been vouchsafed Adam Smith had he realised the
extraordinarily beneficent impetus which would be
given to his economic gospel in the age of machinery !
Wonder is often expressed at the sterility of the in
tellect of the ancients in the domain of inventions
and machinery. How could it have been otherwise ?
Even in Greece civilisation was represented by an
aristocratic elect maintained in idleness and afflu
ence by a slave population whose material wants
were few, limited, and stationary. Apart from the
fact that ancient thinkers looked upon labour as the
peculiar work of slavery, and were therefore not
likely to desire methods of saving labour, there was
not a population sufficiently developed to cause a
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produced at a profit unless in large and increasing
quantities. Until the lower classes had advanced so
far in material prosperity that there arose among
them a variety of desires other than the purely
material social and intellectual desires there
could be no market for the products of machinery.
The time was ripe when in England there had arisen
a large and comparatively intelligent middle class
who were so far removed from the claims of physical
necessity as to enjoy the pleasures and luxuries of
life.
In what way, then, does the substitution of
machine for hand labour help forward the evolution
of society? In other words, how does machinery
contribute to the material prosperity, intellectual
improvement, and moral elevation of the people ?
In pre-machinery days, when the market for labour
was small and uncertain, and when the wages bill
was the main element in cost, high profits could
only be received by cheap labour. When the market
was large and increasing, the superiority of machine
over hand labour turned to the advantage of the
worker. The advantage
&quot;is twofold. Intelligence
on the part of the worker becomes an important
factor in mechanical superiority ; consequently it is
to the advantage of the master to grant high wages
to the intelligent worker. Moreover, as the object
of higher wages is to cheapen production, it follows
that the worker, who is also a consumer, benefits inI
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the cheapening of products brought about by his
highly paid labour. Thus in a twofold manner the
working population profits by machinery by higher
wages and by their increased purchasing power. In
the words of an American economist :
* A reduction in
the price puts commodities within the reach of another
large class who were previously unable to consume
them, and the market is thereby extended, thus en
larging the income without raising the rate of profit
all of which tends to further increase the demand
for labour and to improve the general well-being of
the community.
A civilisation resting upon hand-made goods
necessarily involves the hopeless poverty of the
workers. In such a civilisation labour must neces
sarily be cheap and necessaries dear ; whereas in
the machinery era the situation is reversed wages
are increased and the necessaries of life cheapened.
When we say that wages are increasing, what does
that imply but that man the worker is increasing in
value ; and when we say that the necessaries of
life are being cheapened, what does that mean but
that for the consumer, who is also the worker, life
is becoming easier and more comfortable? The
ancient civilisations fell because man the worker
was of no value ; he was treated as a commodity to
be bought and sold as an instrument to be used for
the selfish enjoyment of a minority, whose corrup
tion brought social ruin. Modern civilisation con-142 HERBERT SPENOER
tains the elements of endurance because man the
worker is increasing in value with every increase in
intelligence and morality. As man the worker is
also man the consumer, it is clear that every advance
in intelligence, leisure, and morality must raise the
standard of society till intellectual and aesthetic
pleasures become no longer the monopoly of a rich
and cultured few, but the heritage of the many.
And thus we come to understand the Spencerian
definition of social progress as a complex process of
adjustment with a complex environment, comprising
not only material sustenance but all other intellec
tual, social, and ethical pleasures which distinguish
a being of great potential qualities. Civilisation is
simply the process of adjustment on a large scale
whereby man s whole nature, physical, intellectual,
and moral, develops in all its marvellous complexity
in response to an environment also increasing in
complexity.CHAPTER IX
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY
IN the preceding chapter an attempt was made to
formulate the cause and law of social evolution.
The cause is not intellectual, as Oomte and Mill
believed, but economic. Social activity has its
origin, not in the intellectual side of human nature,
but in the primitive passions and instincts which
man shares with the animal creation. Man, like the
animal, must provide for his material wants, and as
individual man is the weakest of animals, in order
to maintain with success the struggle for existence,
he is driven to associate with his fellows. More
over, as was shown, the germ of sociality fostered
by family life somewhat softens the fierce play of
egoism, and lays the foundation of altruism, which
in the higher forms of civilisation flowers in the
shape of patriotism, philanthropy, and all the heroic
virtues which link man with the divine. In dealing
with the political evolution of society, it is essential
not to lose sight of the economic root. Once the
economic root is overlooked, the thinker falls into
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the error of attributing political constitutions either
to the deliberate intentions of despots, as with
Hobbes, or to a social contract, as with Locke and
Rousseau, or to considerations of utility, as with
Bentham. If the economic root is kept steadily
in view, the political history of humanity becomes
intelligible.
A flood of light is thrown upon the origin of
political constitutions by Mr. Spencer s comparison
of society to an organism. What are the distinguish
ing characteristics of the animal organisation ? In
order that an animal shall live, the animal must
be possessed of a threefold structure: it must be
able to maintain itself by the assimilation of food ;
it must have a distributing system, by means of
which food is carried to various parts of the body ;-
and it must have a defensive system, by means of
which it can regulate its movements in presence
of enemies. In the most primitive form of society
this threefold constitution exists in the germ. The
tribe must provide itself with food, must secure the
means of subsistence. The manner in which this is
done determines the nature of the other two struc
tures the distributive and the regulative. In
primitive times, owing to man s ignorance, the
productive power of Nature does not keep pace with
the increase of population ; consequently the system
of distribution does not, as in later times, take the
form of friendly barter, of exchange, but of forcibleI
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appropriation. War is the normal state of primitive
society. Under these conditions, the political or
regulative structure is the natural outgrowth of the
economic structure. In other words, political con
stitutions are determined by economic conditions.
That this is so is evident from a study of early
societies. Where the economic conditions are simple,
the distributive and regulative systems are simple.
Where the economic conditions are complex, the
distributive and regulative agencies also increase in
complexity. Society, in the course of its develop
ment, obeys the Spencerian law of progress from the
simple to the complex through successive integra
tions and differentiations. Societies are divisible
into- two kinds Military and Industrial. Not that
these have existed separately. Under the military
regime industry necessarily existed, and under the
industrial regime militarism has never been wholly
absent. We call a regime military when industrial
resources are used to support the military system
in carrying out the national ideal of war. We call
a regime industrial when industry is the national
ideal, the army simply being used for defensive
purposes. Given a tribal kingdom, a nation pre
dominantly military, resting upon the idea that
economic prosperity depends upon the forcible ap
propriation of territory, and the political constitution
will evolve along certain natural and necessary lines.
In brief, political constitutions are determined by
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social necessities. Where these involve war, as
must be the case where prosperity is believed to be
synonymous with forcible possession of territory,
everything will be sacrificed to military efficiency.
The army will simply be the nation mobilised ;
industry will be exploited in the interest of war,
and the individual will be subordinated to the State.
The method of regimentation, so conspicuous in the
army, will be extended to all classes of the com
munity ; individual liberty will be reduced to a
minimum. In a word, an economic conception of
life which rests on war necessarily involves a political
constitution resting on despotism.
History abundantly justifies these generalisations.
In tribes where wars are rare, individual freedom
is greatest. With difficulty can the Chief secure
obedience. Even he himself is allowed to command
only so long as he pays due deference to tribal
customs which, though unwritten, have all the
coercive force of laws. With war, the situation
undergoes a change. In presence of enemies the
loosely-connected units form themselves instinc
tively into a compact mass under the bravest
leader ; the tribe undergoes a process of integration.
The democratic form of government which manifests
itself even in primitive tribes in a peaceful regime
gives place to a military dictatorship. At this
stage there is no difference between the military
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dictators who determine questions of defence and
offence naturally settle questions of a purely civic
character. Industry, being an adjunct of the military
system, comes under the sweep of the principle of
regimentation which naturally belongs to a state
of war. Be the outward form of government what
it may monarchical or oligarchical those in pos
session of power in the military regime carry into
the internal management of the nation the principle
of regulation or despotism, which in the army is an
absolute necessity. The individual has no rights
against the State. He is valued only in so far as he
contributes to the security of the State. In the
ancient world, where war was the main occupation,
the individual was used simply as an instrument for
the glorification of the State. The State might
grant him privileges ; he could demand no rights.
In Rome, as the result of social stability, philo
sophers began to talk about the law of Nature, and
progress in the recognition of individual rights might
have been made but for the eruption of barbarism,
which overthrew the ancient civilisation, and once
more placed Might on the throne of the world. The
long reign of militarism was necessary to pro
duce order out of confusion, and, of course, under
feudalism despotism again reigned supreme. The
military dictator under feudalism was as much the
political dictator as under the great despotic govern
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Spencer : Up to the tenth century each domain in
France had its bond, or only partially free, work
men and artisans, directed by the seigneur, and
paid in meals and goods. Between the eleventh
and fourteenth centuries the feudal superiors
ecclesiastical or lay regulated production and dis
tribution to such extent that industrial and com
mercial licences had to be purchased from them;
in the subsequent monarchial stage, it was a legal
maxim that &quot;The right to labour is a royal right
which the prince may sell and subjects may buy
&quot;
;
and onwards to the time of the Revolution the
country swarmed with officials who authorised
occupation, directed processes, examined products.
In the old English period the heads of guilds were
identical with the local political heads ealdormen,
wick-port, or burgh revees ; and the guild was itself
in part a political body. Purchases and bargains
had to be made in presence of officials. Agri
cultural and manufacturing processes were pre
scribed by law. Dictations, of kindred kinds, though
decreasing, continued to late times. Down to the
sixteenth century there were metropolitan and local
councils, politically authorised, which determined
prices, fixed wages, etc.
Under Militarism, whether in the ancient world or
in the modern feudal world, one process may be
detected, namely, the integration of tribes into com
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into nations. In all cases the inspiring motive was
the desire for territory by means of war. No doubt
other causes such as religion came into operation,
but the root-motive of social evolution was economic
the desire for wealth on the part of the governing
classes. War was the instrument of this desire, and
industrial workers were valued solely as providing
revenue for the ruler and a commissariat for the
army. Under such economic conditions, the political
constitution rested upon despotism, though the form
which it took differed in different countries. It
matters little about the form whether monarchical,
oligarchical, or feudal if the result is the same,
namely, the subordination of the individual to the
State. Social integration is an indispensable factor
in progress, but in studying organic evolution we
saw that an equally important factor is differentia
tion, and the power which an organism possesses
of varying in response to varying agencies in the
environment. Now the political constitutions which
evolved alongside of Militarism made no provision
for the factor of differentiation. Everything was
fixed by statutes. In industry, in religion, in politics,
variations which would have been profitable to civi
lisation were crushed out. The labourer who
claimed the right to work for himself was treated
as a rebel serf, the religious man who claimed a
right to dissent from the church was a heretic, and
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despotism was a traitor. Manifestly, under the
military regime, progress was impossible. Progress
was in danger of being arrested by a political
system of despotism. Whence was salvation to
come ?
In the previous chapter it was shown that a new
era appeared when Industrialism began to be of
more importance than Militarism. When, thanks
to feudalism, something like social security had
been reached, not war but industry became the
means of procuring wealth. Such a far-reaching
change in human affairs could not take place without
having a marked effect upon political constitutions.
With the rise of the Free Cities the old doctrine of
Might upon which political despotism rested gave
place to a new doctrine of Right. With the rise
of commerce and industry, the natural rights of
man, which had been hidden from view during the
long reign of militarism, clamoured for recognition.
The long contest between the feudal barons and the
freemen was something deeper than a squabble over
charters. At bottom the demand of the city-
dweller was the demand that no longer should the
individual be subordinated to the ruling power, that
the individual had certain natural rights with which
no political power, king, knight, or legalised govern
ment, could meddle. The abolition of serfdom had
its root in the feeling that the individual should no
longer receive his freedom as a privilege from hisPOLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 151
feudal superior, but could demand it as a right ;
and the victory of the towns over the barons implied
that men of industry and commerce had a right to
the fruits of their labour. The key to the political
evolution of society in this country, from Magna
Oharta to the last Reform Bill, is found in the fact
that the long period was a contest between the old
despotic elements in the British Constitution founded
on Might, and the growing industrialism with its
demand for the recognition of the fundamental rights
of man rights, moreover, which have a biological
and psychological justification the right to live,
the right to think, the right to labour, and the right
to the products of labour. The various modifica
tions in the British Constitution, from the absolutism
of the Stuarts to the constitutionalism of the Hano
verians, the oligarchy of the Lords, and the demo
cracy of the Reform period, represent successive
stages in the great contest between the old despotism
under which the individual had no rights as against
the State, and the modern view that the duty of
the State is not to confer rights but to safeguard
the prime rights of man, to which the State itself
owes its existence and its rationality.
In confirmation of the view that the political
constitution of a particular period is conditioned by
the dominant economic force, is the fact that Magna
Charta, the starting-point of England s political
freedom, was the product of the industrial and152 HERBERT SPENCER
commercial conflict with the military despotism of
the Grown. True, in the contest the burghers had
the co-operation of the barons, who single-handed
were unable to cope with the king. All the same
the rights embodied in Magna Oharta secured the
burghers against the violence of the barons as well
as against the despotism of the king. By Magna
Oharta it was declared that no freeman shall be
deprived of his freehold liberties or free customs,
be executed, or outlawed, but by lawful judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land. Here was
a great advance upon the military regime, which by
entirely subordinating the individual to the State
conceded privileges but denied rights. Magna
Oharta established in England the doctrine that the
individual had a right which the State dare not
override, namely, the right to justice. Fifty years
later, another right was wrested by the burghers
from the State the right to take part in the
councils of the nation by returning representatives to
Parliament. After the reign of King John, the towns
were granted charters which gave them municipal
independence, including the right to make their own
laws, elect their own magistrates and judges, levy
their own taxes, etc. The economic revolution by
which the Free Cities rose and flourished gave an
impetus to the political revolution which later
destroyed the absolutism of the Stuarts, weakened
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for the reformed Parliament in which the Corn
Laws were repealed, slavery abolished, Free Trade
declared, the legal code purified, and restrictive
laws which pressed heavily upon labour removed
from the statute-book.
Further confirmation of the view that political
evolution is conditioned by economic evolution is
had in the fact that in those countries where the
Free Cities were destroyed, where economic progress
was arrested, the political evolution received a
check, and a retrograde movement to despotism
took place. In Spain charters were granted to the
towns early in the eleventh century, and in the
twelfth they were represented in the Cortes. The
benefits of these political reforms were lost by the
religious wars which raged. In Spain militarism
was too strong for industrialism, which gradually
grew weaker and weaker until, in the fifteenth
century, the burghers ceased to be represented in
the Cortes. With the weakening of economic forces
in Spain began the decline of that great nation in
wealth and political freedom. In Italy the cause
of political freedom was also arrested by the fall
of the Free Cities. The decline of material pro
sperity was followed by the loss of all that makes
for progress. In France likewise the fall of the
Free Cities led to the revival of political despotism
and social misery. In France the burghers were
worsted in their struggle with the barons, the154 HERBERT SPENCER
feudal system was re-established in a form so odious
as to lead to the great Revolution. The Free
Cities, the outcome of economic forces, by ultimately
destroying the political system of militarism and
erecting a political constitution on the idea of
Right instead of Might, were the birthplaces of
material prosperity, and as a consequence became
the nurseries of civilisation.
An American writer, a thinker thoroughly imbued
with the evolutionary philosophy, sums up the close
relation between economic and political evolution
as follows : If we examine the progress of political
and religious freedom, we shall find that it has
always followed the line of the material prosperity
of the masses, rising where that rose, falling where
it fell, and becoming permanent only where indus
trial improvement had been general and continuous.
England was the only country in which the Free
Towns were not overpowered by either the Church,
the Monarchy, or the Barons, and consequently it
was the only country in which social and political
progress was not arrested. The Cortes of Spain, the
States - General of France, and the Republics of
Italy rose and passed away, scarcely leaving
their imprint upon the national character, while
the English House of Commons has ever stood out
as a conspicuous feature of modern civilisation.
The remark has already been made that in the
complex phenomena of social life it frequentlyI
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happens that effects become themselves potent
causes. Thus political constitutions, which are really
the effects of economic causes, by and by become
the causes of increased economic prosperity. How,
then, did legislation influence economic progress?
If we study the great legislative reforms of the
past from Magna Charta to the Reform Bill, we
find that they may all be summed up in three
words Life, Liberty, and Property. Whether we
study Magna Charta, the Reformation, Free Trade,
Political Emancipation, we find throughout them all
the assertion of the right of man to live, to think,
to labour, and to retain the products of his labour.
Legislative reform has mainly consisted in repealing
despotic measures which, congenial to the military
regime, and sometimes beneficent, were fruitful in
evil when carried forward to the industrial epoch.
Of late years a new theory of political evolution
has become popular a theory which cannot possibly
meet with the endorsement of the Evolution philo
sophy as here expounded. From the Spencerian
point of view any theory which advocates increased
power of the State, whether in the form of Socialism,
Collectivism, or Trade Unionism, stands condemned
as a retrograde movement, as an attempt to revive
parts of the political and regulative system which
belong to the regime of Militarism. If man has
natural rights, manifestly no power on earth has a
right to infringe them, be the motive what it may.156 HERBERT SPENCER
Under a military regime men may have to risk their
lives and their property to defend the national
existence, but in a civilisation resting upon pacific
industry no body of men can have a mandate to
tamper with the rights of their fellows. The funda
mental principle of Liberalism which finds ample
justification in the Evolution philosophy is this
Every man is to do that which he wills, provided
he infringes not the equal freedom of any other
man. Socialism, Collectivism, and Trade Unionism,
in their respective spheres, are attempts to destroy
the initiative and energy of the individual from
which have sprung the best elements in civilisation,
and revive the principle of regimentation which
belongs to the military epoch a principle which
makes man a slave, an automaton, a machine. In
the organic world progress is secured by the survival
of profitable variations by giving free play to the
principle of differentiation. Subordinate the man
to the State, and at once order is secured at the
expense of progress, and for the healthy evolution
of civilisation we have a repetition of the old
paternal communities of Peru, which were so lacking
in stamina that they fell before the first blast of
misfortune. It is no coincidence, but a natural
sequence, that Socialist ideas at home should lead
to revival of Militarism abroad. If it is legitimate
to legislate in the interests of the people in domestic
matters, it becomes equally legitimate to attendI
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to their interests abroad. If Parliament is com
petent to legislate on behalf of labour at home, it
is also competent to secure an increase of trade
abroad by means of diplomatic scheming involving
the risk of war. The revival of Militarism means
the revival of despotism, the decay of prosperity,
the decay of political and individual liberty, and a
lowering of those national ideals which have inspired
the best and truest of Englishmen in their heroic
battle for justice and freedom.
This retrograde movement receives intellectual
assistance from a school of political philosophers
who deny that man possesses natural rights. In
their view rights are creations of the State ; con
sequently there are no first principles in politics,
only expediencies. If this theory be correct,
Militarism and Socialism cannot be combated on
purely intellectual grounds. What has the Evolution
theory to say to this doctrine, which is simply a
revival of the social contract theory of Hobbes,
Rousseau, and Bentham? The idea of a social
contract has its root in the error into which Comte
and Mill fell, namely, the belief that progress is
the result of knowledge acquired and deliberately
organised. Now nothing but confusion results till
the truth is recognised that man s first steps in
progress are made, not by means of his intellect,
but through the spontaneous operations of his in
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of this truth, but he missed its significance by his
defective view of human nature. Man, with Hobbes,
is purely a selfish animal, and therefore with him
there was no road out of individual isolation to
social co-operation except by the way of deliberate
calculation of the benefits to be derived from the
social state and deliberate submission to a despot.
Bentham, like Hobbes, had a low view of human
nature. The only difference between them was that
the one saw no hope of social organisation except
through a despotic monarchy, whereas the other
pinned his faith to a utilitarian democracy. The
end which Hobbes sought to gain by absolutism,
Bentham, and for that matter Rousseau, sought to
gain by a popularly elected government whose aim
was the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
For the rights of man, which had fallen into discredit
by the excesses of the French Revolution, Bentham
substituted the happiness of man.
Had Bentham and his followers stopped to analyse
their political creed rigorously, they would have dis
covered that it is impossible to divorce the idea of
happiness from that of rights. What is meant by
the popular saying that self-preservation is the first
law of nature ? What is the meaning of the phrase
struggle for existence ? The meaning plainly is that
man, like the animal, asserts the right to live, the
right, that is, to exercise his powers and faculties.
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a natural consequence. Surrounded on all hands by
enemies and obstacles, primitive man finds existence
so precarious that, urged on not by deliberate
reasoning but by the instinct of self-preservation,
he joins himself to his fellows. He does not look
to government to procure happiness ; he expects
government to safeguard his freedom and security,
which are the conditions of happiness. Primitive
man loses his freedom in ways already indicated.
Governments, tribal and other, rob him of his
freedom, and then begins the contest between the
individual and the State. If it is the function of
governments to legislate for the greatest happiness
of the greatest number, such a social state is quite
compatible with the unhappiness of the minority,
and thus under Bentham as under Hobbes the indi
vidual has no claims against the State, which fulfils
its duty when the happiness of the majority is
secured. On the other hand, if the function of the
State is to safeguard the rights of man the right
to live, to think, and to labour then the requisite
conditions are secured for the individual to realise
his own happiness. By making happiness the direct
aim of legislation you deprive a minority of their
happiness; by making liberty the direct aim, you
produce happiness as a natural consequence, or at
least you make the happiness of the individual the
direct result of his own conduct. If he chooses to
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for his unhappiness, whereas under the Benthamite
constitution the happiness of the minority is neces
sarily interfered with to increase the happiness of
the majority. Or as it might be put otherwise,
happiness in man is the natural consequence of the
developments of his instincts, desires, and faculties.
This development cannot take place unless under
favourable conditions in other words, where liberty
to develop is secured. Thus the conclusion is reached
that so far from society being dependent upon
government for its existence, government is simply
an effort to procure the necessary conditions for the
proper development of society. Society exists before
government. Governments do not exist for the
purpose of laying down the principles of social co
operation. Social co-operation grows out of the
desire of men for one another s society for purposes
of mutual help. The true function of government
is to see that the individual in the assertion of his
liberty does not encroach upon the liberty of his
fellow. Nowhere has the distinction between society
and government been more clearly stated than in
the writings of Paine, the author of The Rights of
Man : A great part of that order which reigns
among mankind is not the effect of government. It
had its origin in the principles of society and the
nature and constitution of man. The mutual de
pendence and reciprocal interest which man has in
man and all the parts of a civilised community uponeach other create the great chain of connection
which holds it together. The more perfect civilisa
tion is, the less occasion has it for government,
because the more does it regulate its own affairs
and govern itself. Government is nothing more
than a national association acting upon the principles
of society a definition very different from the one
given by those who deny the rights of man, namely,
that society is the creation of government, and needs
to be regulated by paternal methods.
In their practical results these opposing theories
may be studied in the Old and New Liberalism.
About the time of the French Revolution, Liberalism
underwent an important change a change which
Burke was the first to detect. Rousseau shifted
the foundation of Liberalism from natural rights to
political rights. According to the French thinker,
the fundamental right of man was not the right to
liberty, but to an equal share in the government of
the country. The people in the exercise of their
political rights being in the majority were sovereign;
what, and only what, they legislatively declared to
be rights were treated as rights. The hitherto
accepted natural rights (liberty and property) could
be annihilated by the fiat of the all-powerful majority.
It is this French theory of political thought which
has passed into British politics under the name
of the New Liberalism. According to the Old
Liberalism, every man has a right to his own
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property ; according to the New Liberalism the
majority have a right to encroach upon other
people s property in order, as Mr. Chamberlain s
* Radical programme puts it, to increase the
comforts and multiply the luxuries of the masses.
The Old Liberals would have spurned such an inter
pretation of their creed. In their view, justice and
liberty had nothing to do with majorities and
minorities. They fought against slavery, not
because it was supported by a powerful minority,
but because slavery was a violation of the funda
mental right of man to personal liberty. The Old
Liberals fought for toleration, not on the majority
principle, but on the principle that no power on
earth had a right to interfere with liberty of con
science. The Old Liberals advocated an extended
franchise, not in order to shift absolute power from
the classes to the masses, but in order to give every
citizen the power to protect his interests. In other
words, with the Old Liberals an extended franchise
was meant to be a safeguard, not an engine of
oppression. The Old Liberals strove to secure for
every man equality of opportunity ; the New Liberals
are striving to procure equality of conditions. They
tell Lazarus, who has been sitting at the rich man s
gate, to take his place boldly at the rich man s
table. In Australia the New Liberalism has borne
its logical fruit. Some years ago, at a meeting in
Sydney of the unemployed, one speaker demandedI
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that the Government should give as a right, not as
a favour, six shillings a day and guarantee work for
twelve months. He further advised the unemployed
not to submit to insults to their independence ! On
the principles of the New Liberalism there is
nothing to prevent the unemployed, if they are in
the majority legislatively, dividing the wealth of the
country among the masses. The passion for equality
when divorced from the passion for justice becomes
a potent instrument of national demoralisation. On
one occasion when Turgot was asked to confer a
benefit on the poor at the cost of the rich, he re
plied :
* We are sure to go wrong the moment we
forget that justice alone can keep the balance true
among all rights and interests. France forgot that,
and went terribly wrong. The Liberal party of the
present day is in danger of making the same fatal
mistake.
To Mr. Spencer belongs the credit of bridging
the gulf between the two views. Agreeing with
Hobbes and Bentham that government is a necessity,
he differs with them as to the origin of that necessity.
Where Hobbes, Bentham, and Rousseau make happi
ness the motive of legislation, Spencer makes it the
result. According to Spencer the legislation has to
do, not with happiness, but with justice. By tracing
the social instincts of man to their biological and
psychological roots, Spencer shows that the motive
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animal and man, is the desire for freedom to develop.
Grant this, and the first and indispensable condition
of happiness is secured. The practical bearing of
these two views of society is far-reaching. If the
function of government is directly to produce social
happiness, there is no escape from paternal legisla
tion, which in practice leads to the rule of a despotic
majority. If on the other hand the function of the
government is to maintain the liberty of the
individual, so far as he does not encroach upon the
like liberty of his fellows, then not only is despotism
impossible, but the way is open for the development
of all kinds of energies and talents in short, for
the growth of those individual variations which
in the social as in the natural world are the real
elements of all enduring progress. The two factors,
order and progress, which previous thinkers were
unable to reconcile, are in the Spencerian theory
brought into a union at once philosophically satis
fying and politically fruitful.CHAPTER X
THE ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY
Two things filled the soul of Kant with awe the
starry heavens above and the moral law within.
What more natural than that the reflective as
well as the uureflective portion of mankind should
attribute these marvellously mysterious phenomena
to the direct creative act of the Deity? How
plausible seemed the primitive theory that God
created the heavens and the earth by His Almighty
fiat, by the word of His power. For ages the
human mind in dealing with the starry heavens
clung to the conception of creation. Similarly
with the moral sense. Man, it was believed, was
created with a keen sense of right and wrong, with
a faculty called Conscience, which was described
as God s vicegerent in the soul. How was this
conception harmonised with the admitted tendency
of man to do wrong ? Either Conscience spoke with
an uncertain voice, or some great anarchic revolution
had taken place in the soul of man whereby God s
vicegerent was deposed, or Conscience itself was
the product of circumstances, man being really at
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the mercy of his passions, like a rudderless ship
in a stormy sea. The theory of the fall of man
held sway in one shape or another for ages. Man,
it was believed, was created as perfect as the
starry heavens, but by virtue of free will, man had
the power of thwarting the design of the Creator ;
by one act of disobedience man entered upon a
career of racial rebellion. Man, it was said, knew
the right but preferred the wrong. Conscience
reigned but did not govern. With the decay of
theological conceptions, the theory of a separate
faculty called Conscience, whose function it was
to preside over the ethical side of human nature,
fell into discredit. Great efforts were made to
preserve in metaphysical form the essential idea
of the theologic conception. Thinkers who had
departed widely from the old supernaturalism still
endeavoured to keep alive the idea that man was
born with an intuitive sense of right and wrong.
Discarding the theological foundation, they made
strenuous efforts to make Conscience a fundamental
attribute of human nature. Adherents of the
intuitive theory of morals were faced with one
supreme difficulty that of accounting for the diverse
and contradictory views of morality existing in
different ages of the world and among different
races of man. On the theological theory these
diversities and contradictions were plausibly ex
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natural view of man, the intuitive thinkers were
incapable of bringing these views into harmony
with history and experience.
How was the difficulty to be met ? If Conscience
is not a supernatural germ implanted in man by
God, and if the facts of life are incompatible with
the intuitive theory of an innate sense of right and
wrong, where is the solution of the problem to be
found? Another set of thinkers professed to have
discovered the key to the problem. They declared
that Conscience is not primary but derivative. In
their view man s desire for- happiness is primary,
Conscience being compounded of several elements,
notably the element of coercion which follows from
the conflict between contending passions in the
individual and contending individuals in society.
The efforts of the Utilitarians, from Bentham to
J. S. Mill, were devoted to the attempt to show
how the belief in Conscience, the sense of right
and wrong, may be traced to individual experiences
of happiness and unhappiness. The Utilitarian
school failed in the sphere of ethics, as it failed,
as was shown, in the sphere of economic history,
by giving undue prominence to conscious reflection
as an element in primitive progress. Primitive
men did not seek to acquire wealth from con
scious motives, nor did they, as Locke believed,
draw up a social compact from a deep sense of the
benefits of social co-operation. No more did primitive168 HERBERT SPENCER
men make utility the avowed and consciously pursued
means of securing the greatest amount of happiness.
Primitive man was not, as the Utilitarians assumed,
a reasoning and calculating animal. The Evolution
theory in the realm of ethics successfully attacked
the problem which the Utilitarians found insoluble.
So long as morality as a science was viewed
from the standpoint of empiric Individualism, Utili
tarianism as advocated by Mill had great difficulty
in repelling critical attacks. Spencer came to the
rescue by substituting the racial for the individual
standpoint. As he puts it in his letter to Mill,
* Just in the same way that I believe the intuition
of space possessed by any living individual, to have
arisen from organised and consolidated experiences
of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to
them their slowly-developed nervous organisations
just as I believe this intuition, requiring only to be
made definite and complete by personal experiences,
has practically become a form of thought, apparently
quite independent of experiences; so do I believe
that the experiences of utility organised and con
solidated through all past generations of the human
race, have been producing corresponding nervous
modifications, which, by continued transmission and
accumulation, have become in us certain faculties
of moral intuition certain emotions to right and
wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis ,u
the individual experiences of utility.I
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In his highly original work, The Origin and Growth
of the Moral Instinct, Mr. Alexander Sutherland
goes to the root of the failure of Benthamite
Utilitarianism, when he says: To the individual
in actual life, the test as to the Tightness of an
action is never supplied by a consideration of its
usefulness to the race. The true test he finds
within himself in his instinct of sympathy. The
philosopher is justified in proving that these sym
pathies have grown up and exist within us in
order to minister to the use and preservation of
the species, and it thus happens that while morality
is founded on sympathy, sympathy is founded on
utility. It would be doing a gross injustice to
men such as Bentham, Austin, and Mill, to imagine
that they were not themselves clear-sighted enough
fully to perceive this chain of causation. But
they lost their hold of a general assent by suffer
ing the middle link to drop out of view ; and the
public, which acts rightly, not by reason of any
abstract notion of utility, but by the inward impulse
of sympathy and duty, has always resented what
seemed to be the application of a cold and prag
matical principle to a warm and beautiful senti
ment. Discarding alike the theological theory of
man as supernaturally created and endowed with
Conscience, and the Utilitarian theory of man as
guided by reason and consciously testing right and
wrong by experiences of utility, the evolutionist170 HERBERT SPENCER
bases his ethical philosophy on the view of man in
his primitive stage as not much removed from the
animal, and under the control of desires, passions,
and instincts. In his view the ethical evolution of
man is co-related with the economic, political, and
intellectual evolution of society. Ethical codes are
not supernaturally imposed upon mankind, nor are
they intellectually elaborated from experiences of
utility ; they are evolved in the course of man s
struggle for existence, and are determined by that
struggle in its threefold aspects the struggle for
self-maintenance, family
- maintenance, and race-
maintenance.
In dealing with economic evolution, the question
was as to the material result increase and dis
tribution of wealth. In dealing with political
evolution the question was as to the conditions
that of liberty or despotism under which the
economic forces work. In dealing with ethical
evolution we are concerned with the effect of the
economic and political evolution on the feelings
and sentiments of man, and the reaction of those
feelings and sentiments upon society. In this
connection it is necessary to recall the words
used in a previous chapter in treating of the root-
passions of society : Whether the habits of an
animal shall be solitary or gregarious depends
upon the relation between the two most general
functions self-maintenance and race-maintenance.I
ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 171
Those animals which can adequately provide for
their own wants lead solitary lives ; whereas those
which cannot supply their individual wants live and
act in concert. Now of all animals man is least
fitted to lead a solitary life ; some kind of co-opera
tion with his fellows is an indispensable necessity.
Here, then, is the germ of sociality. To this must
be now added the remark that in sociality we have
the germ of morality. The two things are distinct,
though closely related. Sociality may exist without
morality, as among the lower animals, but morality
cannot exist without sociality. For a true under
standing of ethical evolution it is essential to trace
the gradual and subtle manner in which sociality
shades into morality. In order that we may be
able to trace the various stages, it is necessary to
have a clear idea of the end which Nature has in
view in social evolution. Unless we understand
the aim of Nature, no intelligent understanding is
possible of the process. The aim of Nature is to
favour the existence of those individuals, families,
and organised societies that are most successful in
maintaining themselves in presence of numerous
competitors. We call conduct ethical in the highest
sense which consciously furthers the efficiency of
the individual, the species, and the social state.
In no existing society has this ideal been realised,
but we must keep this ideal in view if we wish to
trace the various stages in the ethical process.172 HERBERT SPENCER
Manifestly such a process would be impossible, were
it not for the element of sociality. Those very
passions which stamp man as a selfish animal contain
the germ of sympathy which in higher civilisations
blossoms into altruism and all the virtues and graces
which adorn humanity. Adam Smith was right in
making sympathy the basis of morals, but in the
absence of knowledge it was impossible for him to
analyse sympathy, which is a complex quality, into
its simpler social elements. How does sympathy
evolve from the rude selfish passions of primitive
man? Sympathy develops out of sociality, to which
primitive man is driven like the animal by his pas
sions and necessities. Primitive man is not a con
scious co-worker with Nature ; he is carried on by
forces over which he has no control, the tendency
of which he cannot detect, and the aim of which
he cannot understand. The rate at which sym
pathy develops is the measure of ethical evolution.
Sympathy is the root of all the virtues.
On the ethical side, the struggle which is every
where found in Nature resolves itself into a struggle
between the selfish and sympathetic sides of human
nature. Other things being equal, Nature favours
the sympathetic man at the expense of the un
sympathetic ; the family and tribe bound together
by sympathy are more than a match for families
and tribes which are torn by internal dissensions,
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So important are the sympathetic instincts that we
can detect in the animal world the beginning of the
great ethical evolution which in mankind has reached
such an advanced stage. In the earlier stages of
animal life, Nature secures the perpetuation of
species by means of an extraordinary individual
fertility. Among fishes the average mother deposits
more than 600,000 spawn, out of which perhaps one
or two remain to maintain the existence of the
species. Nature scatters the germs of life with
prodigious prodigality, so as to make sure that in
the midst of the prodigious destruction a few of the
germs will be saved. Under such conditions, where
there is no parental care, sociality is impossible.
This stage, which may be called that of competitive
fertility, gives place to another stage, that where
success in the struggle for existence is determined
by higher nerve organisation, and increased brain
power and intelligence. Mr. John Piske has de
monstrated conclusively that one result of increase
in nerve and brain organisation is prolongation
of infancy. Thus we find in the more highly-
organised animals a close connection between
parent and young. The period of helplessness
draws forth the emotional power of the parents,
and among the higher class of animals we detect
features of conduct quite human, as when the
mother monkey rushes with her young to a hiding-
place and then turns and faces death with a sense174: HERBERT SPENCER
of satisfaction. Through the animal world the
strength of the sympathetic instincts are in direct
relation to the period of infancy, which again is
determined by the slowness with which the complex
nervous system and brain evolve.
When we come to primitive man the process
becomes distinctly traceable. To make this plain,
it is necessary to bear in mind the description
in a previous chapter of primitive man from the
purely economic side. Primitive man was a
creature of appetites and instincts, controlled by
rigorous necessities. Marriage was unknown ; the
social bond weak and uncertain ; life resolved itself
into a bitter struggle for existence among dis
cordant units. . . . However crude and unsatis
factory the affection between mother and child in
primitive times, it must have been kept alive and
increased during the period of infancy. The family
is the ethical unit as it is the economic and political
unit. In treating of biological evolution, it was seen
that environment is the controlling cause. Unless
an animal can adapt itself to its environment, unless
its structure and functions are in harmony with its
surrounding, it must perish. It is the same with
emotions and sentiments. Called forth by the
environment, they are determined in their nature
and force by the environment. Now, what is the
environment which confronts the family as the
ethical unit ? The environment is no other thanI
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other families whose attitude is that of chronic
hostility. Inside the family circle certain narrow,
rude, but powerful sentiments hold sway such as
paternal and fraternal sympathy, courage, self-
sacrifice, and the martial virtues generally. But
there comes a time when, for purposes of protection,
families join to families, and the clan is formed.
This extension of the environment leads to exten
sion of the sympathies, which, no longer confined to
the family circle, embrace all who are associated
together in defence of the clan. With the extension
of sympathy inside the clan area, there still exists
a feeling of hostility to all outside. The feeling of
clannishness is greatly deepened by religion, by
bringing into operation the sanction of departed
chiefs, and by the commands issued by living chiefs,
whose governments become increasingly despotic
with the increase of hostile relations with tribal
enemies. Along with the military regime there
evolves an appropriate ethical code. The finer and
tenderer virtues can have no place in a state of
society in which war is the dominating form of
activity, where industry is left to slaves, and where
cannibalism and infanticide are recognised features
of the national life. In the military regime the
sympathetic qualities of human nature, fostered by
family life and man s need for social co-operation,
are arrested, and the few virtues which war calls
into exercise are of a hard, imperious, and loveless176 HERBERT SPENCER
type. How potent war is in arresting ethical
evolution is shown by the fact that in all the
ancient civilisations, from the barbaric empires of
the East to the comparative civilisations of Greece
and Rome, no room was found for the specifically
Christian virtues of gentleness, charity, mercy,
benevolence, and forgiveness. Morality is not the
root but the fruit of civilisation, and hence in a
national life based on antagonism to other national
lives, those peculiarly civilised virtues which we
identify with love of humanity as such could not
possibly blossom.
In Greece and Rome, in the minds of a few philo
sophers, there dawned the idea of an environment
beyond the confines of the tribe, the nation, and
the empire. Thanks to the world-wide conquests
of Rome, the idea of a humanity beyond racial
boundaries began to dawn upon the mind of philo
sophers, but at best the feeling was more senti
mental than real. Socrates spoke of himself as a
citizen of the world, and Roman Jurists were
familiar with the idea of a humanity resting, not
upon blood relationships and national privileges, but
on natural rights. The Founder of Christianity gave
this idea vivid and practical form when He boldly
declared for the brotherhood of man on the basis of
one Father in Heaven. Evolutionists have not
done justice to the great impetus given to the
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Enamoured of massive generalisations, students of
evolution have sometimes under-estimated the
immense power in history of great personalities,
who, by unlocking new forces in human nature,
have frequently done more than general causes
to modify the course of civilisation. Unhappily
personal influences tend to be transient, and thus
it has happened that the pacific creed of the
Founder of Christianity gradually was pressed into
the service of war, and ended, in the Middle Ages,
in contracting the idea of human brotherhood till
it became synonymous with a theological concep
tion narrower even than the tribal conception
with its dogma of destruction to all outside the
pale. Christianity on the ethical side failed because
the ideas of its Founder were in advance of the
time. The Sermon on the Mount came into conflict
with the ethical ideas of the military regime, which
lasted till the economic revolution produced by the
doctrine of Free Trade. In fact the military regime
is not yet extinct, as may be seen by the revival of
Protection theories in our day, accompanied by the
increase of armaments as a condition of increased
trade and commerce.
Still the economic doctrine of Adam Smith is
destined to have incalculable influence upon ethical
evolution. The relation of the doctrine of Free
Trade to ethics is thus stated in my book on Adam
Smith: At the first blush it would seem as if,
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from the Darwinian point of view, Nature was
given over to universal warfare. In In Memoriam
Tennyson has given fit poetic expression to the
sombre, not to say gloomy, thoughts which force
themselves upon the cultured observer of Nature.
Now it is usually forgotten that in order to em
phasise the rationality of his view of the origin of
the marvellous variety and complexity of species, it
was necessary for Darwin to call special attention
to the struggle for existence and its prime cause,
namely, the tendency of population to outrun the
means of subsistence. There are two other ten
dencies, however, which, as not bearing on his
particular problem, Darwin did not specify, but
which must be taken into account in any philo
sophical survey of History, namely, the tendency
of man, in order to relieve the intensity of the
struggle for existence, to unite with his fellows,
and the tendency of man towards increasing intelli
gence by which he can increase the productive
power of nature, thereby checking the fierce struggle
which in the animal world goes on between popula
tion and subsistence. See how these two tendencies
give to human evolution the quality of hopefulness.
The fierce struggle for existence, which among
animals leads to warfare, among men has the same
result in the earlier days of primitive life. But by
virtue of dawning intelligence and the germs of
co-operation developed in family life men discoverI
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the advantages of union. Whereas animals fight
one another for food which is more or less scarce,
men by co-operative methods begin to grow food,
thereby increasing the productive power of nature.
In order to facilitate the process comes division of
labour, which leads to barter ; and thus, instead of
a fierce struggle for existence between isolated
individuals, we have the beginning of a new method,
that of co-operative assistance in the struggle for
existence, and for result great increase in the total
means of subsistence, and great increase in the
individual share. The individual who co-operates
with his fellows may not get all he would like, but
he gets infinitely more than if he had earned his
livelihood in solitary fashion.
Troublous times lie before us ere modern statesmen
incorporate into their foreign policy the great truth
which Adam Smith taught, namely, that all human
interests are harmonious. Mankind does not seem
yet advanced enough ethically to make the passage
from nationalism to internationalism in pacific
fashion. On the path of civilisation there are great
stages tribal, national, and international. The
state of hostility, as we have seen, is the normal
state of the race in early times. Outside of the
tribe all is hatred, revenge, and bloodshed. The
necessities of life compel kindred tribes to amalga
mate. Towards those tribes which remain outside
the union a policy of hostility is still pursued. An-180 HERBERT SPENCER
other step is taken when the tribes amalgamate
over a still larger area, and the nation evolves.
Within the national area we find reciprocity of
interests taking the place of the old idea of antago
nism of interests : the descendants of the old High
land clans live and work peacefully with one another,
whereas their ancestors lived in a state of feud.
What brought about this change? The necessities
of life have taught the descendants of the old fight
ing clansmen the truth that peaceful co-operation
is more profitable and pleasurable than the old
regime of hostility. If the student desires to see
how the tribal stage merges into the national,
through the gradual substitution of co-operation for
hostility, he has only to peruse Guizot s book on
civilisation, where the process is traced in impres
sive panoramic fashion. The nineteenth century
has borne the greatest share in the work of nation-
creation. Out of the chaos of conflicting interests
have been evolved the various harmonies which give
to the respective nationalities a common unity.
The course of national evolution has reached its
natural end, and the energies of the various peoples
are seeking international outlets. The scramble
in China, the race for territory in South Africa,
the expansion of Britain in Egypt, what are all
these but evidence of the fact that civilisation is
beginning to overflow its old boundaries, and is
becoming world-wide in its aspirations? It is aI
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suggestive fact that humanity has always been
under the delusioa that war is a necessary factor
at each evolutionary stage. We have had tribal
wars and national wars, and now we have a wide
spread belief that international interests are so
antagonistic that war is unavoidable. Thus we find
influential public men so saturated with the idea
of the necessity of war that the national resources
are spent enthusiastically in increasing warlike
armaments, and speeches are made by prominent
leaders with the object of stirring up the war spirit
of the nation. One day we are on the eve of war
with Russia in China, another day we are all but
in the death-grips with France in the Soudan, and
at some future day we may find ourselves in conflict
with America over the Open Door. The doctrine of
Adam Smith and Richard Cobden is treated as an
exploded superstition. But the time is coming when
its principles will be found to have deep international
significance. What Cobden saw with clear and un
erring vision was that Free Trade, which, as was
seen in the abolition of the Corn Laws, broke down
the monopoly of landowners to the advantage of the
consumer, would, when logically developed, break
down national monopolies in the interest of humanity
as such, apart from purely national distinctions.
And thus, by substituting reciprocity of interests
for antagonism of interests, Free Trade would
render huge armaments as needless between nations182 HERBERT SPENCER
as hostile tariffs. Free Trade, according to Oobden,
was something more than a bringer of cheap food
to the people: it was the application of the moral
law to international affairs by the simple process
of making the interest of consumers all over the
world consist in peaceful industry and the free
spontaneous exchange of the products of their labour
for the common good. Not only is Oobdenism the
practical application to industry of the ethics of
Christianity from the side of economics, but it is
also a potent factor in the development of humanity
on historic lines as interpreted by the Evolution
philosophy. The future of civilisation depends upon
the success with which statesmen grasp the fact
that humanity is drawing a stage nearer the realisa
tion of the ideal of poets and prophets, the ideal of
universal felicity through comradeship resting on the
basis of reciprocity of interests.
Human history, beginning with a sordid struggle
for existence and an ethical code steeped in blood,
ends with a harmonious civilisation resting upon the
all-embracing conception of human brotherhood.
Man and society, no longer at war, are destined to
form one harmonious whole on the basis of recipro
city of service. With the magic wands of Reason,
Science, and Industry, man on the basis of an egoism
which is gradually being transfigured by sympathy,
will yet lay the foundation of a new social order, in
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of conflicting interests and warring passions may be
heard, by those who listen in the spirit of evolu
tionary science, the inspiring tones of the humani
tarian evangel Peace on earth, and goodwill among
men.
To those who have been accustomed to look at
man and society from the old point of view, this
theory of ethical development will be sufficiently
startling. But if the Spencerian theory is true,
there is no escape from the conclusion thatonorality
is a natural product of social evolution. It is the
consequence rather than the cause of progress. No
doubt as society advances the effect in turn becomes
a cause. In a higher state of civilisation morality
is pursued as its own end. Like art and knowledge,
morality becomes detached from utility, and is
pursued for its own sake. From the realities of life
ideals emerge. The artistic genius, enamoured of
his ideals, pursues them without regard to immediate
utility. The philosopher, consumed with a passion
for knowledge, sets at naught the attractions of the
market-place : he follows Truth though the heavens
fall. So, too, with the devotee of goodness. His
mind responds intuitively to high and noble deeds,
and his soul quivers with a subdued delight at the
thought of virtue. In him the experiences of the
race have become organic instincts; he thinks not
of happiness he soars into the ampler air of virtue.
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between happiness and goodness ; he is good because,
thanks to the triumph of morality in the long
ancestral past, his whole being is responsive to
disinterested motives, and thrills with altruistic
fervour. Such men increase the social fund of
morality, and become in their turn potent causes
in social development. In our devotion to general
causes, let us not forget the part played in evolution
by those rare beings who, by the purity of their
lives and the magnetism of their natures, tune the
souls of their fellows to noble issues. As I have
expressed it elsewhere, pleasures and pains are the
fundamental elements of life, but they are no more
to be identified with the ethical fruits of civilisation
than the rose-bush and its fragrance with the soil
at its roots. By means of the subtle chemistry
of Sympathy man purifies the passions of human
nature, and by pressing them into the service of the
ideal, invests them with an ethical purpose which,
when incarnated in the moral pioneers of the race,
becomes fragrant of the divine.CHAPTER XI
THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION
WHAT of religion? Is it also a natural product of the
great evolutionary process? Here we enter upon
a thorny path. The evolutionist who seeks to give
a natural account of religion has to reckon at the
outset with the two antagonists with whom he was
confronted in the ethical arena the Supernaturalist
and the Intuitionalist. The Supernaturalist s con
ception of religion follows naturally from his con
ception of man and his origin. Grant the truth of
the biblical account of man s creation, probation,
and fall, and a highly plausible theory is provided of
man s religious history. In man s original relation
to the Creator we have an explanation of the reli
gious sentiment; and the fall of man abundantly
accounts for the existence of evil which, like a
malevolent being, has ever dogged the footsteps
of humanity.
So true does this theory seem to be to human
experience, that for centuries it did not occur to
thinkers to doubt the authenticity of the biblical
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record. Belief in the record was strengthened
when the Old Testament was bound up with the
history and fortunes of the Jews. Spinoza, in this
as in much else centuries ahead of his time, threw
doubt upon the biblical record ; and since his day,
especially within the last fifty years, the attitude
of thinkers, even within the Church, has undergone
an entire change. By admitting the presence in
the Bible of large slices of legendary matter, the
Higher Critics have knocked away the foundation
of the orthodox theory of religion. Relegate to the
region of myth the supernatural creation of man and
his disobedience, and at once the mind is prepared
for the reception of the evolution theory of the
rise of man. Human misery and wretchedness, no
longer the result of Divine displeasure, become the
natural consequences of man s unequal contest with
his environment. Religion, like ethics, is seen to
be determined by the struggle for existence is, in
short, the intellectual and emotional reflection of
that struggle.
The Intuitionalists, while admitting the break
down of the supernatural theory, refuse to subscribe
to the view that the religious sentiment has no
immovable subjective roots. Many Intuitionalists
opposed supernaturalism on the ground that it failed
to place religion on a rational basis. Rejecting
the dogmas of the fall and original sin, the Intui
tionalists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuriesTHE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 187
fell back upon a supposed natural religion. Great
as are the differences between the Deists of the last
century and the Theists of to-day as represented
by the late Dr. Martineau, they agree in holding
that man is endowed with the capacity of forming
enlightened views of Deity, and of rising by a
process of intuition to a knowledge of, and com
munion with, Deity. In their view, supernaturalism
as held in the Established Churches is a deforma
tion of natural religion. In order to free religion
from its supernatural corruptions, Lord Herbert
published his famous treatise, in which he laboured
to show that Reason when interrogated on rational
principles testified to the universality of belief in
God, moral worship, and a future recompense.
These truths, according to Lord Herbert, shone full
upon primitive man till obscured by the fraud and
deception of priests. The same idea prompted
Locke in his work on The Reasonableness of
Christianity. Christianity, in so far as it was a
supernatural system, was simply the republication
of Natural Religion. Christianity in this view
has introduced nothing new ; it only brought the
original true religion of reason again to light, by
removing the false additions to it ; but it soon
again fell under the same fate of superstitious dis
tortion by mysterious dogmas. As regards their
fundamental positions, John Locke and James
Martineau were at one.188 HERBERT SPENCER
In the sphere of religion, as in philosophy, David
Hume proved a destructive force. He combated
the idea of intuitive religious ideas, just as he com
bated the belief in intuitive intellectual concep
tions. In regard to religion, Hume went beyond
mere theorising ; he justified his attack upon
religious Intuitionalism by his work The Natural
History of Religion. In that work we have a pre
cursor of the evolutionary theory as applied to
religion. According to Hume, religion has its roots
not in the reason but in the passions. Primitive
man was not prompted to worship, as the Deists held,
by feelings of gratitude, wonder, and awe, aroused
by calm contemplation of the works of Nature.
Hume clearly saw that the faculty of contemplation,
and the feelings of gratitude, wonder, and awe, were
products of a high state of civilisation, and could
not exist in primitive man, who was really at the
mercy of his passions and his imagination. In
that case Monotheism was not the oldest form of
religion. The monotheistic conception demanded
a higher type of intellect than early man possessed.
Man s early religion, according to Hume, was not
monotheistic but fetichistic. Ignorance of the
forces of Nature drove primitive man to personify
them, to clothe them with his own qualities greatly
enlarged. In a word, man created God in his own
image.
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man, Hume s sketch of the origin and development
of religion is largely speculative ; but his main posi
tion, that religion takes its rise in the passions rather
than the reason, is amply justified by the Evolution
philosophy. Primitive man was not religious be
cause he was a reasoning contemplative being; he
was driven to religion through ignorance and fear.
From one point of view, indeed, religion is just
another name for primitive man s theory of the
world and of his relation to it a theory, observe,
directly suggested to him by his contest with his
environment. Just as primitive man s economic,
political, and ethical ideals were determined by his
environment, so his religious ideals had a like origin.
To primitive man the environment was in the main
hostile. Nature was as unfriendly as neighbouring
tribes. Ignorant of the laws and forces around him,
primitive man must have lived in terror. How could
he explain those forces except on the supposition
that somehow or other they were manifestations
of intelligences akin to the human, though vastly
transcending it in power. What was the attitude
of primitive man to those overwhelming nature-
forces? Clearly the same in kind, though greatly
differing in degree, as the attitude of man to a
formidable tribesman, chief, or king, namely, the
attitude of abject submission showing itself in
conduct of a propitiatory kind. Out of this grew
all those rites and ceremonies whose object was to190 HERBERT SPENCER
ward off the anger and obtain the favour of the
god.
How did primitive man conceive the mysterious
power or powers which wielded the forces of nature?
According to Mr. Spencer, the gods were deified
ancestors, and the earliest form of the religious senti
ment was ancestor-worship. In his admirable little
book, The Idea of God, Mr. John Fiske thus describes
the Spencerian view of the origin of religion : It
was in accordance with this primitive theory of
things that the earliest form of religious worship
was developed. In all races of men, so far as can
be determined, this was the worship of ancestors.
The other self of the dead chieftain continued after
death to watch over the interests of the tribe, to
defend it against the attack of enemies, to reward
brave warriors, and to punish traitors and cowards.
His favour must be propitiated with ceremonies like
those in which a subject does homage to a living
ruler. If offended by neglect or irreverent treat
ment, defeat in battle, damage by flood or fire,
visitations of famine or pestilence were inter
preted as marks of his anger. Ancestor-worship
when reduced to its psychological root is found to
rest upon primitive man s conceptions of a double
personality. By means of it dreams, swoons,
trances, are explained. What happens in sleep
and unconsciousness ? The hypothesis of the other
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and accounts for the presence in his dreams of
parents, comrades, or enemies known to be dead
and buried. In swoons and trances the other self
is believed to be temporarily absent from the body ;
and at death the soul is believed to have gone to the
ghost-world. It still exercises influence upon its
old environment friendly or hostile according to its
relations with its former associates. In the case of
a departed chief two feelings spring up among the
members of the tribe desire to do him honour,
and a desire to secure his favour. Out of this
spring sacred places. His tomb grows into a
temple, the tomb itself becomes an altar upon
which provisions are placed a custom which is
the germ of religious oblations and festivals.
Closely connected with this are propitiatory sacri
fices as a means of securing the favour and support
of the god in battle.
By what process does ancestor-worship, with its
few simple ceremonies, grow into Polytheism and
Monotheism with their complex institutions, priest
hoods, and ritual ? Religious like ethical sentiments
and ideas are determined by economic necessities
and political structures. The expansion of the
family into the tribe, and the tribe into the kingdom,
leads to an expansion of the religious idea. Here,
as in the economic and political spheres, war has
great influence in moulding the ideas and sentiments
of primitive man. In the words of Mr. Spencer :192 HERBERT SPENCER
* The overrunnings of tribe by tribe and nation by
nation, which have been everywhere and always
going on, have necessarily tended to impose one cult
upon another. Not destroying the worship of the
conquered, the conquerors bring in their own wor
ships either carrying them on among themselves
only, or making the conquered join in them. In
either case the result is a multiplication of deities,
priests, creeds, and rituals. The monotheistic idea
does not evolve till one people either by superi
ority triumphs over all rivals, or where circum
stances, as in the case of the Jews, render the
worship of the tribal deity of such a fanatical
and exclusive nature that no amount of military
pressure can bring them to adopt the religion
and worship the gods of the conquered.
One important fact to be noted in the evolution of
religion is that the characters of the deities are also
determined by the economic environment of the
tribe. Where war is viewed as the natural method
of tribal and national expansion, the deity is repre
sented as favouring the warlike sentiments. The
gods of militarism demand human sacrifice, take
delight in scenes of cruelty, authorise as in the
Old Testament the wholesale slaughter of men,
women, and children. No greater evidence that the
God of the Jews, and of Christianity, is a product of
evolution could be had than the following, from
Deuteronomy xx. 10-18 :
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make no peace with thee, but will make war against
thee, then thou shalt besiege it : and when the Lord
thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou
shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the
sword. . . . But of the cities of these people, which
the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance,
thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth ; but
thou shalt utterly destroy them. How true is it
that man creates God in his own image !
Highly suggestive is the fact that with the change
from militarism to industrialism the character of
the Deity also undergoes a change. Since mankind
grasped the truth that national prosperity was
betteFlfecured by industry than by war, two im
portant results followed : the laws of Nature began
to be studied, and encouragement was given to the
industrial virtues, which favoured peaceful co-opera
tion, as opposed to the militant virtues, which made
for strife. It was no coincidence that Christianity
sprang up during a time when the world was at
peace. The conception of the Deity under the
figure of a Father filled with love and compassion,
who showered his gifts alike on the just and the
unjust, could not possibly have arisen during a time
of tribal or national warfare. It was no coinci
dence either that the sweet and winsome gospel of
Jesus of Nazareth was transformed during the tur
moil of the Middle Ages into a gospel of hate, and
promulgated by means of the thumbscrew, the
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rack, the sword, and the scaffold. Nor is it a
coincidence that to-day, when the war spirit is
rampant, the clergy should be declaring that the
Sermon on the Mount is impracticable, and that the
powder-cart is a more potent factor in spreading
civilisation than the Cross of Christ. So long as
nations act upon the belief that the prosperity of
the one can only be had through the impoverishment
of others, so long will they view war as a necessary
factor in civilisation, and so long will the clergy
worship, not the All-Pitiful Father of Jesus Christ,
but the bellicose tribal deity of the Jews.
In another way Industrialism strikes at the root
of supernaturalism by the rapidity with which
it seizes and popularises the conception of law.
The primitive theory of the Universe rests upon
the idea of the miraculous. Truth was sought
not by observation but by divination ; prosperity
was the result not of industry but of war, tempered
with faith in the god of battles ; disease was not
the result of breach of Nature s laws, but of spiritual
possession. In such an atmosphere Industrialism
could not possibly thrive; and accordingly we find
that when man began to turn his attention to
pacific industry, study of Nature took the place of
fantastic theorisings about extra-mundane exist
ences, and activities which previously were lost
in the quicksands of superstition were turned in
the fruitful direction of intellectual progress and
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between the decline of the theological spirit and
the rise of the humanitarian spirit. In its early
days Theology embraced in its sweep all phases of
human activity Politics, Industry, Art, Science, and
Philosophy. The result was the stagnation of the
human intellect and the hardening of the human
heart. Even at its best the theological ideal as it
affects society cannot compare with the humanitarian
ideal. It is far more important, as Diderot has
remarked, to work for the prevention of misery
than to multiply places of refuge for the miserable.
The place hitherto occupied by Theology will
henceforth be taken by Science. The religious
sentiments will no longer be under the guidance of a
theory of life which, under all its transformations, is
identical at root with the ancestor-worship of primi
tive man. Science will increase rather than diminish
the feelings of wonder, awe, and humility, which
are the real roots of religious emotion, and so long
as this is the case, man need not fear .that with
the decay of Theology a blight will fall upon the
earth. The religious sentiment, so long distorted
by Theology, is made up of two distinct feelings
a feeling of relationship with Nature, as expressed
by Wordsworth, which the Evolution philosophy
has greatly intensified, and a deep sense of the
unity, trustworthiness, and beneficence of the great
cosmic forces. Now as of old it is true that under
neath the righteous are the everlasting arms.CHAPTER XII
THE PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT OP SPENCERISM
So far, the Spencerian theory has been presented on
the purely scientific side as a philosophy of the
Cosmos. In dealing with the knowable, Mr. Spencer s
great aim has been to frame into one all-compre
hensive generalisation the separate generalisations
of Science; in other words, to trace from star to
soul the working of one universal evolutionary pro
cess, scientifically interpretable in terms of Force.
For purposes of convenience, phenomena are divided
into astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, and
sociologic, but through these divisions one process
holds sway. While the Cosmos as a whole is evolv
ing from simplicity to complexity, by successive
integrations and differentiations, the parts are also
subject to the same law of evolution. So under
stood, says Mr. Spencer, evolution becomes not
one in principle only, but in fact. But man is not
satisfied with positive knowledge. For practical
purposes science suffices, but no sooner has the
philosophic mind brought phenomena within the
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sweep of mechanical explanations, than it discovers
that Force, which is the last word of science, is far
from being the last word of philosophy. To the
philosopher, Force is but a symbol ; atoms and
energies have only relative validity. What is the
nature of that Reality of which Force is a symbol ?
The Spencerian answer to that question in no way
affects the great evolutionary generalisation as ex
pounded in previous chapters. As remarked in an
earlier portion of this book,
*
Spencerism stands on
its merits as the philosophy of the knowable, and
the only organised body of thought which has its
roots in experience, and is a guide to the under
standing of life theoretically and practically.
Apart from practical life, science has great
intellectual and emotional bearings. Deeper than
purely mechanical interpretations of Nature lie
fundamental questions of thought and being. So
long as man is endowed with intelligence, he
will never cease from attempts to solve the
great Sphinx riddle of existence. Generation
after generation of storm-tossed thinkers have
sighed in vain for a glimpse of the haven of intel
lectual and emotional rest. Oppressed by a sense of
the unfathomable mystery of life, deeply reflective
natures, with Job-like sadness, have been prostrated
in the dust by a feeling of mental helplessness and
moral perplexity. Undismayed by the failure of
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and from Job to Newman, men to-day are as busy as
ever in their attempts to find an answer to the riddle
of the Sphinx. Behind phenomena with their fleet
ingness, is there a permanent Power, and, if so, can
we discover its nature ? Can we ascribe to it per
sonality ? Can science, as interpreted by philosophy,
throw some light upon the great and fundamental
question of purpose ? Have the vast cosmical trans
formations which science reveals a definite signifi
cance ? Is humanity, in the words of Mr. Fiske, a
mere local incident in an endless series of aimless
cosmical changes ? What answer has the Spencerian
philosophy to give to these questions ? In philo
sophy as in science the starting-point of inquiry is
self-consciousness. The evolution of consciousness
has been traced by Mr. Spencer from its earliest
dim manifestations in animal life to its highest
manifestations as cultured intelligence. Here the
task of the scientific evolutionist ends ; but the
philosophic evolutionist must proceed further; he
has to determine, if possible, the nature and limits
of intelligence. Is the mind of man rigidly con
fined to the world of positive verifiable fact, or
does it possess capacities which link it to an extra-
mundane existence ?
Philosophy is rooted in Psychology. The central
question upon which all other questions rest is this :
What is the nature of Knowledge ? Upon Episte-
mology rest Cosmology and Ontology. It is uselessPHILOSOPHIC ASPECT OF SPENCERISM 199
to endeavour to discover the real significance of
the World and Being until we discover the nature
and limits of Knowledge. In differences of psycho
logical theory, all differences among philosophers
take their rise. What, then, is Mr. Spencer s
psychological theory viewed from the standpoint
of philosophy ? The answer to the questions : How
do we know ? How does Knowledge develop ? has
already been given in the chapter dealing with the
Evolution of Mind. The question now is : What
is the nature and limitation of Knowledge ? The
answer to this is involved in the reply to this further
question : What do we know ? To this the Spencerian
reply is : We know things in their relations. This
view is summed up in the phrase Relativity of
Knowledge. Even since Hume s rigorous and some
what sceptical analysis of mind, the idea of the
relativity of human knowledge has held an important
place in philosophical discussions. Kant, whose aim
was to overthrow Hume s Empiricism, placed the
doctrine of Relativity in a stronger position than
ever by his artificial theory of the categories of
knowledge. In his famous essay, Sir William Hamilton
made the relativity of knowledge the basis of his
attack on the Absolute of German philosophers.
*We think in relation, said Hamilton,
* and therefore
by the very nature of the mind we are debarred
from knowledge of the unrelated, the Absolute.
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Hamiltonian position by a careful analysis of the
nature and the development of intelligence. If, as
Mr. Spencer shows, all knowledge is classifying,
obviously our knowledge of one thing is impossible,
except through a knowledge of other things. A
thing is perfectly known only when it is in all
respects like certain things previously observed ;
in proportion to the number of respects in which it is
unlike them is the extent to which it is unknown ;
and hence, when it has absolutely no attribute in
common with anything else, it must be absolutely
beyond the bounds of knowledge.
The doctrine of Relativity is so abundantly in
harmony with science, that it might be left to stand
without further elaboration, were it not that it has
been vigorously attacked in recent years by the
Hegelian school of philosophers. Instead of dwell
ing, with Mr. Spencer, on the inherent relativity of
intelligence, it may be desirable to look at the sub
ject from a different point of view. Not only do we
think in relation, but Nature itself is one huge mass
of relativity. In dealing with Nature, we deal not
with inherent substances but with bundles of rela
tions. The impression which the observer first forms
of Nature is, that it is composed of numerous inde
pendent passive substances which are energised by
independent forces. Of the actual existence of
Matter as an independent substance, the observer
entertains no doubt. Matter is supposed to exist inPHILOSOPHIC ASPECT OP SPENCERISM 201
three forms solid, liquid, and gaseous each with its
different properties, to which the individuality of
objects is supposed to be due. The atomic theory
is based upon the idea of Matter as made up of sub
stances incomprehensively small, to whose properties
and combinations the complexity of the Cosmos is due.
Let us examine the so-called properties of atoms.
That hardness is a property of the atom is not
doubted by the man of science. But what is hard
ness? It is not a property at all it is a relation.
Hardness is simply the measure of the
* resistance
offered to the separation of molecules from one
another. Obviously, there is no sense in talking of
hardness in a single atom. Again, we cannot con
ceive of atoms apart from colour of some kind. But
what is colour ? Is it a property of matter ? Colour
is not a property of matter ; it is due to certain
vibratory motions in the atoms, and is related to
the rate of energy. If all substances were at
absolute zero in temperature, there would be no
vibratory motions, and consequently no colour. Sub
stance itself would be invisible. The same holds
good of inertia, mass, heat the primary as well
as the secondary properties which are no longer
viewed as properties but as conditions of matter.
Matter is not a thing but a state, and except in
relation has no existence. No force in Nature can
be isolated from other forces. As has been said,
* What we call solids, liquids, and gases, with all the202 HERBERT SPENCER
laws that belong to each of them, are simply the
relations of heat-energy to groups of atoms, not the
properties or laws that may be asserted of atoms as
such. Nature resolves itself into a scene of unvarying
activity, and what appear to us to be distinct exist
ences, isolated and independent, are really relative
conditions of that activity. For this view of Nature
we are indebted to the theory of the conservation and
transformation of Forces which on the philosophic
side rests on the view that Nature is not an assem
blage of existences, but a bundle of forces whose
existences are known to us by the relative states
in which they manifest themselves. Helmholtz
expresses the dynamic conception of Nature when
he says, Every property or quality of a thing is in
reality nothing but its capability of producing certain
effects on other things. Stallo, in his book Con
cepts of Modern Physics, sums up the new view
which has emerged from the doctrine of the conser
vation and transformation of Forces as follows:
The real existence of things is co-extensive with
their qualitative and quantitative determinations,
and both are in their nature relations, quality result
ing from mutual action, and quantity being simply a
ratio between terms neither of which is absolute.
Every objectively real thing is thus a term in a
numberless series of mutual implications, and forms
of reality beyond these implications are as unknown
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material quality, no absolute material substance, no
absolutely physical unit, no absolutely simple physi
cal entity, no absolute physical constant, no
absolute standard, either of quantity or quality.
There is no form of material existence which is
either its own support or its own measure, and
which abides either quantitatively or qualitatively
otherwise than in perpetual change in an unceasing
flow of mutations. And thus what Mr. Spencer
finds to be true of mind, that it works on the prin
ciple of Relativity, science also finds to be true of
the Cosmos, where Relativity reigns supreme.
How do the Hegelians get their Absolute ? They
quarrelled with Hamilton for making the Absolute
equivalent to pure identity, an abstraction of the
intellect, an absolute unit which the Hegelians have
no difficulty in showing cannot possibly exis*. The
quarrel of the Hegelians with Hamilton and Spencer
is that they identify the Absolute with something
out of relation, and then declare that the Absolute
is unknowable because they have placed it outside
the arena of knowledge. The Absolute as the nega
tion of all relation is an absurdity it cannot be
known, because if it exists it exists out of relation
to thought. How, then, do the Hegelians conceive
the Absolute ? Not as the negation of relations, but
as the unification of relations. With Hegel the
Absolute is not a barren identity, a sterile unity, but
a unity reached through differences. The Absolute,204 HERBERT SPENCER
according to Hegel, is an identity which manifests
itself through distinctions. Now what, after all, is
Hegel s Absolute but simply another name for the
totality of cosmic relations ? Hegel does not place
the Absolute on one side and the Relative on the
other. Viewing the Universe as a whole, and com
bining in thought process and product, lie calls the
result the Absolute. His system rests upon the
relativity of thought and being, but by laying hold
of the ideas of reciprocity and development, and
looking at the process in its totality, Hegel makes
Nature an absolute unity manifesting itself in per
petual differences. Hegel s system differs from
Materialism simply in making logic instead of
matter, the idea instead of the atom, the starting-
point. Strip Hegelism of its misty phraseology, and
its Absolute is no other than the Relative with its
roots in human experience and human thought. As
against Hamilton s notion of the Absolute, Hegel s
polemic was highly effective ; but reduced to its ulti
mate analysis, his Absolute differs in no essential from
Spencer s doctrine of Relativity. Where Spencer
contents himself with tracing the evolution and
defining the limits of self-consciousness, Hegel deifies
the logical process and calls it God.
If, then, we can only know things in their rela
tions, the question immediately emerges What do
we know of things ? How does the world stand
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really what it seems ? A partial answer has been
given by the insight which is obtained of the
Universe when discussing the relativity of know
ledge. The world is not what it seems, an assem
blage of independent things composed of substances
with their respective properties. The multiform
energies of Nature are reducible to one form of
activity protean in its manifestations. The
phenomena of Nature are due not to the combined
action of numerous agents endowed with substance
and acted upon by powers, but to the ceaseless
transformations of Force or Energy. As James
Hinton expresses it in one of his suggestive chapters
on Nature : We are obliged to think of the forces as
one, because, in fact, they will not remain distinct.
We cannot practically isolate any one of them,
except for some special and temporary purpose : it
is constantly escaping from us and passing off into
other forms. Motion resolves itself in sound and
heat ; heat flies off in motion, in chemical or electric
change ; electricity is lost in sparks of light, in
magnetism, in mechanical disruptions, in the pro
duction of chemical power ; chemical power no
sooner acts than it is no more chemical, and must
be recognised in explosions, in electric currents, in
heat. No force can be permanently retained ; if we
need to preserve any one, we must perpetually
generate it afresh. Nor can we isolate any of the
forces from the rest in our thought of Nature, any206 HERBERT SPENCER
more than in our operations upon her. To do so
would be for the intellect to choose unreason ; to
create disorder where order reigns. We should be
perpetually losing our force without reason, and
finding it reappear without necessity. We can
only follow one, by recognising the essential
sameness of them all. . . . Owing to the limited
capacity of our senses, which only perceive a few
of the multitudinous processes which are really
taking place in Nature, we continually lose the
chain of her operations. Its links are ever passing
out of the sphere of our perception ; and, reappear
ing at a distant spot or point of time, they produce
on us the impression of original and disconnected
actions. From this cause from this imperfection
of our senses arose the false conception of the
various forces as distinct existences or causes;
from this cause it was, that that false conception
so long maintained its sway. If our sense had been
penetrating enough to follow the entire course of
Nature s action, and to recognise it in every shape,
that thought never could have arisen. And thus it
is that reason sets it aside, by supplementing sense,
and teaching us to recognise the existence of that
which we cannot see. By tracing the strict chain
of causation throughout Nature, it substitutes un
varying activity for imaginary agents. . . . Nor
can we better picture the activity of Nature to our
minds, than by conceiving it as a vast, even a limit-PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT OF SPENCERISM 207
less, multitude of vibrations a rush and whirl, a
maze, of actions to and fro ; shifting their place,
changing their mode, yielding to each other, modified
and altered in endless ways ; ceasing and recom
mencing in every quarter ; with nothing constant
but that the exactness of the balance be maintained.
Is the conception of Force as the fundamental
fact of the Universe philosophically satisfying?
Many critics have assumed that Mr. Spencer is
a Materialist, because his system is founded upon
the persistence of Force, overlooking the fact that
Mr. Spencer, when viewing the Cosmos from the
side of philosophy, distinctly states that Force is
not the ultimate Reality, but simply the symbol
of that Reality. To make Force the ultimate
Reality would be to do violence to the principle
of relativity, which forbids the reduction of the
Universe to a unit. Unity and duality are relative
conceptions, and therefore all materialistic theories,
whether resting upon a static or dynamic concep
tion the Atomic theory or the theory of Energy
are ruled out of court. Mr. Spencer s theory of
the world grows naturally and logically out of his
Psychology. True to his doctrine of the relativity
of knowledge, Mr. Spencer recognises that Force,
though a scientific ultimate, has only a relative
value as a philosophic explanation, inasmuch as the
idea of Force is derived from our muscular activity.
On this point he is quite explicit. In First208 HERBERT SPENCER
Principles, at the conclusion of the chapter,
* The
Persistence of Force, Mr. Spencer says :
4
But, now,
what is the force of which we predicate persistence ?
It is not the force we are immediately conscious of
in our own muscular efforts, for this does not persist.
. . . By the persistence of Force, we really mean
the persistence of some Cause which transcends
our knowledge and conception. In asserting it we
assert an Unconditioned Reality, without beginning
or end. Similarly, in the concluding chapter, Mr.
Spencer states his position thus : Over and over
again it has been shown, in various ways, that the
deepest truths we can reach are simply statements
of the widest uniformities in our experience of the
relations of Matter, Motion, and Force are but
symbols of the unknown Reality. A power of which
the nature remains for ever inconceivable, and to
which no limits in time or space can be imagined,
works in us certain effects. . . . The interpretation
of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and
Force is nothing more than the reduction of our
complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols ;
and when the equation has been brought to its lowest
terms, the symbols remain symbols still. What com
pels us to treat Force, not as the ultimate Reality,
but as a symbol ? The theory of the relativity of
knowledge. In the words of James Hinton : What
ever be that secret activity in Nature of which
all the &quot;forces&quot; are exhibitions to our senses, weknow one thing respecting it, namely, that it is not
force. Force is a sensation of our own, and is no
more to be attributed to the objects in connection
with which we feel it than are the brightness of a
colour or the sweetness of a taste. . . . The feeling
from which we derive the idea of force rests upon a
consciousness of difficulty, of opposition, of imperfect
ability. It arises from resisted effort. In fact, it is
our own imperfection we ascribe to Nature when
we imagine that our feeling of force truly represents
its working.
The Spencerian philosophical attitude to the great
problem is summed up in the concluding words of
his
* Ecclesiastical Institutions : But one truth
must grow ever clearer the truth that there is an
Inscrutable Existence everywhere manifested, to
which we can neither find nor conceive beginning
or end. Amid the mysteries which become the more
mysterious the more they are thought about, there
will remain the one absolute certainty that he [the
philosopher] is ever in presence of an Infinite and
Eternal Energy from which all things proceed.
Thus the Spencerian philosophy shades into religion,
and finds expression in the note of interrogation
of Zophar, the Naamathite, the friend of Job :
* Canst thou by searching find out God ? Canst
thou find out the Almighty unto perfection ?CHAPTER XIII
THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF SPENCERISM
THAT the negative attitude of the Spencerian
philosophy towards religion should give great dis
satisfaction was only what was to be expected.
The human mind is not easily reconciled to an
attitude of suspense. Theologians challenged the
views of Mr. Spencer on historical and religious
grounds. They dissented from his evolutionary
sketch of religion as originating in ancestor-worship,
and they repudiated his conclusion that man s re
ligious conceptions and aspirations are ineffective
attempts to solve the insoluble, and have no objec
tive validity. Idealistic philosophers, on the other
hand, combated Spencerism on the ground that
his religious negativism had its root in a defective
psychology. If mind is chained to experience, if
the senses are the only inlets of knowledge, there
can be no pathway to the supernatural except by
miraculous interposition, of which Idealistic philo
sophers are not enamoured. Clearly, if the super-
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natural was to be saved from the blight of nega
tivity, it could only be by a new analysis of the
mind in order to discover principles transcending
experience. Of course, by this method Christianity
as a revealed religion could not hope to be vindicated.
Indeed the Idealist philosophers had no wish to
come to the rescue of the religion of the churches.
Hegelians, as a school, have turned their backs upon
popular supernaturalism. Their aim rather has been
to give a philosophical basis to Theism as opposed
to Agnosticism.
The position of the Idealists has been stated thus :
* There is something more in the world of experi
ence than a mere succession of sense-data. Sense-
experience sets the mind to working on its own
account, and causes it to deliver itself of truths
which are not contained in any of our actual experi
ences or in all of them together, but which extend
over a wider ground than experience can possibly
cover. The theory of innate ideas is no longer
held. The new view rather is that the mind is
possessed of innate capacities, the power of
assimilating and interpreting sense - data. Con
sciousness, say the Idealists, cannot at once be
the product and the interpreter of experience.
Self-consciousness, according to the Neo-Kantians,
is impossible except on the assumption that in the
mind there exists a unifying spiritual principle
which, so to speak, sits at the loom of Time and212 HERBERT SPENCER
weaves the isolated unrelated threads of experience
into an organised coherent whole.
Have we not here an illustration of the tendency
of the mind to which attention has already been
called that of personifying the processes of Nature,
of converting the final product into an initial, all-
controlling agent? Just as Idealistic biologists
explained life - processes by means of an entity
called the Vital Force, so Idealistic psychologists
postulate an entity called the Self-conscious Prin
ciple as the primary agent in converting sense-data
into Knowledge. These philosophers fall into their
mistake through neglect of the great fact of rela
tivity upon which Nature and Consciousness alike
depend. They assume that Mind and Matter exist
as separate independent entities, whereas they are
simply relative existences. The one apart from
the other is unthinkable. We know nothing of Mind
apart from Matter, and nothing of Matter apart
from Mind. As Professor Seth Pringle Pattison
has admirably pointed out :
* The ultimate fact of
knowledge is neither pure subject nor pure object,
neither a mere sense nor a mere ego, but an ego or
subject conscious of sensations. It is not a mere
unity, but a unity in duality. For purposes of
analysis philosophers distinguish between the sub
ject and the object, but when they forget that the
distinction is purely logical and has no counterpart
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abstraction as a concrete reality, they are guilty of
the scholastic error of constructing the world out
of universals. This is exactly the error into which
Professor Green fell. Proceeding on the assumption
that consciousness is not the result of the action and
interaction of matter and mind, but is the work of
a single spiritual principle, Professor Green bridges
the gulf which separates the human and the divine
by identifying this Spiritual Principle with the
universal or divine self-consciousness. In his hands
human consciousness, which he elevated to the rank
of an entity, becomes a reproduction in the human
organism of the eternal complete self-consciousness.
Thus at one stroke the process of knowledge in the
mind is transformed into an agent. By personify
ing knowledge Professor Green reaches the concep
tion of an eternal Knower who sustains the world,
and who reproduces himself in the mind of man.
Let us see to what this attempt to secure a
Theistic ground for the universe leads. &quot;What sup
port does religion get from the Neo-Kantian and
Hegelian attempts to identify human consciousness
with an eternal complete self-consciousness ?
* From
a world of spirits to a supreme Spirit, says Pro
fessor Ward, is a possible step. On this line of
advance, Idealists like Green and Ward hope to
secure a basis for Natural Theology. The great
difficulty which faces Idealism is the problem of
personality. The basis of the system is the identity214 HERBERT SPENOER
of the human and the divine self-consciousness.
Now human self-consciousness is the product of two
factors, the Ego and the Non-Ego. We cannot
think of self-consciousness as a unity ; it is a unity
in duality. It manifests itself through a constant
reduction of differences to identity. Can we con
ceive of a divine self-consciousness working by
analogous methods ? Manifestly if the two forms
of self-consciousness are the same in kind, if the
human is a reproduction of the divine, God must be,
like man, a thinking, feeling, progressive Intelli
gence. Hegel saw this difficulty, and boldly repre
sented Deity as the product of evolution ! Lotze,
who opposed Hegelism, approached the problem from
another point, but when he came to deal with the
question of divine personality, he was intellectually
stranded. Deal with generalities after the fashion
of Green and Ward, claim a monopoly of intellectual
haziness, and antagonistic views can live in the mind
comfortably enough together, but bring them into
the daylight of analysis, and the unity of Idealistic
Theism is seen to be the unity of a landscape in a fog.
How true is this may be seen by the shifts to which
Lotze is driven to render intelligible his conception
of a divine personality. In his History of Modern
Philosophy, Dr. Hoffding thus discusses the theistic
position of Lotze : Lotze conceives the world-prin
ciple as an Absolute Personality, and he defends the
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Absolute Being as follows: The Absolute Being
must be personal, because personality alone possesses
inner independence and originality, while the con
cept of personality only finds imperfect realisation
in finite beings who are dependent on external con
ditions. Lotze, it is true, admits that a personal life
involves resistance to be overcome and the faculty
of suffering and receiving as well as of working.
But if it is asked, How can an Absolute Being, sub
ject to no limitations, suffer? Lotze answers that
the feeling of the Deity must be set in motion by
the inner happenings of its own creative imagina
tion ! But it is a great question whether such a
self-created opposition can have any serious signific
ance, especially since it can at any moment be
destroyed at will. Personalities, as we know them,
at least have to fight against barriers which are
neither self-created nor easily set aside ; the analogy
on which Lotze builds, therefore, seems to break
down at the critical point. Moreover, according to
the most probable interpretation of his confused and
hesitating utterances on the subject, Lotze diverges
from Weisse in holding that the form of time is not
applicable to the Absolute Being ; a personal being
which does not develop in time, a timeless life and
a timeless suffering and working these are concepts
which make too great demands on our power of
drawing analogies
!
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ness to a divine self-consciousness by means of the
principle of psychological identity lands us in be
wildering contradictions. Abolish the idea of an
environment and you abolish the exciting cause of
man s psychical nature his reason, his feelings, his
will. But for God the Uncreated, the Eternal,
there can be no environment, and consequently
there can be no need for what is understood by
reason, feeling, and will, which are all marks of
imperfection, and have their root in biological
phenomena. God the all-Perfect, the all-Knowing,
cannot be conceived as reaching knowledge through
a process of reasoning, and as little can He be
conceived as loving and sorrowing, which are
distinctive marks of finiteness. Considerations
such as these led Spinoza to empty his conception
of Deity of all anthropomorphic qualities. In his
view, to make the term God embrace the concep
tion of a magnified human personality, and of the
Uncreated, the Unrelated, the Eternal One, was as
illogical as to embrace under the term dog the
barking animal of that name and the dog-star,
Sirius.
The same considerations led Mr. Spencer, in defining
his philosophical attitude towards Theism, to write
as follows :
* To believe in a divine consciousness
men must refrain from thinking what is meant by
consciousness must stop short with verbal pro
positions ; and propositions which they are debarredI
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from rendering into thoughts will more and more
fail to satisfy them. Of course like difficulties
present themselves when the will of God is spoken
of. So long as we refrain from giving a definite
meaning to the word will, we may say that it is
possessed by the Cause of All Things as readily as
we may say that love of approbation is possessed
by a circle ; but when from the words we pass to
the thoughts they stand for, we find that we can
no more unite in consciousness the terms of the one
proposition than we can those of the other. Who
ever conceives any other will than his own must do
so in terms of his own will, which is the sole will
directly known to him, all other wills being only
inferred. But will, as each is conscious of it, pre
supposes a motive, a prompting desire of some kind.
Absolute indifference excludes the conception of
will. Moreover will, as implying a prompting
desire, connotes some end contemplated as one to
be achieved, and ceases with the achievement of it ;
some other will referring to some other end taking
its place. That is to say, will like emotion neces
sarily supposes a series of states of consciousness.
The conception of a divine will, derived from that
of the human will, involves, like it, localisation in
space and time. The willing of each end excludes
from consciousness for an interval the willing of
other ends
; and therefore is inconsistent with that
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out an infinity of ends. It is the same with the
ascription of intelligence. Not to dwell on the
seriality and limitation implied as before, we may
note that intelligence, as alone conceivable by us,
presupposes existences independent of it and objec
tive to it. It is carried on in terms of changes
primarily wrought by alien activities the impres
sions generated by things beyond consciousness, and
the ideas derived from such impressions. To speak
of an intelligence which exists in the absence of all
such alien activities, is to use a meaningless word.
If to the corollary that the First Cause, considered
as intelligent, must be continually affected by in
dependent objective activities, it is replied that
these have become such by act of creation, and
were previously included in the First Cause, then
the reply is that in such case the First Cause could,
before this creation, have had nothing to generate
in it such changes as those constituting what we
call intelligence, and must therefore have been
unintelligent at the time when intelligence was
most called for. Hence it is clear that the intelli
gence ascribed answers in no respect to that
which we know by the name. It is intelligence
out of which all the characters constituting it
have vanished.
Suppose we accept as valid the Idealistic con
ception of a supreme self-conscious principle as
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the relation to it of the human self-consciousness.
Consciousness in man, according to Idealism, is the
highest form in which existence appears. Apart
from the Supreme Spiritual Principle, man has no
existence. He is the incarnation under imperfect
physical conditions of the Supreme Principle. What
guarantee is there that this physically conditioned
consciousness will exist as an entity after the break
up of material conditions? There is no more
guarantee in the case of Idealism than in the case
of Materialism. No thinker of any note now defends
Materialism. Sun-worship, indeed, is a more digni
fied attitude towards the Cosmos than atom-worship,
and prostration before the soul of the Universe is
more creditable to the savage than deification of
ether. To what were the vagaries of materialistic
scientists due? They were due to the neglect,
common to men of science, of philosophic thinking.
Materialists were entirely unaware of the fact that
not one step can be taken in scientific generalisation
without the aid of certain all-embracing categories
of thought. Philosophy has got past the stage of
viewing the Universe as made up of an infinite
number cf isolated particulars, or even as the out
come of one material force. To the highest philo
sophy of the day, the Universe is an organic unity.
According to Idealism this cannot be mechanical.
It can only be likened to one thing the spiritual
principle in man. For all practical purposes, however,220 HERBERT SPENCER
it signifies little whether mind is the temporary
embodiment of a Spiritual Principle or a specialised
form of Matter. In either case man is a bubble
on the great stream of time. We may discourse of
the bubble in the language of poetry or of science ;
the result is the same absorption in the universal.
Idealism equally with Materialism leaves man a
prisoner in the hands of necessity. The only differ
ence is that while Materialism puts round the
prisoner s neck a plain unpretentious noose, Ideal
ism adds fringes and embroidery. Materialism, in
plain blunt language, passes sentence of death, while
Idealism indulges in a poetic funeral oration.
The conclusion that Idealism affords no resting-
place for the religious instincts and aspirations of
man is forcing itself upon the more thoughtful of
orthodox theologians. Thus we find Professor
Iverach in a review of the late Principal Caird s
last work, writing as follows : Idealism starts from
the self, and strives to interpret the experience
of the self. Our thought constitutes the world we
know and live in. It exists for us in thinkable
relations, and it is easy to prove this, as is done in
the book before us, that
&quot;
this constant amidst the
variable, not given by them but above them, is
something which sense does not and cannot pro
vide is, and can only be, the self-conscious, spiritual
self, the unifying, constitutive power of thought.&quot;
From the self-conscious, spiritual self, idealismI
RELIGIOUS ASPECT OP SPENCERISM 221
swiftly proceeds on its way to the conclusion that
as for the world in which this self-conscious self
lives and moves the self is necessary, so for the
universe of things and persons an absolute self-
consciousness, a constitutive power of thought, is
necessary. As the objective world of the self is
in relation to the self, so the universe is the objec
tive of the absolute self. If the world is cast into
the life of God, if the world is regarded as the other
of God, one may strive as he may, but he cannot
avoid the path which leads swiftly to pantheism.
Conscious of the weakness of Idealism, other ex
pounders of Theism, such as Professor Fraser, the
well-known editor of Berkeley, attack the problem
from another point of view. In Professor Fraser s
Gifford lectures there are no sleight-of-hand
methods of the Hegelian type. The difficulties in
the way of Theism are fairly faced. The Pro
fessor covers a large piece of historical and
critical ground, in which he deals with Hume,
Spinoza, Hegel, Spencer. Against all the argu
ments drawn from philosophy and from contempla
tion of the evils of life, the Professor puts faith in
the goodness and omnipotence of God a position
he takes up as the only way to give a rational
meaning to life, and to ward off pessimistic despair.
When we come to analyse the Professor s reasoning
and study his results critically, we are surprised at
the slender foundations upon which his Theistic222 HERBERT SPENCER
structure rests. When the average man thinks of
God, he thinks of Him as a Person who can be moved
by appeals, and who possesses in infinite degree tne
best qualities of the best men. This conception of
Deity lies at the root of the belief in miracles and
revelation. Take away, or render pale and shadowy,
the idea of personality, or tie the hands of Deity
with the ropes of physical necessity and invariability
of law, and at once the average man ceases to be inter
ested in Theism, and hands it over to the philosopher.
If Professor Fraser wishes to give vitality to Theism,
lie must bring into relief the idea of personality. If
the God of philosophic thought is not personal in
the understood sense of the term, philosophic Theism
comes perilously near Agnosticism. Let us listen
to Professor Fraser on this decisive point of person
ality: The &quot;personality&quot; of God need not mean
that the Being adumbrated in Nature and Man is
embodied and individual self-conscious life, like the
human that God is organised and extended, as man
now is or omnipresent as in sensuous imagination ;
or that God has a conscious experience, that is
subject like ours to change of conscious state. . . .
Personality in man, moreover, implies memory ; but
we are not bound to suppose that the religious
conception of the universe implies memory in the
Perfect Person with whom all experience brings
us into constant intercourse. Also a human intelli
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of human persons ; but it does not follow that the
Perfect Person who speaks to us in the universe of
Nature and Man must be conscious of deducing con
clusions from premises, or of generalising under
conditions of inductive calculation. The &quot;personality
of God&quot; is a formula which implies that, in relation
to us or at the human point of view the Universal
Power, manifested in nature and in man, must be
regarded at last ethically, not physically therefore
as an imperfectly conceived Person, not as an im
perfectly conceived Thing. After all, we do not get
much beyond the conclusions reached by David Hume
and Herbert Spencer. In his dialogues on religion,
Hume admits that in the agency discoverable in
the world we trace the operation of qualities akin
to those we know as human. Spencer, too, admits
that the Power of which all phenomena are mani
festations may be more readily conceived under
mental than material symbols. With Hume and
Spencer, Professor Eraser admits the impossibility of
finding God by the cognitive process, and stumbles
at the difficulties of reconciling the existence of
evil with divine personality. What is the note
which differentiates this view from Agnosticism?
He falls back upon faith in the conception that the
world is so framed as to give man in the long-run
rational and emotional satisfaction. The question
at once arises In matters of fundamental import
ance are the dictates of the heart more authoritative224 HERBERT SPENCER
than the conclusions of the head? Are man s
aspirations the measure of Nature s possibilities?
Or is it the duty of man to make his aspirations
conform to Nature s actualities ? To these questions
all mythologies and theologies give one answer ;
science and critical philosophy give another.
Professor Fraser declares for Theism as the only
breakwater to pessimism. If there is not a Deity for
man to trust, and a future existence for man to ex
pect, life must be declared a despairful tangle. Now,
before Theism gives an optimist flavour to human
thought, something would need to be known of the
nature of the future existence postulated by Pro
fessor Fraser. There is nothing captivating in the
thought of a prolongation of life, apart from its value
and conditions. The Greeks believed in life after
death, but they got little satisfaction out of their
creed, because of the dreariness of their conceptions.
Who, again, can rest satisfied with the conception
of immortality embodied in Calvinism ? Who would
not prefer the annihilation of the entire human race
to a future in which a few revelled in heavenly bliss,
while the vast majority endured for ever the pangs
of Tophet ? To assume, therefore, as Theists do, that
the bare expectation of life after death is a consol
ing thought, is to go in the teeth of history and
human nature. In order to find a resting-point for
his optimism, the Theist must declare for the neces
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against the Theist by simply asking whether it is
reasonable to suppose that the great question of
man s destiny would be left to vague surmisings
and melancholy musings. Professor Fraser feels
the force of this consideration. No doubt he realises
the fact that when once the miraculous element is
introduced, the question enters the historical sphere,
where again Hume meets us with his formidable
essay on miracles. Speculative philosophy will help
us little in dealing with Hume. Light, if it comes,
will come from a deeper study of history, keener
scientific penetration into the nature and purpose
of life, and a more exhaustive psychological study
of man. Already science, when reduced to its last
analysis, supplies a rational basis for the belief in a
mysterious, awe-inspiring Power, and fosters a sense
of dependence on that Power. It remains to be
seen whether science, as interpreted by philosophy,
can throw some light upon the great and funda
mental question of purpose. Already science, in
the form of the Evolution theory, has lightened
the burden of this question, so far as this earthly
scene is concerned. The problem of evil and pain
is not so formidable to us as it was to Hume. We
are discovering significance in the earthly drama.
A reverential Agnosticism does not preclude the
hope that in the future man may secure for himself
an harmonious conception of the world and human
destiny, by means of which he will no longer find
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himself an orphan wandering in a dreary wilderness,
but the heir of all the ages, the interpreter of
Nature and co-worker with the Eternal.
Whatever the future has in store for philosophy,
one prediction may confidently be made, that humanity
will owe to Herbert Spencer an everlasting debt of
gratitude. Forty years ago he set himself a colossal
task. He resolved to give to the world a new system
of philosophy. Ill-health dogged the footsteps of the
philosopher all through the long spell of years, and
at times it seemed as if the Synthetic Philosophy
would be left an unfinished monument of splendid
audacity. Handicapped by ill-health, uncheered by
popular sympathy, unrewarded by the reading public,
Herbert Spencer went his lonely way with a courage
akin to heroism. Now he sees his task completed.
Only those who have been privileged with Mr.
Spencer s friendship fully know the difficulties with
which he had to battle, and can estimate the victory
he has won. Many thinkers in the flush of opening
manhood have conceived great systems of thought,
and entered upon far-reaching projects. But too
often the glow of intellectual enthusiasm has died
away in presence of the daily drudgery of lonely
toil. Even those who get beyond the Ooleridgean
stage of weaving philosophic dreams, find their ideal
receding as they get entangled in the pleasures,
anxieties, and ambitions of Vanity Fair. Herbert
Spencer has refused to soil his robes in VanityI
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Fair. He has treated the baubles of the passing
hour with philosophic indifference. Into old age
he has carried the intellectual vigour of youth,
and the mellow wisdom of ripe manhood. He has
never wavered in his devotion to the great interpre
tative and constructive ideas with which his name is
associated ; and thus the reader has the rare pleasure
of studying a system of thought which, from start
to finish, breathes the spirit of continuity. There
are no gaps to fill in ; the various volumes hang on
* First Principles like golden beads upon a golden
string. Herbert Spencer may rest from his labours
with the proud consciousness that with his own right
hand he has carved his path from obscurity to a
philosophic throne. He now stands among the
sceptred immortals.
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